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Abstract
This dissertation consists of three essays on information and interactive knowledge in game
theory. In the first essay, we study how a consensus emerges in a finite population of
rational individuals who are asymmetrically informed about the realization of the true state
of the world. Agents observe a private signal about the state and then start exchanging
messages. Generalizing previous models of rational dialogues, we dispense with the standard
assumption that the state space is either finite or a probability space. We show that a class
of rational dialogues can be found that always lead to consensus provided that three main
conditions are met. First, everybody must be able to send messages to everybody else, either
directly or indirectly. Second, communication must be reciprocal. Finally, agents need to
have the opportunity to participate in dialogues of transfinite length.
In the second essay, we provide a syntactic construction of correlated equilibrium. For
any finite game, we study how players coordinate their play on a signal by means of a public
strategy whose instructions are expressed in some natural language. Language can be am-
biguous in that different players may assign different truth values to the very same formula in
the same state of the world. We show that, absent any ambiguity, self-enforcing coordination
always induces a correlated equilibrium of the underlying game. When language ambiguity
is allowed, self-enforcing coordination strategies induce subjective correlated equilibria. Our
analysis provides a justification for heterogeneous beliefs in strategic play.
In the final essay, we study the problem of a Sender who wants to persuade a two-
member committee to take a certain action. Contrary to previous models, we assume that
the Sender is uncertain about committee members’ preference parameters. We provide a
full characterization of the Sender’s optimal persuasion strategy in two different contexts.
In the first case, the Sender is allowed to elicit information by asking committee members
to report their preference types. In the second, the Sender is not allow to do so. We show
how the Sender’s optimal persuasion strategy depends on the prior probability distribution
over preference types. If the prior is informative enough, the Sender may find it optimal to
persuade only a strict subset of type profiles. Finally, we show that uncertainty always entails




I owe many thanks to the people who have helped in the preparation of this dissertation.
My supervisor Hannu Vartiainen has played an indispensable role throughout the entire
process. During many conversations over the last five years, I have had the opportunity
to appreciate and benefit form his generosity, curiosity, and deep knowledge of economic
theory. He has helped me to think better, more clearly, and he has always been encouraging
along the way. I am grateful for how much I have learned from him. I wish to thank the
preliminary examiners Hannu Salonen and Mark Voorneveld. Their careful reading of the
manuscript and their detailed comments and suggestions have significantly improved this
dissertation. I also thank Mark Voorneveld for accepting with enthusiasm to act as the
opponent in my public examination. Many thanks to Klaus Kultti for reading my work,
providing helpful feedback on it, and for several enjoyable conversations on academic and
non-academic matters. I wish to thank Juuso Välimäki for having introduced me to the
literature on Bayesian persuasion and for his constructive comments on my work. I also
thank the discussants and participants in the workshops of the Finnish Doctoral Programme
in Economics and in several other conferences in Finland and abroad for their suggestions
and thought-provoking questions.
Venturing into the intellectual inquiries of academic research is impossible without the
prosaic comfort of money. I thank the Faculty of Social Sciences of the University of Helsinki
and the OP Group Research Foundation for generously funding my doctoral studies. I also
benefited from the Chancellor’s travel grant and travel grants from the Doctoral School in
Humanities and Social Sciences.
Finally, I wish to thank all my friends and colleagues at Economicum, especially Olena
Izhak, Sara Yi Zheng, Yin Ming, and Min Zhu. Their kindness and laid-back attitude have






1.1 The framework . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.1 Interactive epistemology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
1.1.2 Information design . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.2 Contribution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.3 Summary of the Essays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.1 Chapter 2: Learning to agree over large state spaces . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.3.2 Chapter 3: Coordination through ambiguous language . . . . . . . . 10
1.3.3 Chapter 4: Persuading a committee with privately known preferences 11
2 Learning to agree over large state spaces 13
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
2.1.1 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2.1.2 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.1 Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.2.2 Messages, communication, and learning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
2.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.1 Consensus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
2.3.2 Dialogues leading to consensus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
2.3.3 Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
2.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
2.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
3 Coordination through ambiguous language 32
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.1.1 Related literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
3.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
v
3.2.1 Syntax . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
3.2.2 Semantics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.2.3 Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
3.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3.1 Common-interpretation structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
3.3.2 Ambiguous structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
3.4 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
4 Persuading a committee with privately known preferences 54
4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54
4.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.2.1 Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.2.2 Benchmark with commonly known preferences . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
4.3 Persuasion with information elicitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.3.1 The solution concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
4.3.2 Unanimity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.3.3 Single approval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
4.4 Persuasion without information elicitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.4.1 The solution concept . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.4.2 Unanimity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
4.4.3 Single approval . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
4.5 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
4.6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 87
A Proofs and additional computation for Chapter 4 89
A.1 Incentive constraints for the case with information elicitation and k = 2 . . . 89
A.2 Proof of Proposition 10 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
A.3 Incentive constraints for the case with information elicitation and k = 1 . . . 94
A.4 Proof of Proposition 11 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
A.5 Incentive constraints for the case without information elicitation and k = 2 . 100
A.6 Proof of Proposition 12 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
A.7 Incentive constraints for the case without information elicitation and k = 1 . 105





Information and knowledge are foundational concepts in game theory. Every game involves
interactive reasoning. Indeed, the game is typically assumed to be common knowledge.
This means that everybody knows the game which is being played, everybody knows that
everybody knows the game which is being played, and so on. No matter what the adopted
solution concept is, the very fact that a game is being played implies that there is an infinite
hierarchy of propositions about states of knowledge. Furthermore, a game is made of many
components, and knowledge may refer to each and every aspect that is included in the
description of the game. For instance, a player may know who her opponents are, but she
may not know what the set of available actions of, say, player i is. What a player knows or
does not know is a function of her information.
This dissertation contributes to the understanding of the interplay between knowledge
and information in game theory and, more generally, in interactive rationality. It consists
of three self-contained chapters. The first chapter examines how common knowledge can
be acquired through communication and how it leads to consensus. The second chapter
studies how ambiguity in natural language induces differential information in games. The
third paper examines how information can be selected and manipulated for strategic motives.
The first two chapters belong to the area called interactive epistemology, where interactive
reasoning about knowledge and beliefs are at the center of stage. The last chapter belongs to
the area of information design, where the strategic manipulation of information is examined.
In the subsequent section, we give a brief overview of the theoretical frameworks in these




There are two main frameworks to represent interactive knowledge and beliefs: the event-
based model and the syntactic model. We use the first in Chapter 2, and the latter in
Chapter 3. We now give a brief overview of these models. The material we are about to
discuss is standard and is adapted from Fagin et al. (2004) and Maschler et al. (2013). The
standard framework in game theory for modeling interactive knowledge is the event-based
model introduced by Aumann (1976). The model has a simple structure and it consists
of two elements: a state space Ω and a profile of information partitions (Hi)i∈I , where I
is the set of players. The state space is a set containing the possible states. A state is a
complete description of all the relevant aspects of the world. Information partitions represent
players’ information about the prevailing state of the world. If two states belong to the same
partition cell, then the player cannot distinguish these two states. Differently put, she does
not have enough information to distinguish the occurrence of one world from the occurrence
of the other. Players reason about events, which are subsets of the state space. We say that i
knows E ⊆ Ω in state ω if Hi(ω) ⊆ E, where Hi(ω) is the cell of the information partition Hi
containing state ω. In words, i knows E if E occurs in each and every state that i considers
as possible based on the information she has at ω. For each player, one can thus define a
knowledge operator Ki : 2Ω −→ 2Ω such that KiE := {ω ∈ Ω : Hi(ω) ⊆ E}. In words, the
event KiE stands for “i knows that E” and is the (possibly empty) subset of states where i
knows that E.
It is a standard requirement that the knowledge operator Ki satisfies the following prop-
erties, also known as S5 System:
1. KiΩ = Ω: the player knows what the state space is. This also captures the fact that
the player is logically omniscient, i.e. she knows all the theories (or tautologies) in the
system.
2. KiE ∩ KiF = Ki(E ∩ F ): knowing E and knowing F is the same as knowing the
conjunction E and F .
3. KiE ⊆ E: this is called the axiom of knowledge. It says that agents can only know
events that are true.
4. Ki(KiE) = KiE: this is called the axiom of positive introspection. It says that, if i
knows E, then she also knows that she knows E.
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5. (KiE)c = Ki((KiE)c), where the superscript denotes the set-theoretic complement in
Ω. This is called the axiom of negative introspection. It says that, if i does not know
E, then she also knows that she does not know E.
Since the definition of knowledge is information-based, there is a close connection between
properties of knowledge and properties of information. More specifically, for any information
partition, the corresponding knowledge operator satisfies the S5 system above. In addition,
one can show that, for any operator satisfying the S5 system, there exists a partition that
induces that operator.
The model presented so far allows us to talk about higher-order and interactive knowl-
edge in a natural way. For instance, the event that i knows that j knows E is KiKjE; i
knows that j knows that i knows that j knows E is expressed as KiKjKiKjE; and so on.
Importantly, one can construct arbitrarily long chains describing interactive reasoning of
any order. Therefore, the concept of common knowledge is well defined. We say that E is
common knowledge in state ω if, for every finite sequence of players i1, . . . , ij, we have that
ω ∈ Ki1Ki2 · · ·Kij−1KijE.
The above definition captures our intuition that common knowledge presupposes an in-
finite sequence of statements: everybody knows E, everybody knows that everybody knows
E, and so on. But this appeal to our intuition is also a weakness because one needs to
check infinitely many objects to assess whether a certain event is common knowledge. An
equivalent, yet more compact, representation is provided by Aumann (1976). Let M be the
meet, i.e. the finest common coarsening, of the information partitions (Hi)i∈I . Then the
event E is common knowledge at ω if and only if M(ω) ⊆ E, where M(ω) is the cell of the
meet containing ω.
One can use the event-based framework to represent not only knowledge but also be-
liefs. The model is the same as in the case of knowledge with the proviso that Ω is now
required to be a probability space. Then one can define the belief operator as BiE :=
{ω ∈ Ω : µ (E|Hi(ω)) = 1}, where µ is a probability measure over Ω. The event BiE stands
for “i believes that E”. The interpretation is that BiE contains every state of the world
where, based on the information that i has at that state, she ascribes probability 1 to the
event E. The belief operator shares all the S5 properties of knowledge except for the axiom
of knowledge. That is, it is not necessarily true that BiE ⊆ E. This means that, while people
can only know true facts, they may believe in events that turn out to be false. Similarly to
the case of knowledge, we can talk about higher-order and interactive beliefs in a natural way.
In particular, one can construct arbitrarily long chains of events, called belief hierarchies,
which describe beliefs, beliefs about beliefs, beliefs about beliefs about beliefs, and so on.
As is usually done in applications, these belief hierarchies can be equivalently represented in
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type spaces à la Harsanyi. The reason is that belief hierarchies are rather complex objects to
work with. Instead of describing belief hierarchies in full detail, Harsanyi’s idea is to describe
them implicitly using a more elementary set of types. For instance, in Chapter 4 we use a
finite set of types to represent the (infinitely long) belief hierarchies that are relevant to our
analysis.
The syntactic approach to knowledge and beliefs is the standard framework in fields like
logic, computer science, and philosophy. The fundamental component of the model is a set
of primitive propositions Φ. Then a language is formed by taking primitive propositions and
closing off under negation, conjunction, and modal operators K1, . . . , Kn. In this case, the
argument of Ki is a formula and not an event. Intuitively, the language contains sentences
through which agents reason about the world. The truth value of each formula is determined
by a semantic model. The most common semantics are Kripke structures. A Kripke structure
consists of a state space, a profile of information partitions, and, contrary to the event-based
approach, an interpretation function π : Ω × Φ −→ {true, false}. The latter allows us
to determine whether any given primitive proposition is true or false at any given state of
the world. By structural induction, the assignment of truth values can be extended to any
other non-primitive formula in the language. To express common knowledge, one needs to
augment the language with the operator CK, which stands for “it is common knowledge
that”. To express beliefs, one needs to augment the language with probability formulas, i.e.
sentences that allow players to use probabilities in their reasoning. In addition, the state
space needs to be a probability space.
The event-based and the syntactic models are two distinct representations of interactive
knowledge. These representations are essentially equivalent. More specifically, for any syn-
tactic model there exists an event-based model such that any formula in the former is true
if and only if the corresponding event in the latter holds. Conversely, for any event-based
model, one can always construct a syntactic model such that an event in the former holds
if and only if the corresponding formula in the latter is true. However, there is a sense in
which the syntactic model is a richer framework than the event-based model is. The richness
lies in the fact that a formal language is part of the model. This allows us to talk formally
and explicitly about players’ reasoning.
1.1.2 Information design
In the model of interactive knowledge and beliefs that we have just introduced, information is
taken as a given. More specifically, agents are endowed with an initial stock of information,
hence knowledge, the origin of which is left out of the model. The recent literature on
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information design examines how information can be strategically acquired and exchanged
when potentially conflicting interests are present.
It is convenient to introduce information design by making a comparison with the classical
literature on mechanism design. In the latter, one typically asks the following question:
Given an economic environment, and given a certain distribution of information, what are the
rules of the game that allow us to achieve a certain distribution of outcomes? In information
design, the starting point is different. Given an economic environment, and given the rules of
the game, what are the information structures that allow us to attain a certain distribution of
outcomes? While both approaches seek to understand how social outcomes can be attained,
they differ in what the designer, or planner, is allowed to do. In mechanism design, the
designer’s choice variable is a game form; in information design, it is an information structure.
We now introduce the basic framework for studying information design. The literature
on this topic was initiated by Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) and Bergemann and Morris
(2016a). The material in this subsection is standard and is adapted from Bergemann and
Morris (2019) and Taneva (2019). The fundamental object is a finite game of incomplete
information, which we represent as a pair (G,S). The first component describes the so-called
payoff structure of the game, namely the set of agents I, the profile of available action sets
(Ai)i∈I , a set of states Θ, and payoff functions ui : A×Θ −→ R, where A = ×i∈IAi. Players
share a common prior µ over Θ. The component S describes the information structure of
the game. More specifically, it includes a profile of signal realizations (Ti)i∈I and a function
π : Θ −→ ∆(T ), where ∆(T ) is the set of probability distributions over T = ×i∈ITi.
Intuitively, Θ is the set containing the payoff-relevant parameters about which players are
uncertain. At the ex-ante stage, their information about the state is represented by a common
prior over this set. At the interim stage, each agent receives information about the true state
by means of the information structure. Once the true state has been determined by nature,
each player i observes a signal in Ti. The probability with which profiles of signals are
observed as a function of the true state is captured by the map π.
Absent any design problem, the above representation describes a standard game of in-
complete information. Now suppose that, for a fixed G, a designer wants to choose the
information structure so as to induce a particular outcome distribution. The designer’s be-
havior is represented by a decision rule σ : T ×Θ −→ ∆(A). In words, a decision rule sends
recommendations on how to play the game that are contingent on the true state of the world
and the profile of signal realizations. Each player observes her action recommendation ai
privately, and the designer knows both the true state of the world and which signals are
being observed. Clearly, players might have the incentive to disobey the designer’s recom-
mendations. Therefore, one needs to identify the set of decision rules so that nobody has
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such an incentive. Formally, we say that a decision rule σ is obedient if, for every player i,
every ti ∈ Ti, and every ai, a′i ∈ Ai, we have that∑
a−i,t−i,θ




i, a−i), θ)σ(a|t, θ)π(t|θ)µ(θ).
(1.1)
Every obedient decision rule is a Bayes Correlated Equilibrium as introduced in Berge-
mann and Morris (2016a). They show that this solution concept is a superset of all the main
notions of correlated equilibrium for games with incomplete information considered in Forges
(1993, 2006). The reason why this is the case is that, in a Bayes Correlated Equilibrium,
the designer can condition her action recommendations on both the true state of the world
and the actual signal realizations that players observe.
The set of obedient decision rules identifies the set of implementable allocations. The task
of designing information thus amounts to choosing the decision rule that the designer prefers
among all the obedient ones. As (Bergemann and Morris, 2016a, Theorem 1) show, any
obedient rule implicitly defines an information structure for which there exists a Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium of the underlying game that induces the same outcome distribution as
the chosen rule. In case of multiple equilibria, it is standard to assume that the players
coordinate over the equilibrium that the designer has selected. More stringent solution
concepts can be used instead of Bayes Correlated Equilibrium. For example, if the designer
cannot condition her recommendations on the true signals ti, she can elicit that information
from players. Since constraints in (1.1) guarantee obedience only, additional constraints need
to be imposed on σ so as to guarantee truthful reporting. Irrespective of the solution concept,
we emphasize that information design is always a two-step procedure. First, one identifies the
set of implementable allocations through Bayes Correlated Equilibrium or more restrictive
solution concepts. Second, one chooses the implementable allocation(s) that maximizes the
designer’s objective function.
1.2 Contribution
In this section we give a brief overview of the research questions we address and motivate
their relevance. The first chapter of this thesis contributes to the literature on Aumann’s
agreement theorem and common knowledge acquisition through communication. The sem-
inal papers are Aumann (1976) and Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982), respectively.
Aumann’s agreement theorem says that rational people sharing a common prior cannot
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agree to disagree. More specifically, if their posterior beliefs about a certain event are com-
mon knowledge, then those beliefs must be the same. The question arises as to how to attain
a state of affairs where common knowledge holds. The insight put forward by Geanakoplos
and Polemarchakis (1982) is that common knowledge can be attained through communica-
tion. If people announce their beliefs, and concurrently update their information in light of
others’ announcements, then a consensus will eventually emerge. That is, beliefs will become
common knowledge and therefore they will be the same for every agent.
The above results have been generalized along several dimensions. Bacharach (1985)
was the first to show that Aumann’s agreement theorem is an extremely general result.
Not only does it hold for beliefs, but it also holds for any function that maps information
sets to messages and that satisfies the sure thing principle. In addition, the theorem goes
through even when the state space is not a probability space. As we mentioned earlier,
all we need to define knowledge is a set and information partitions, no further structure
is required. Bacharach’s generalization ensures that, provided the message function is well-
defined, the agreement theorem holds in extremely general spaces. But we lack such a degree
of generality in the literature on common knowledge acquisition and communication initiated
by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982). More specifically, all the analyses that study
convergence to consensus, e.g. Parikh and Krasucki (1990) and Krasucki (1996), assume
that information partitions are finite, even when the underlying state space is infinite, or
that the state space is a probability space. But, as we already remarked, neither finiteness
nor probability are strictly necessary for the agreement theorem to hold. Therefore, we fill
this gap by asking the following question: Is it possible for rational people to converge to
common knowledge and consensus through dialogues when the underlying state space is
not assumed to be a probability space and when information partitions are not necessarily
finite? We show that it is indeed possible provided that dialogues of transfinite length
are allowed. Our contribution thus highlights that, at least from a conceptual viewpoint,
common knowledge acquisition through communication and convergence to consensus are
extremely general properties. On a methodological level, our main contribution is to provide
a new framework that is general enough to accommodate for dialogues of transfinite length.
In the second chapter we provide a syntactic construction of the correlated equilibrium
introduced by Aumann (1974). Correlated equilibrium is a solution concept that captures
correlated play. By making use of a correlating device, players have the opportunity to select
strategies that are not statistically independent of each other. Correlating devices are the-
oretical constructs that subsume implicit opportunities of communication and coordination
that players have at their disposal. For a given game, the set of correlated equilibria identifies
all the possible equilibrium outcomes that can possibly arise from all the implicit and un-
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modeled communication opportunities. Being theoretical constructs, correlating devices may
have no natural interpretation. Our contribution in this chapter is to provide a construction
of correlated equilibrium that has a more natural interpretation. Our analysis is motivated
by the following observation. When people agree to coordinate their actions, they typically
do so by means of some contract or agreement expressed in some natural language. But
natural languages are ambiguous, i.e. the map from sentences to meanings that they induce
is not necessarily commonly known. We argue that it is this interpretive uncertainty that
acts as a correlating device. Using the syntactic approach, we model explicitly the language
that players use to communicate. This allows us to separate messages from their meaning.
The logic we use is that of Halpern and Kets (2015), in which the interpretation of formulas
is player-dependent. In a nutshell, our model consists of a group of players who agree on a
public strategy that tells them how to play a given game. We show that the ambiguity of
the language that players use to communicate and reason is able to induce every correlated
equilibrium of the underlying game.
The third chapter of this dissertation contributes to the literature on information design.
In the standard model, a designer chooses an information structure to induce one or more
agents to take a certain action. This problem has been studied under a variety of assump-
tions on what the designer can or cannot condition her recommendations upon. Relevant
analyses include Bergemann and Morris (2016a), Alonso and Câmara (2016), Chan et al.
(2019), and Kolotilin et al. (2017). In all these studies, agents’ preferences are assumed to
be commonly known. Consequently, the designer can effortlessly send different messages to
different types of agents with absolute certainty about their preferences. Our contribution
is to study an information design problem under the assumption that preferences are not
commonly known. To motivate our analysis, one can consider the following example. Sup-
pose a prosecutor wants to persuade a jury to convict the defendant in a court of law. It
is not hard to imagine that the juror may be uncertain about the composition of the jury
she is addressing. More specifically, she does not know if jurors are relatively tough or le-
nient. If the prosecutor knew the exact jury composition, she would tailor her persuasion
strategy accordingly. Presumably, this would allow her to induce a more beneficial (to her)
outcome. We conduct our analysis by identifying the designer’s optimal persuasion strategy
in a model where outcomes are chosen by a two-member, heterogeneous committee. We show
that the optimal strategy crucially depends on the informativeness of the prior distribution
over preference types. In addition, we show how uncertainty about preferences always entails
a loss to the designer with respect to the benchmark case with commonly known preferences.
This shows that the assumption of complete information about preferences that is commonly
made in the literature is not without loss of generality.
8
1.3 Summary of the Essays
1.3.1 Chapter 2: Learning to agree over large state spaces
In the first paper of this dissertation, we study the problem of common knowledge acquisition
and consensus. The model consists of a finite set of agents exchanging messages according
to a well-defined message function f . Agents are like-minded and f satisfies the sure-thing
principle. A rational dialogue between agents takes place as follows. A directed graph G
describes who sends a message to whom in one round of communication. At the end of the
round, everybody updates her information by taking the join (coarsest common refinement)
between her information partition and the partition induced by the messages she receives.
This process naturally defines a function g from the set of profiles of information partitions to
itself. We thus use this function to construct a dialogue of arbitrary, and possibly transfinite
length. More specifically, we define a dialogue as a sequence obtained by iterating the
function g transfinitely often, starting from some profile of initial information partitions.
Our result is to give sufficient conditions under which a dialogue leads to a consensus, i.e.
a state of affairs where, at any state of the world, everybody sends the same message. The
emergence of consensus turns out to depend crucially on the properties of the communication
graph G. For any graph, we first show that the (non-empty) set of fixed points of the message
function f is always a subset of the fixed points of the function g induced by G. Since g
is also increasing, this means that a dialogue is always a well-defined sequence that will
eventually be constant. However, a consensus need not hold when the sequence becomes
constant. Loosely speaking, learning stops at some point, but we cannot be sure that agents
agree at that point. We then show that, if the graph G satisfies two properties, then the
sets of fixed points of f and g coincide. This means that, not only will learning stop at some
point, but players will also agree at that point. The two properties of G are the following.
First, we require that G contains a spanning subgraph that is strongly connected: for every
pair of distinct agents i and j, there is a directed path from i to j and a directed path
from j to i. The second property is that the spanning subgraph in G is symmetric: if there
is a directed edge from i to j, then there is also a directed edge from j to i. These two
conditions capture the fact that everybody must be able to talk with everybody else, and
that communication must be reciprocal. Under these assumptions about G, we are able to
establish a theorem that goes roughly as follows: In any event-based model of interactive
knowledge, every rational dialogue leads to a consensus. Finally, we show that the cardinality
of the least index ordinal at which a consensus holds cannot be greater than n times the
cardinality of the state space, where n is the number of agents.
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1.3.2 Chapter 3: Coordination through ambiguous language
In the second paper, we give a syntactic construction of correlated equilibrium. The lan-
guage through which players communicate is expressive enough to talk about signals, beliefs,
expected payoffs, and choices in a given finite game with simultaneous moves. Before playing
the game, agents receive information expressed in formulas. The interpretation of formulas
is captured by an epistemic probability structure in which truth values are assigned relative
to a player. This implies that players may disagree on the interpretation of the signals they
are receiving. Coordination is achieved by means of a public strategy, which is a set of
conditional formulas telling players how to play the game as a function of observed signals.
We make assumptions about the interpretation of signals so that it is always the case that,
according to any given player, everybody receives one, and only one, signal per state. Since
the coordination strategy maps signals to actions, this means that, according to any player,
everybody chooses one, and only one, action in each state.
Our results give a characterization of the probability distributions over action profiles
induced by self-enforcing coordination strategies. By self-enforcing we mean that nobody
has the incentive to choose an action different from that prescribed by the public strategy.
We examine two cases separately. In the first, we assume that the language is not ambigu-
ous, so that everybody assigns the same truth value to any given formula. We show that
any self-enforcing coordination strategy induces a correlated equilibrium distribution of the
underlying game. Conversely, for any correlated equilibrium distribution of the underlying
game, one can always find an unambiguous language, a set of signals, and a self-enforcing
coordination strategy, that induce that equilibrium distribution. The two results together
suggest that our model can be interpreted as a syntactic version of the standard, event-based
construction of correlated equilibrium.
In the second case, we allow the language to be ambiguous. More specifically, each player
has her own interpretation function which assigns truth values to primitive propositions in
every state of the world. We show that any self-enforcing coordination strategy now induces
a subjective correlated equilibrium. Conversely, for every subjective correlated equilibrium
of the underlying game, one can always find a (possibly ambiguous) language, a set of
signals, and a self-enforcing coordination strategy, that induce that equilibrium. These
results suggest that ambiguity in natural language provides a justification for heterogeneous
and possibly inconsistent beliefs about strategic play.
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1.3.3 Chapter 4: Persuading a committee with privately known
preferences
In the final paper of this dissertation, we solve the decision problem of a designer who
wants to persuade a two-member committee to take a certain action. Contrary to existing
models, we assume that the committee members’ preferences are not commonly known. The
underlying environment is binary: there are two states of nature, each player has two actions
at her disposal, and each player’s set of types is binary. Preferences are not perfectly aligned.
The designer wants the committee to take the same action irrespective of the true state of the
world, whereas committee members prefer one action in one state, and the other action in the
other state. As we mentioned, players can be of two types: low types require relatively little
evidence to choose the designer’s preferred alternative, whereas the high types are harder to
persuade.
We study two cases separately. In the first case, the designer can elicit private informa-
tion. She asks committee members to report their preference types and then sends action
recommendations based on these reports and the true state of nature. In the second case,
information elicitation is not allowed. The designer does not ask committee members to
send any information at all and she sends action recommendations that are contingent on
the true state of the world and her prior distribution over types. In either case, we solve
the designer’s choice problem both when a unanimous consent is needed to implement her
preferred option and when a single approval is sufficient.
We show that the designer’s optimal decision rule has some qualitative features that are
invariant to the different cases we examine. More specifically, the optimal rule crucially
depends on the informativeness of the prior probability distribution over types. When the
designer is confident enough that no committee member is of the high type, she tailors
her strategy entirely to low types without persuading high type members. The reason is
that incentive constraints require that, in order to persuade high types, low types vote for
the designer’s preferred alternative with lower probability. Thus the expected gain from
persuading the high types is more than compensated by the expected loss from the low
types. When the prior is such that the designer is confident enough that one committee
member, but not both of them, is of the high type, she finds it optimal not to persuade the
committee to adopt her preferred policy in the case in which they both declare to be of the
high type. Finally, when the prior is such that a committee of high types only is more likely,
then the designer finds it optimal to induce both members to vote for her preferred policy
irrespective of what information they choose to report. While these qualitative features of
the optimal persuasion strategy are shown to hold across all the cases we examine, we show
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that non-unanimous decision making and the possibility of eliciting information are both
beneficial to the information designer.
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Chapter 2
Learning to agree over large state spaces
2.1 Introduction
A classic result of Aumann (1976) shows that rational people sharing a common prior cannot
agree to disagree. If their posterior beliefs about a certain event are common knowledge, then
these beliefs must be the same. But what if, as it is often the case, the common knowledge
assumption does not hold? Starting from a situation of disagreement, how can people arrive
at a state of common knowledge and, therefore, agree? A possible answer, originally put
forward by Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982), is that people can achieve a consensus
through dialogues. If everyone announces her beliefs, or other types of messages that depend
on one’s information in a sufficiently regular way, and concurrently updates her information
in light of others’ announcements during a dialogue, then a consensus will eventually emerge.
Our goal is to examine how general this emergence of consensus is. More specifically, we
ask the following question: Does a dialogue between like-minded and rational people lead to
consensus when the underlying set of states of the world is arbitrarily large? We know from
existing results that, provided that messages are derived from a sufficiently regular function,
there are essentially two (not mutually exclusive) cases where a dialogue ends up with a
consensus. The first is when people’s information about the state of the world is represented
by a finite partition, even if the underlying state space is infinite. The second case is when
the state space is a probability space and, consequently, exchanged messages are posterior
probabilities. But one can argue that these two cases do not exhaust all possible situations
that one could be interested in. First of all, the restriction to finite information partitions
seems hard to justify when the underlying state space is infinite. Secondly, the problem
of common knowledge acquisition and consensus is not necessarily confined to probability
spaces. Indeed, the very definition of knowledge is independent from probabilities, and one
can safely talk about interactive knowledge even without beliefs.
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In this paper, we attempt to overcome both of the limitations we have just mentioned.
More specifically, we study a model of dialogues where information partitions are not assumed
to be finite and, at the same time, the underlying state space is not necessarily a probability
space. Our main result is that, if two main conditions are met, it is always possible for
rational and like-minded people to engage in a dialogue that ends up with a consensus on
the value of a sufficiently regular function. The first condition that needs to hold is on
the richness of the communication structure. Intuitively, everyone should be able to talk to
everyone else during a dialogue, either directly or indirectly. And communication should be
reciprocal: if agent i sends her message to j at some point during a dialogue, then j has to
send a message back to i. The second condition is about the length of feasible dialogues.
More specifically, we allow dialogues to have transfinite length. When the state space is
infinite, it might be the case that agents need to exchange infinitely many messages before
reaching a consensus. Therefore, we should make sure that a dialogue lasts sufficiently long
to accommodate this possibility. The first condition is essentially equivalent to that already
explored in finite models. As for the second condition, to the best of our knowledge this is
the first paper that allows transfinite dialogues in problems of common knowledge acquisition
and consensus.
On a methodological level, we approach the problem from a somewhat different perspec-
tive than existing papers. The standard approach is to define dialogues starting from a
communication protocol, i.e. a sequence of ordered pairs of agents that indicate who talks
to whom and when. Every protocol induces a graph over the set of agents, and conditions
ensuring consensus are found by studying the properties of this graph. Our approach takes
the opposite route. The primitive object is a graph which describes who talks to whom
during one round of communication. This graph induces a self-function in the set of pro-
files of information partitions: intuitively, it maps the information that agents have at the
beginning of the communication round to the refined information they have after having
talked. By iterating this function “transfinitely often” we can generate a sequence of profiles
of partitions that capture all the information that is generated during the dialogue. And
the dialogue is the one in which every round of communication takes place according to the
graph that we initially fixed. While the two approaches are essentially equivalent, we believe
that our way to frame the problem allows us to “solve” the model in a more compact way.
The paper is organized as follows. In the remainder of this section, we offer an example to
illustrate why transfinite dialogues are needed and then discuss the related literature. The
model is presented in section 2.2 and results are illustrated in section 2.3. A discussion of




Consider a simple decision-making problem under uncertainty. There are two agents, Ann
and Bob. The set of possible states of the world is the set of natural numbers N. The
true state is x. The set of feasible decisions is D = N ∪ {0}. For each agent, payoffs are
determined by the following function:
u (d, x) =

1 if d = x
0 if d = 0
−3 otherwise.
In words, taking action d 6= 0 in state x yields a reward if the action and the state match. If
they don’t, the decision maker incurs a loss. In every state, the safe option of choosing d = 0
is always available. Decisions are made independently. There are no payoff externalities: the
payoff accruing to Ann is independent of what Bob does, and vice versa.
At the ex ante stage, information about the state is represented by a prior probability
distribution over N. The prior is such that, for every k ∈ N, the probability of x = k is 1
2k
.
If decisions were to be made at the ex ante stage, it is clear that both Ann and Bob would
choose the safe option d = 0. In addition, the fact that Ann chose d = 0 would not reveal
any new information to Bob, and vice versa.
Things change when decision makers are no longer symmetrically informed. Suppose
that, after the actual state is determined, agents observe different partitional signals about
x before making their choice. More specifically, each agent is endowed with an information
partition over N. When Nature selects x = k, either agent learns that the true state lies in
his or her partition block containing k. Let information partitions be as follows:
πA = {{1}, {2, 3}, {4, 5}, . . . }
πB = {{1, 2}, {3, 4}, {5, 6}, . . . } .
Observe that, for each information set {k, k + 1} of two elements, posterior beliefs are such
that
Prob(x = k|{k, k + 1}) = 2
3
Prob(x = k + 1|{k, k + 1}) = 1
3
.
It is then straightforward to verify that, when x 6= 1, the unique optimal choice is d = 0 for
both Ann and Bob. But when x = 1, Ann chooses d = 1 and Bob selects d = 0. Thus there
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is a state in which agents act differently, i.e. they disagree. But if Bob knew that they were
disagreeing, he would learn new information about the state and would revise his decision
accordingly.
To be more specific about the learning process we have just mentioned, suppose that
agents are now allowed to communicate and revise their decisions sequentially. During each
stage, Ann and Bob declare their actions. Then each of them revises his or her information
in light of the other’s announcement. Finally, they can change their decisions.
During the first stage, we have the following scenario. If the state is x = 1, Ann already
knows this. Bob only knows that the true state must be either x = 1 or x = 2. Also he
knows that Ann would choose d = 1 when x = 1 and d = 0 otherwise. By learning that
Ann chose d = 1, he concludes that x = 1 and so he changes his action to d = 1. Similarly,
when x = 2, Bob infers from Ann’s picking d = 0 that x 6= 1. Thus he concludes that x = 2
and changes his action to d = 2. If x 6= 1, 2, neither agent can learn anything new about
the state. In sum, at the end of the first stage, Ann and Bob have the following information
partitions:
π1A = {{1}, {2, 3}, {4, 5}, . . . }
π1B = {{1}, {2}, {3, 4}, {5, 6}, . . . } .
In the second stage, both agents revise their information on the basis of what they com-
municate during that stage and of what they learned from the previous stage. Therefore,
when x = 1, they already know this. When x = 2, Ann only knows that either x = 2 or
x = 3. Also she knows that Bob would choose d = 2 in the former case and d = 0 in the
latter. By learning that Bob chose d = 2 at the end of the previous stage, she infers that
true state must be x = 2, so changing her decision to d = 2. Similarly, if x = 3, Ann infers
from Bob’s picking d = 0 in the first stage that x 6= 2. Thus she concludes that x = 3 and
selects d = 3. When x ≥ 4, neither agent can learn anything new about the state. In sum,
at the end of the second stage, Ann and Bob have the following information partitions:
π2A = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4, 5}, . . . }
π2B = {{1}, {2}, {3, 4}, {5, 6}, . . . } .
It is easy to see that, for any state k, it takes k stages of communication for both players
to learn that the actual state is indeed k. But there is always a state where they disagree,
the reason being that their actions are not commonly known at that state. Is it possible
to achieve a consensus at every state in N? Equivalently, can Ann and Bob learn to agree
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over the entire state space? We show later on that the answer is affirmative if the dialogue
they are participating in has order type ω + 1, and not just ω as it is commonly assumed in
existing models.
2.1.2 Related literature
The paper contributes to the vast literature on common knowledge and agreement initiated
by Aumann (1976), a survey of which can be found in Bonanno and Nehring (1997). Pa-
pers that are closer to ours are those focusing on dialogues and convergence to consensus.
Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982) introduce dialogues in a two-player model with a
finite state space where messages exchanged during the dialogue are posterior beliefs about
a fixed event. Bacharach (1985) and Cave (1983) show that a consensus can be reached not
only when people communicate posterior beliefs but also when they communicate the values
of any function satisfying a condition akin to the sure thing principle from decision theory.
Bacharach (1985) assumes that initial information partitions are finite, whereas Cave (1983)
assumes that the state space is countably infinite. Washburn and Teneketzis (1984), Nielsen
(1984), and Bergin (1989) study convergence to consensus but they all confine their attention
to the probabilistic case only.
Dialogues between more than two agents and with private communication are introduced
by Parikh and Krasucki (1990) and further examined in Krasucki (1996) and Heifetz (1996).
Assuming finite partitions, they show how convergence to a commonly known consensus is
guaranteed if communication takes place according to a protocol whose graph is strongly
connected and symmetric.
Our paper is also related to the common learning model of Cripps et al. (2008). They
study (approximate) common knowledge acquisition for two agents who privately observe a
sequence of exogenous signals. In our model, we let agents observe external private signals
only once, i.e. at the beginning of a dialogue. As a consequence, people learn from the
messages that they endogenously choose to exchange during a dialogue.
Mueller-Frank (2013) provides a framework from learning in social networks in an envi-
ronment similar to ours. However, his analysis is confined to countably infinite information
partitions and he uses choice correspondences instead of choice (message) functions as we
do.
Finally, both Aumann and Hart (2003) and Parikh (1992) study dialogues of transfinite
length. In the former, a simultaneous-move game is played after a countable sequence of
cheap talk messages are exchanged. In the latter, knowledge acquisition is studied using
Kripke structures. The analysis is confined to the countable case and interactive discovery
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systems are introduced instead of message functions.
2.2 Model
2.2.1 Setup
Our object of study is an environment E = (I,X,A, f,G) where:
• I = {1, . . . , n}, with n ≥ 2, is a finite set of agents;
• X is a nonempty set of states of the world;
• A is a nonempty set of messages;
• f : X −→ A is a message function, where X is the set of non-empty subsets of X;
• G is a directed graph whose set of nodes is I. Abusing notation, we write G to indicate
both the graph and its set of edges G ⊆ I × I.
Information about the state is represented by partitions. The set of all partitions of X is
Π, with typical elements π, π′, etc. Given a state x ∈ X and a partition π of X, the block of
the partition containing x is denoted by π(x). The set Π is partially ordered by the relation
≤ such that, for any two partitions π and π′, we have π ≤ π′ if and only if π is a coarsening
of π′, i.e. every block of π can be written as the union of some blocks of π′. We use π ∨ π′
to denote the join (coarsest common refinement) of {π, π′}, and
∨
{πh : h ∈ H} for the join
of the indexed family {πh : h ∈ H}. Similarly, we use
∧
{πh : h ∈ H} to indicate the meet
(finest common coarsening) of the family {πh : h ∈ H}. Recall that Π is a complete lattice.
When agent i’s information is represented by a partition πi ∈ Π, we say that i has
information πi. The definition of knowledge is standard. Given a state x ∈ X and an event
E ⊆ X, we say that agent i knows E in state x if πi(x) ⊆ E. We say that E is common
knowledge at x if
∧
{πi : i ∈ I} (x) ⊆ E.
2.2.2 Messages, communication, and learning
Agents are allowed to exchange messages. The message function f determines how agents
send messages as a function of their information. The graph G determines who sends a
message to whom. We do not make any particular assumption about the content of messages.
We interpret a message just as a function of agents’ private information. For example, a
message can be a posterior belief about a certain event as in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis
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(1982); it can be an action as in Example 2.1.1; or it can be a string of symbols in some
formal language.
Messages. When i has information πi, we use the function fi : X −→ A to indicate what
message i sends at any given state x. Since no confusion should arise, we save on notation
by dropping the dependence of fi on πi. We assume the following condition.
Assumption 1 (Like-mindedness). For every i ∈ I, and for every partition πi ∈ Π, if i has
information πi, then fi(x) = f(πi(x)) for every x ∈ X.
Like-mindedness captures the fact that agents share the same view of the world. If any
two agents have the same information in a given state, then they must send the same message
in that state. Consequently, agents’ sending different messages is solely due to asymmetric
information and not to, say, different subjective states or other forms of fundamental dis-
agreement. Notice that, in every state x and for every player i, the message that i sends
when x is the true state is a function of the smallest event that i knows at x, i.e. πi(x).
Another implication of Assumption 1 is that, for every x, x′ ∈ X, if πi(x) = πi(x′), then
fi(x) = fi(x
′). This reflects full rationality. If an agent transmitted different messages
in different states belonging to the same information block, then she would realize that
those states are not indistinguishable after all, and so she would assign them to different
information blocks. In addition, every agent always knows the message she is transmitting.
We also make the following assumption about f .
Assumption 2 (Sure thing principle (STP)). For any S ∈ X , and for any partition {Sh :
h ∈ H} of S, if f(Sh) = a for all h ∈ H then f(S) = a.
We use the same formulation as Bacharach (1985). The condition is also known as union
consistency1. Intuitively, the STP says that if an agent sends message a when she knows
that the state is in S ⊆ X, and she sends again message a when she knows that the state
is in S ′, with S ∩ S ′ = ∅, then she must send the same message a when she knows that
the state is in S ∪ S ′. Bacharach (1985) shows that the STP is satisfied by “just about any
plausible theory of rational decision”. Two relevant examples of message functions satisfying
this principle are: 1) the function that, as in Example 2.1.1, maps information sets to Bayes
rational choices; 2) the function that, as in Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1982), maps
information sets to posterior beliefs about a certain event2.
1See Section 2.4 for a comparison between the sure thing principle as defined in Bacharach (1985) and
the union consistency of Cave (1983).
2See Moses and Nachum (1990) for a critique of the STP in epistemic models, and Samet (2010) and
Tarbush (2016) for possible ways to address their critique.
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We can now define working partitions. For a given individual signal function fi, we let
Wi be the corresponding working partition. For every x ∈ X, the block of Wi containing x
is Wi(x) := {x′ ∈ X : fi(x′) = fi(x)}. In words, Wi(x) corresponds to the event “i emitted
signal a” for some a ∈ A. Therefore, one can also interpretWi(x) as the information conveyed
to any agent j 6= i who receives i’s message fi(x) in state x. The fact that Wi is a partition
reflects the lack of any sort of ambiguity about the interpretation of messages. Since no
confusion should arise, we save again on notation by dropping the dependence of Wi on the
underlying information partition πi. Finally, notice that Wi is necessarily a coarsening of πi.
Communication and learning. Communication between agents takes place according
to the graph G. If (i, j) ∈ G, then there is a directed edge from i to j and we say that i
sends a message to j. To describe how a receiver updates her information upon receiving a
message, we introduce a function g constructed as follows.
Let Πn be the n-fold Cartesian product of Π. An element of Πn is an indexed collection
π = (π1, . . . , πn) of partitions of X. We endow this space with the product order:
(π1, . . . , πn) ≤ (π′1, . . . , π′n) ⇐⇒ πi ≤ π′i for all i ∈ I.
Notice that Πn is a complete lattice. For each i ∈ I, we define the (possibly empty) set
S(i) := {j ∈ I : (j, i) ∈ G}. In words, S(i) is the subset of agents that send a message to i.
We can now define the function g : Πn −→ Πn as follows:
gi ((π1, . . . , πn)) =

∨
{πi ∨Wj}j∈S(i) if S(i) 6= ∅
πi otherwise,
(2.1)
where we write gi(π) to denote the ith component of g(π).
The function g captures the following process of communication and learning. Suppose
agents have information π. Then they exchange messages according to the communication
graph G. How should they revise their information in light of the new information they
receive? If i does not receive any message, her information will clearly stay the same. But
if she receives a message from j, and if the state is x, she reasons as follows3: “I know that
the true state must be in πi(x), and I know that j has information πj. Now, j sent me
a message fj(x), and I know that he would have sent that message if and only if the true
state had been contained in Wj(x). Therefore, I can conclude that the true state must be
3This is the learning process introduced in Parikh and Krasucki (1990) and later amended by Weyers
(1992). In particular, Weyers (1992) shows that fully rational agents update their entire information partition
and not just the partition block containing the true state of the world.
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in πi(x) ∩Wj(x).” By repeating this line of reasoning at any state, we obtain that i’s new
information partition after receiving a message from j is the join πi ∨Wj. With more than
one sender, i refines her information by taking into account the working partition of every
j ∈ S(i).
We assume that communication does not take place just once. Agents are allowed to
engage in dialogues of arbitrary length. Formally, given a profile π0 of initial information
partitions, a dialogue starting from π0 is the sequence (gα : α ∈ Ord) constructed recursively
as follows:
g0 := π0,
gα+1 := g (gα) for every ordinal α,
gλ :=
∨
{gα : α < λ} for every limit ordinal λ.
In words, a dialogue is a sequence in Πn starting from an initial profile π0 and constructed
by iterating “transfinitely often” the function g induced byG. Notice that a profile π uniquely
determines the profile of messages transmitted at every state. Thus it is without loss of
generality to define a dialogue as a sequence of partitions and not, as it would be more
natural, as a sequence of messages.
The fact that we construct a dialogue from g can also be interpreted as follows. The
graph G describes one round of communication; the corresponding function g maps profiles
of information partitions that agents have at the beginning of this round of communication
to profiles of partitions that are refined in light of the messages exchanged during the com-
munication round. Thus a dialogue is nothing other than the transfinite repetition of this
round of communication: the element gα tells us what information agents have at the end
of the αth round of communication.
Finally, we remark that the initial profile π0 can be thought of as exogenous information,
whereas partitions gα, with α > 0, can be thought of as endogenous information. That
is, π0 captures the information content of a privately observed signal about the state that
we do not explicitly model. Nature acts only once and determines what realization of this
signal agents observe. Subsequent information partitions are endogenously determined by
the communication and learning process described above. As we discuss in more detail in
section 2.4, the whole structure of the model is common knowledge. In particular, it is
commonly known who talks with whom and when, how partition blocks are mapped to
messages, and how information is updated.
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2.3 Results
In this section we study properties of the communication structure that lead to consensus.
We first give a full characterization of consensus for the static case, i.e. for a fixed profile of
information partitions; we then find conditions under which dialogues lead to consensus.
2.3.1 Consensus
Let π ∈ Πn be the profile of agents’ information partitions. Then we say that a consensus
holds if, for all i, j ∈ I, we have that fi = fj. Our definition describes consensus in a global
sense. That is, we require that, for all i, j ∈ I, fi(x) = fj(x) for every state x ∈ X. If agents
agree at some state x but not necessarily at every state, then we say that a partial consensus
holds at x.
Our first result is a full characterization of (global) consensus.
Proposition 1. Suppose agents have information π = (π1, . . . , πn). Then the following are
equivalent:
a) For all x ∈ X, the profile of messages that is sent at x, i.e. the event
E(x) = {x′ ∈ X : f1(x′) = f1(x), . . . , fn(x′) = fn(x)} ,
is common knowledge at x
b) For all i, j ∈ I, fi = fj
c) For all i, j ∈ I, Wi = Wj.
Proof. The implication a)⇒ b) follows from Theorem 3 in Bacharach (1985). b)⇒ c) follows
immediately from the definition of the working partition. To show c)⇒ a), fix a state x ∈ X.
By the definition of the working partition, for every i ∈ I, the event {x′ ∈ X : fi(x′) = fi(x)}
is the same as Wi(x). Let W (x) := ∩i∈IWi(x). Since every Wi is a coarsening of πi, and
since Wi(x) = Wj(x) for all i, j ∈ I by assumption, we have that, for all i ∈ I,
πi(x) ⊆ Wi(x) = W (x).
Therefore, for all i ∈ I,
πi(x) ⊆
∧
{πi : i ∈ I} (x) ⊆ W (x).
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A global consensus is equivalent to the knowledge configuration where, at every state,
the profile of messages that are being sent at that state is common knowledge. And when a
profile of messages is commonly known, then those messages must be the same. The latter
statement is nothing other than the generalized version of Aumann’s agreement theorem
established in Bacharach (1985).
We can also say that a global consensus cannot hold without it being common knowledge
that it holds. This is not necessarily true for a partial consensus. In Example 2.1.1, both
Ann and Bob send message 0 in state 2. But this is not common knowledge and not even
mutual knowledge. Since Bob knows that the state can be either 1 or 2, he doesn’t know
which message Ann is going to send to him.
Notice that a consensus does not imply that agents have the same information partitions.
Furthermore, we emphasize that the equivalence in Proposition 1 crucially relies on the STP.
Without it4, one can only conclude that b)⇒ c)⇒ a). Consequently, it would no longer be
impossible to agree to disagree.
We conclude this subsection with a corollary that will prove useful in establishing subse-
quent results.
Corollary 1. If fi 6= fj, then πi < πi ∨Wj or πj < πj ∨Wi.
Proof. By contrapositive, suppose that neither πi < πi ∨Wj nor πj < πj ∨Wi hold. Since
it is always the case that πi ≤ πi ∨Wj and πj ≤ πj ∨Wi, we must have both πi = πi ∨Wj
and πj = πj ∨Wi. This implies that Wi is a coarsening of πj and Wj is a coarsening of πi.
Combining this with the fact that each working partition is a coarsening of the underlying
information partition, we have that both Wi and Wj are common coarsenings of πi and πj.
Therefore, for every x ∈ X, Wi(x)∩Wj(x) is common knowledge at x between i and j. Thus
it follows from Proposition 1 that fi = fj.
The interpretation is straightforward. If i and j disagree at some state, then it must be
the case that either i can (strictly) refine her information by receiving a message from j, or
j can refine his information by receiving a message from i, or both. In other words, when
two agents are disagreeing, at least one of them can learn some new information from the
other.
2.3.2 Dialogues leading to consensus
We now examine conditions under which dialogues lead to consensus. Formally, for a given
communication graph G, we say that the corresponding dialogue (gα : α ∈ Ord), starting
4See Section 2.4 for a proof.
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from initial information π0, leads to a consensus if, for every i, j ∈ I, fαi = fαj for some
α ∈ Ord, where we write fαi to indicate the individual message function associated with
the ith component of gα. In other words, a dialogue leads to consensus if the sequence
(gα : α ∈ Ord) contains a profile gα ∈ Πn at which everybody agrees.
The structure of the communication graph G clearly affects g and, consequently, the
corresponding dialogue (gα : α ∈ Ord). We make the following preliminary observation.
Remark. For any G, the function g is inflationary but need not be monotone5.
Proof. It follows immediately from (2.1) that g is inflationary. The following example shows
that g need not be monotone. Let X = {x, y, w, z}, I = {1, 2}, and let the message function
f be such that f({x}) = f({x, y}) = a, and f(S) = b for any other non-empty subset S
of X. In addition, suppose the communication graph is G = {(1, 2), (2, 1)}. Now take the
following elements of Π2:
π = (π1, π2) = ({X}, {{x, y}, {w, z}})
π′ = (π′1, π
′
2) = ({X}, {{x}, {y}, {w}, {z}}) .
Thus we have
g (π) = ({{x, y}, {w, z}}, {{x, y}, {w, z}})
g (π′) = ({{x}, {y, w, z}}, {{x}, {y}, {w}, {z}}) .
Therefore, π ≤ π′ but g (π) 6≤ g (π′).
A consequence of g’s being inflationary is that the sequence (gα : α ∈ Ord) is increasing,
i.e. for every α, β ∈ Ord, β < α implies gβ ≤ gα. The argument is straightforward and is by
induction on α.
We define for later use the following subsets of Πn:
Cons(f) := {π ∈ Πn : fi = fj for all i, j ∈ I}
and
Fix(g) := {π ∈ Πn : g(π) = π} .
In words, Cons(f) is the set of partition profiles at which a global consensus holds, whereas
Fix(g) is the set of fixed points of g.
5Let P be a poset. Then a function h : P −→ P is monotone (or order-preserving) if x ≤ y =⇒ h(x) ≤
h(y); h is inflationary (or increasing) if, for all x ∈ P , x ≤ h(x).
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Proposition 2. For any G, we have ∅ 6= Cons(f) ⊆ Fix(g).
Proof. To show that Cons(f) is nonempty, take any profile (π1, . . . , πn) ∈ Πn such that
πi = πj for every i, j ∈ I. By like-mindedness, any such a profile is always contained in
Cons(f).
To show the inclusion Cons(f) ⊆ Fix(g), take (π1, . . . , πn) ∈ Cons(f). By Proposition 1,
(π1, . . . , πn) is such that Wi = Wj for any i, j ∈ I. Therefore, since Wi is a coarsening of πi,
we have that πi ∨Wj = πi for any i, j ∈ I. Thus (π1, . . . , πn) ∈ Fix(g).
Notice that the non-emptiness of Fix(g) could alternatively be proved by invoking the
Bourbaki-Witt fixed point theorem, see (Roman, 2008, Theorem 12.7).
It is clear that if a dialogue (gα : α ∈ Ord) contains a fixed point at gα, then it stays
constant at any β > α. However, it is not necessarily the case that the dialogue leads to a
consensus. In order for this to be the case, we need to make sure that the communication
structure in G is sufficiently rich. We thus make the following assumption.
Assumption 3. The communication graph G contains a spanning subgraph6 G′ such that:
a) G′ is strongly connected: for every distinct i, j ∈ I, there exists a directed path in G′
from i to j and a directed path from j to i;
b) G′ is symmetric: for every i, j ∈ I, if (i, j) ∈ G′, then (j, i) ∈ G′ ⊆ G.
Strong connectedness says that no one is excluded from communication, i.e. everyone
communicates with everybody else, either directly or indirectly. Symmetry means that com-
munication is reciprocal. When the communication structure satisfies these two properties,
the following equivalence holds.
Proposition 3. Let G satisfy Assumption 3. Then Cons(f) = Fix(g).
Proof. By Proposition 2, it is enough to show that Fix(g) ⊆ Cons(f). Let π = (π1, . . . , πn)
be a fixed point of g. Suppose by way of contradiction that π does not induce a consensus.
Hence there are distinct i and j in I such that fi 6= fj. By strong connectedness, there
exists a directed path in G from i to j: that is, for some integer K ≥ 1, there is a path
i0, i1, . . . , iK in G such that i0 = i and iK = j. Since i and j disagree, this path must contain
an edge (ik, ik+1) such that ik and ik+1 disagree, for some k ∈ {0, . . . , K − 1}. By symmetry,
(ik+1, ik) ∈ G. By Corollary 1, we have
πk < πk ∨Wk+1 or πk+1 < πk+1 ∨Wk,
6Recall that a spanning subgraph of G is a subgraph G′ ⊆ G with the same set of vertexes as G.
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and using this in (2.1) we obtain
πk < gk(π) or πk+1 < gk+1(π),
so contradicting the hypothesis that π is a fixed point of g.
In light of Proposition 3, looking for dialogues leading to consensus is the same as looking
for fixed points of g. Intuitively, we know from Corollary 1 that, in case of disagreement
between i and j, learning can take place in either direction. Assumption 3 makes sure
that communication between i and j is reciprocal, so that it can never be the case that i
and j disagree without having the possibility of exchanging messages between each other.
The importance of reciprocity in communication has been already pointed out by Krasucki
(1996), and Example 2 in Parikh and Krasucki (1990) shows how a consensus may never
emerge if one dispenses with it.
We can now establish the main result. We write α∗ to denote the least ordinal α such
that gα+1 = gα. Then we have the following.
Theorem. Let E = (I,X,A, f,G) be an environment satisfying Assumptions 1-3. For any
profile π0 of initial information partitions, the dialogue (gα : α ∈ Ord) induced by G and
starting from π0 always leads to a consensus. Furthermore, |α∗| ≤ n|X|.
Proof. Since g is inflationary, and since Πn is a complete lattice, it follows from (Roman,
2008, Theorem 12.9) that the sequence (gα : α ∈ Ord) starting from π0 is always well-defined,
increasing, and contains one, and only one, fixed point of g. By Proposition 3, the dialogue
(gα : α ∈ Ord) induces a consensus.
In order to show that |α∗| ≤ n|X|, take the subsequence (gα : α ≤ α∗). Since (gα : α ∈ Ord)
is increasing and gα∗ is a fixed point of g, the subsequence (gα : α ≤ α∗) is strictly increasing,
i.e. for all α, β ≤ α∗,
β < α =⇒ gβ ≤ gα and gβ 6= gα. (2.2)
Now define the image of (gα : α ≤ α∗) as Im := {gα : α ≤ α∗}. Since (gα : α ≤ α∗) is strictly
increasing, Im is a well-ordered subset of Πn having order type α∗+1. Furthermore, for every
i ∈ I, let Imi := {gαi : α ≤ α∗} be the ith projection of Im. Notice that Imi is a well-ordered
subset of Π having order type at most α∗ + 1. Furthermore, by Lemma 3.1 in Avery et al.
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In words, φ maps each ordinal α less than or equal to α∗ to an individual partition gαi that is
a strict refinement of all partitions gβi having index less than α. Without loss of generality,
in case of multiple individual partitions satisfying (2.3), we take the one with the lowest
(agent) index. It follows from (2.2) that φ is well-defined and injective. Therefore we have





Notice that, when X is an infinite set, we have |α∗| ≤ n|X| = |X|.
We now provide an example to show what a dialogue of transfinite length looks like in a
three-agent environment.
2.3.3 Example
Suppose the state space is X = N, the set of players is I = {A,B,C}, and the profile π0 of
initial information partitions is the following:
π0A = {{1, 3, 6}, {2, 4}, {5}, {7, 9}, {11, 13}, . . . , {8, 10}, {12, 14}, . . . }
π0B = {{1, 3, 6, 8}, {2, 4}, {5, 7}, {9, 11}, . . . , {10, 12}, {14, 16}, . . . }
π0C = {{1, 5, 9, 13 . . . }, {2, 6, 10, 14, . . . }, {3, 7, 11, 15, . . . }, {4, 8, 12, 16, . . . }}
or, more formally:
π0A = {{1, 3, 6}, {2, 4}, {5}} ∪ {{7 + 4k1, 9 + 4k1} : k1 ≥ 0} ∪ {{8 + 4k2, 10 + 4k2} : k2 ≥ 0}
π0B = {{1, 3, 6, 8}, {2, 4}} ∪ {{5 + 4k1, 7 + 4k1} : k1 ≥ 0} ∪ {{10 + 4k2, 12 + 4k2} : k2 ≥ 0}
π0C = {{1 + 4k1 : k1 ≥ 0}, {2 + 4k2 : k2 ≥ 0}, {3 + 4k3 : k3 ≥ 0}, {4 + 4k4 : k4 ≥ 0}} .
The message function is:
f(S) =
k if S = {k} for some k ∈ N0 otherwise.
The communication graph is G = {(A,B), (B,A), (B,C), (C,B)}.









At α = 2 we get




g2C = {{5}, {7}, {1, 9, 13 . . . }, {2, 6, 10, 14, . . . }, {3, 11, 15, . . . }, {4, 8, 12, 16, . . . }} .
Continuing this way, at the first limit ordinal we have
gωA = {{1, 3, 6}, {2, 4}, {5}, {7}, {9}, {11}, {13}, . . . , {8, 10}, {12, 14}, . . . }
gωB = {{1, 3, 6, 8}, {2, 4}, {5}, {7}, {9}, {11}, {13}, . . . , {10, 12}, {14, 16}, . . . }
gωC = {{1}, {3}, {5}, {7}, {9}, {11}, {13}, . . . , {2, 6, 10, 14, . . . }, {4, 8, 12, 16, . . . }} .
Similarly, at the second limit ordinal we have
gω·2A = {{2, 4}, {1}, {3}, {5}, {6}, . . . }
gω·2B = {{2, 4}, {1}, {3}, {5}, {6}, . . . }
gω·2C = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {5}, {6}, . . . } .
In words, C always knows the true state; A and B knows what the true state is expect
for when x = 2 or x = 4. But at α = ω · 2 + 1, B learns to distinguish between x = 2 and
x = 4 by communicating with C. Then at α = ω · 2 + 2, A learns this piece of information





C = {{1}, {2}, {3}, {4}, {5}, {6}, . . . } = π
0
A ∨ π0B ∨ π0C ,
so that α∗ = ω ·2 + 2. Notice that X and α∗ have the same cardinality, but their order types
are different.
2.4 Discussion
1. Proposition 1 and subsequent results hinge upon the STP. If one dispenses with it, the
equivalence a)⇔ b)⇔ c) in Proposition 1 breaks down and one can only conclude that
b)⇒ c)⇒ a). Notice that the arguments used in the main text to prove both b)⇒ c)
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and c) ⇒ a) do no rely on the STP. Now let us consider two elementary examples to
show how the converse implications do not need to hold. First, let us show how b) does
not follow from a) or from c). Set X = {x, y} and let the message function be such
that f({x}) = f({y}) = a and f({x, y}) = b. Suppose that there are two agents whose
information partitions are π1 = {{x}, {y}} and π2 = {{x, y}}. It is common knowledge
at every state what messages 1 and 2 are sending, but clearly f1 6= f2. Notice that we
also have W1 = W2 = X.
It remains to show that c) does not follow from a). Set X = {x, y, z} and let the
message function be such that
f({x}) = f({y}) = a
f({z}) = f({x, y}) = b.
Suppose that there are two agents with the following information partitions:
π1 = {{x}, {y}, {z}}
π2 = {{x, y}, {z}} .
At every state, the profile of messages is common knowledge but W1 6= W2.
2. We use the same formulation of the STP as Bacharach (1985). In several papers in the
literature on common knowledge and consensus, the union consistency of Cave (1983)
is used instead of the STP.
Definition (Union consistency (UC)). The message function f : X −→ A is union
consistent if S, S ′ ∈ X , S ∩ S ′ = ∅, and f(S) = f(S ′) = a imply f(S ∪ S ′) = a.
While the two conditions are equivalent in the finite case, this is no longer true for
infinite information partitions. The reason is simple: UC applies to finite collections of
disjoint sets, while the STP applies to collections of arbitrary cardinality. Consequently,
UC is no longer sufficient for a consensus to hold in the infinite case. This can easily
be seen in the following example.
Set X = N and let the message function f be the following:
f(S) =
0 if |S| <∞1 otherwise.
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It is straightforward verifying that f satisfies UC but not STP. Take any two disjoint
sets S and S ′ in X such that f(S) = f(S ′). By the definition of f , they must be both
finite or both infinite; in the former case, their union is a finite set, and f(S ∪ S ′) = 0;
if the latter case, the union is an infinite set, and so f(S ∪ S ′) = 1. To see that
STP does not hold, take the finest partition of X, i.e. π = {{1}, {2}, . . . }. Each
block in π is finite, so that f(S) = 0 for every S ∈ π; but f(X) = 1. To see that
it is possible to agree to disagree, suppose there are two agents having information
partitions π1 = {{1}, {2}, . . . } and π2 = {X}. It is then immediate that W1 = W2 and
f1 6= f2.
3. Our analysis assumes that the communication structure is common knowledge. The
graph G is commonly known, and so is the dialogue that it gives rise to. This is crucial
in order to have a well-defined learning process. When i receives a message from j,
she knows exactly whom j talked with in the past and, consequently, she can infer
what information j learned from that history, even if i does not necessarily know the
actual message that j sent to others or received in some states. Roughly speaking, a
commonly known communication structure implies that the informational content of
any given message is not ambiguous, so making it possible for people to learn. In the
case in which the common knowledge assumption is relaxed, learning is not well-defined
in our framework and thus convergence to consensus is not guaranteed. As Koessler
(2001) and Tsakas and Voorneveld (2011) show, one needs to enlarge the state space
so as to include any possible history of communication. In so doing, uncertainty about
the communication structure can be dealt with in the enlarged state space. In other
words, the fact that we keep the state space fixed throughout a dialogue is a direct
consequence of having a commonly known communication structure.
We also remark that the communication channel is assumed to be faultless and fully
reliable. That is, when i sends a message to j, that message is delivered to j with
absolute certainty, and it is common knowledge that it is so. In other words, we rule
out the possibility that a message never reaches the intended recipient and also the
possibility that a recipient gets a different message than what was sent by the sender.
Should the communication channel be unreliable, we would be in a situation akin to
the email game of Rubinstein (1989), where convergence to consensus is not guaranteed
to hold.
4. Communication is not strategic. Adding strategic motives to our analysis is likely to
alter our results substantially. In a different yet related setting, Anderlini et al. (2011)
show that, while agents with common interests are able to aggregate their information
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in a full learning equilibrium, no such an equilibrium can be sustained when interests
diverge.
5. Since our goal is to establish whether a consensus emerges or not, we observe that our
assumption of pairwise and simultaneous (within a round) communication is without
loss of generality. As long as strong connectedness and symmetry in Assumption 3 are
preserved, any modification of the communication network could affect only the speed
of convergence or the fixed point contained in the dialogue. That is, a communication
graph leads to a unique fixed point, but different graphs may lead to different fixed
points, all of which induce a consensus.
We emphasize that the need for two-way communication arises from the fact that we
want to find a class of dialogues that induce a consensus for every possible profile of
information partitions. It is not hard to find cases where a consensus can be reached
even with unilateral communication. For instance, suppose that the initial information
partitions are totally ordered. It suffices to let the agent with the finest partition send
a message to everyone else and a consensus immediately ensues.
2.5 Conclusion
We have studied the problem of knowledge acquisition and convergence to consensus in a
finite population of like-minded, fully rational individuals. We have showed that such a
convergence is always possible provided that dialogues of transfinite length are allowed and
that the communication structure is sufficiently rich. More generally, our results suggest that,
at least in principle, knowledge acquisition between fully rational individuals is well-defined






Correlated equilibrium is a solution concept that captures the impact of communication on
strategic interaction. It does so without modeling explicitly the communication process in
which players are involved. Differently put, correlated equilibrium “express[es] an assumption
that players have implicit communication opportunities, in addition to the strategic options
explicitly described in the game model” (Myerson, 1991, p. 245). All implicit communication
opportunities are subsumed into canonical correlating devices which send private recommen-
dations on how to play the game. But such devices, and the corresponding “equilibria[,] may
have no natural interpretation” (Osborne and Rubinstein, 1994, p. 47).
Our goal in this paper is to provide an alternative construction of correlated equilibrium
which, we believe, has a more natural interpretation than the canonical one. The main
idea behind our construction is that correlated play can be induced by the ambiguity of the
natural language through which players communicate. By ambiguity, we mean interpretive
uncertainty stemming from the fact that words or sentences can have a plurality of meanings.
Let us consider an example. Suppose a central banker delivers the following public speech:
“If the GDP growth is sustained, then interest rates will be kept constant; otherwise they
will be lowered”. Firms listen to the speech in order to decide on their investments, which
depend on future interest rates. But what is the true content of the banker’s statement?
More specifically, how should the antecedent “if the GDP growth is sustained” be interpreted?
Is there a threshold x such that if the actual growth rate y is greater than x then it is really
the case that “the GDP growth is sustained”? One can argue that such a threshold x does
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exist but, unless its value is explicitly stipulated in some contract or convention, it is not
necessarily unique. A firm i may think that the threshold is xi, whereas firm j believes that
it is xj 6= xi. In addition, either firm does not know what threshold the other is using to
classify the growth rate as sustained or not. In sum, even if the banker’s speech is public, it
may convey differential information to those who hear it. Differently put, uncertainty about
the interpretation of an ambiguous statement acts like a correlating device that sends private
messages to players, so inducing differential information.
The backbone of our analysis is the following process of communication and coordination.
In a given simultaneous-move game, players receive information about the prevailing state
of the world at the pre-play stage. Information is not payoff relevant, and it may come
in different varieties. It can be a public speech, a private signal, a sunspot, etc. Players
have the opportunity to condition their play on the information received in the pre-play
stage. They do so by means of a coordination strategy, which is a public list of conditional
statements on how to play the game. In the banker’s example, a coordination strategy can
contain the following statements: “if interest rates will be kept constant, then only firm
i invests” and “if interest rates will be lowered, everybody invests”. Firms publicly agree
to follow the action recommendations contained in the coordination strategy. But due to
language ambiguity, firms do not know with certainty how others will interpret the strategy
recommendations and, therefore, how they will react to the banker’s speech. As in the
standard case, this uncertainty can sustain equilibrium payoffs that are outside the convex
hull of Nash equilibrium payoffs of the underlying game.
Contrary to the standard construction of correlated equilibrium, we separate messages
from their meaning. We do so by modeling explicitly the language through which players
communicate. A language is a set of well-defined formulas that describe every relevant
aspect of the world. To capture ambiguity, we use the logic of Halpern and Kets (2015). In
it, truthfulness of formulas is defined relative to a player. Consequently, there can be states
of the world where different players give different truth values to the very same formula.
Players can disagree on a subset of formulas, namely those constructed as the conjunction
or negation of primitive propositions, whereas the interpretation of probability formulas, i.e.
beliefs, is the same for everybody. This means that every player is sophisticated enough to
understand that others might be using different information partitions to form their beliefs.
Our main contribution is to provide a syntactic construction of correlated equilibrium.
We consider two cases. In the first, we model the communication and coordination process
illustrated in the central banker’s example under the assumption that language is not am-
biguous. We show that, for any finite game, any self-enforcing coordination strategy induces
an objective correlated equilibrium distribution of the underlying game. In addition, any
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objective correlated equilibrium distribution of the underlying game can be induced by some
coordination strategy in some unambiguous epistemic structure capturing players’ interpre-
tations of formulas in the language. In the second case, we allow language to be ambiguous.
We obtain the same characterization as in the unambiguous case with the proviso that equi-
librium distributions are now subjective correlated equilibria. We thus show that language
ambiguity provides a justification for heterogeneous beliefs about strategic play.
We illustrate the model in Section 3.2. It consists of three parts: the syntax (how formulas
are formed), the semantics (how meaning to formulas is assigned), and the coordination
process. Results are presented in Section 3.3, where the two cases of common-interpretation
and ambiguous epistemic structures are treated separately.
3.1.1 Related literature
Correlated equilibrium is introduced in Aumann (1974). A reformulation of it in a decision-
theoretic framework is provided in Aumann (1987). Our analysis is related to the following
strands of the literature.
First, a classical literature initiated by Forges (1988, 1990) and Bárány (1992) studies
whether and how correlated equilibrium can be obtained in a decentralized manner, i.e.
without the help of a mediator. In our analysis, a mediator is not strictly necessary in that
the information that players receive in the pre-play stage can be interpreted as a sunspot à
la Cass and Shell (1983).
Lehrer (1996), Lehrer and Sorin (1997), and Di Tillio (2004) study public mediated talk
in which correlation is achieved trough a machine that receives private inputs and sends out
public recommendations. If we assume that the information in our model is provided by
a mediator, then communication is always one-way, i.e. from the mediator to the players.
Under this interpretation, correlation is achieved through uncertainty about the messages
sent by the mediator. Players do not need to exchange messages with each other, nor do
they need to send reports to the mediator.
Blume and Board (2013) examine strategic interaction under the assumption that players
differ in their “language competence”, i.e. their ability to use language. They model language
explicitly. Other analyses aimed at modeling ambiguity (or vagueness) in natural language
include Lipman (2009) and De Jaegher (2003). However, none of these papers use the
syntactic approach as we do.
Our work is also related to the literature on epistemic foundations of solution concepts
initiated by Aumann and Brandenburger (1995). The main goal of this literature is to find
epistemic conditions that give rise to standard solution concepts. The approach is to model
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explicitly how players reason about the game and, in particular, how they reason about
the rationality of their opponents. Recent contributions in which correlated equilibrium is
studied include Bach and Perea (2018) and Barelli (2009). Rather than rational play, the
focus of our analysis is on how players reason about the realization of extraneous signals,
and how this reasoning is affected by language ambiguity. All the contributions mentioned
so far are carried out from a set-theoretic perspective. But another branch of the research
program on epistemic foundations uses techniques from modal logic, as is done in Lorini and
Schwarzentruber (2010) and Galeazzi and Lorini (2016). An extensive overview is provided
in De Bruin (2010). To the best of our knowledge, our analysis would be the first to use
modal logic to examine ambiguity about the interpretation of extraneous signals in games.
As we already mentioned, we build on the logic of Halpern and Kets (2015). In particular,
the syntax (Section 3.2.1) and the semantics (Section 3.2.2) are theirs.
3.2 Model
Let G = (I, (Ai, ui)i∈I) be a finite game with simultaneous moves. The set of players is
I = {1, . . . , n}. For every i ∈ I, Ai is a non-empty, finite set of actions, and ui : ×j∈IAj −→ R
is the corresponding payoff function. As is standard, we define A := ×i∈IAi and, for any i,
A−i := ×j 6=iAj.
Players coordinate their play in G on the realizations of a payoff-irrelevant signal. In
the pre-play stage, they agree on a list of instructions that tell them how to play the game
conditional on signal observations. Players’ reasoning about the game and the signals is
captured by a formal language, which we are going to model explicitly. We describe the
syntax in subsection 3.2.1, the semantics in subsection 3.2.2, and the coordination strategy
in subsection 3.2.3.
3.2.1 Syntax
The fundamental object is a non-empty, countable set Φ of primitive propositions, with
typical elements p, q, . . . . Propositions in Φ describe non-epistemic aspects of the world.
A language L(Φ) is a set of well-formed formulas constructed from Φ through syntactic
rules. Since no confusion should arise, from now on we omit the reference to Φ and write
L. The formulas contained in L determine the expressiveness of the language, i.e. the set
of epistemic and non-epistemic aspects of the world that players can reason about. We
construct L according to the following syntax:
• If p ∈ Φ, then p is a formula in L;
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• Negation: If ϕ ∈ L, then ¬ϕ (“not ϕ”) is a formula in L;
• Conjunction: If ϕ, ψ ∈ L, then ϕ ∧ ψ (“ϕ and ψ”) is a formula in L;
• Probability formulas : If ϕ1, . . . , ϕk ∈ L and b1, . . . , bk, c ∈ R, then, for every i ∈ I,
b1pri(ϕ1) + · · ·+ bkpri(ϕk) ≥ c
is a formula in L. The intended reading of pri(ϕ) ≥ x is “the probability that player i
ascribes to formula ϕ is at least x”;
• Modal operator CB: If ϕ ∈ L, then CBϕ (“it is commonly believed that ϕ”) is a formula
in L.
Probability formulas allow players to reason about beliefs and expected payoffs. We also
want L to be sufficiently rich to describe how agents play the game G and how they interpret
the signals that they observe. Hence we assume that, for every i ∈ I, and for every ai ∈ Ai,
there is a primitive proposition pliai in Φ. The intended reading of pliai is “i chooses ai”
or, equivalently, “i plays ai”. We assume that all these propositions describing choices are
distinct elements, i.e. if pliai = pljbj, then i = j and ai = bj. Let ΦG be the finite subset of Φ
containing all such propositions about choices in G. In order to describe signals, let Φ∗ be the
set obtained by closing off Φ\ΦG under negation and conjunction. Notice that formulas in
Φ∗ describe non-epistemic aspects of the world that are not payoff-relevant. We assume that
there is a finite subset Σ ⊆ Φ∗ of signals. Furthermore, if σ ∈ Σ, then {reci σ : i ∈ I} ⊆ Φ.
The intended reading of reci σ is “i has received signal σ”.
We make use of the following abbreviations:
• Implication: ϕ =⇒ ψ (“ϕ implies ψ”) is an abbreviation for ¬ (ϕ ∧ ¬ψ);
• Belief operator : Biϕ (“i believes that ϕ”) is an abbreviation for
(pri(ϕ) ≥ 1) ∧ (−pri(ϕ) ≥ −1) ;
• Mutual belief operator : EBϕ (“everybody believes that ϕ”) is an abbreviation for
∧i∈IBiϕ. In addition, we define EBmϕ (“ϕ is mth-order mutual belief”) recursively:




for m ≥ 2;
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• Ui(ai) is the abbreviation for the probability formula∑
(a1,...,ai−1,ai+1,...,an)∈A−i
ui(a1, . . . , an) pri
(




The intended reading of Ui(ai) is “the expected payoff to i from playing ai”. In order
for this intended reading to be meaningful, the probabilities that i ascribes to formulas
in (3.1) must be non-negative and sum up to one. Under the assumptions we make
in Subsections 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, it is always the case that these probabilities are well-
defined, so making the reading of Ui(ai) as expected payoff unproblematic.
• a∗i = ai is the abbreviation for
∧a′i∈Ai (Ui(ai) ≥ Ui(a
′
i)) .
The intended reading of a∗i = ai is “ai is utility-maximizing”.
• rati is the abbreviation for
∧ai∈Ai (pliai =⇒ (a∗i = ai)) . (3.2)
The intended reading of rati is “i is rational”. Notice that (3.2) is equivalent to saying
that i never chooses an action that is not utility-maximizing.
3.2.2 Semantics
We need a semantic model to assign meaning to formulas in L. That is, we need a consistent
set of rules to determine whether any given formula is true or false. The semantic model
we use is an epistemic probability structure in which the interpretation of primitive proposi-
tions is player-dependent. Formally, an epistemic probability structure M over Φ is a tuple
(Ω, µ, {πi}i∈I , {Hi}i∈I), where:
• Ω is a non-empty, finite set of states or possible worlds;
• µ is a common prior on (the power set of) Ω;
• πi : Ω× Φ −→ {0, 1} is agent i’s interpretation function. Agent i deems proposition p
as true in state ω if πi(ω, p) = 1, and false otherwise;
• Hi is agent i’s information partition over Ω, with typical element hi. We write hi(ω) to
indicate the cell containing the states that i considers as possible when the true state
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is ω. We make assumptions on how information partitions are determined by signals
at the end of this subsection.
The finiteness of Ω is without loss of generality since we are confining ourselves to finite
games. The player-dependent interpretation function πi captures language ambiguity: in a
given world, different agents may assign different truth values to the very same primitive
proposition. If πi = πj for all i, j ∈ I, then we say that M is a common-interpretation
structure. The latter corresponds to the standard case without ambiguity where the in-
terpretation of every formula is player-independent. If M is not a common-interpretation
structure, then we call it ambiguous.
Agents update beliefs through Bayes’s rule. Given any event E ⊆ Ω, agent i’s posterior





To ensure that posteriors are always well-defined, we assume that µ(hi(ω)) > 0 for every
state ω ∈ Ω and every player i ∈ I.
Meaning to formulas in a structure M is given inductively. The expression (M,ω, i)  ϕ
means that ϕ holds at ω according to player i in structure M . In addition, the intension of a
formula ϕ to player i is [[ϕ]]i := {ω ∈ Ω : (M,ω, i)  ϕ}, i.e. the set of states where i deems
ϕ as true in structure M . Meaning to formulas is given as follows:
• If p is a primitive proposition in Φ, then (M,ω, i)  p iff πi(ω, p) = 1;
• (M,ω, i)  ϕ ∧ ψ iff (M,ω, i)  ϕ and (M,ω, i)  ψ;
• (M,ω, i)  ¬ϕ iff (M,ω, i) 6 ϕ;
• (M,ω, i)  b1prj(ϕ1) + · · ·+ bkprj(ϕk) ≥ c iff
b1 µ ([[ϕ1]]j|hj(ω)) + · · ·+ bk µ ([[ϕk]]j|hj(ω)) ≥ c; (3.3)
• (M,ω, i)  Bjϕ iff µ ([[ϕ]]j|hj(ω)) = 1;
• (M,ω, i)  CBϕ iff (M,ω, i)  EBkϕ for k = 1, 2, . . . .
We emphasize that meaning to a formula is always given relative to a player. Due to
language ambiguity, there can be states where different players assign different meaning to
the very same formula. Formally, there can be states and formulas such that (M,ω, i)  ϕ
and (M,ω, j)  ¬ϕ for some i and j. However, players are fully sophisticated in that
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they understand that others are using different information partitions to update beliefs1.
Consequently, everybody agrees on the interpretation of probability formulas. As can be
seen from (3.3), according to player i, agent j assigns probability at least c to a formula ϕ if
and only if the set of worlds where ϕ holds according to j has probability at least c according
to j. When the interpretation of a formula ϕ is player-independent at a state ω, we simplify
notation and write (M,ω)  ϕ instead of (M,ω, i)  ϕ for all i ∈ I. In addition, we write
M  ϕ when (M,ω, i)  ϕ for every ω ∈ Ω and every i ∈ I. In this case, we also say that ϕ
is valid in M .
We now make two assumptions about the interpretation of signals and information par-
titions.
Assumption 4. For every i, j ∈ I,
• the collection
{[[reci σ]]j : σ ∈ Σ and [[reci σ]]j 6= ∅}
is a partition of Ω;
• for every σ, σ′ ∈ Σ, if [[reci σ]]j = [[reci σ′]]j 6= ∅, then σ = σ′.
The assumption says that, according to any player, everyone receives one, and only one,
signal at every state. Because of ambiguity, the event of i’s receiving signal σ can be in-
terpreted differently by different agents. For instance, it could be the case that (M,ω, i) 
reci σ∧¬reci σ′ and (M,ω, j)  reci σ′∧¬reci σ, where σ 6= σ′. For ease of reference, we write
σi,ω to denote the necessarily unique signal that i thinks she is observing at state ω.
Assumption 5. For every i ∈ I and every ω ∈ Ω,
hi(ω) = [[reci σi,ω]]i.
The assumption says that a player’s information is determined by the signal she thinks
she is observing. More specifically, the worlds that i considers as possible at ω are all those
where i thinks that she is observing the same signal as in ω. Notice that ω ∈ hi(ω) and, if
ω′ ∈ hi(ω), then σi,ω = σi,ω′ .
The following example is meant to illustrate how one can use the main concepts introduced
so far to capture ambiguity.
1This is the innermost-scope semantics of Halpern and Kets (2014).
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Example 1 There are two agents: A(nn) and B(ob). Suppose there is a primitive propo-
sition p ∈ Φ, whose intended reading is “the air temperature is extreme”. According to Ann,
temperatures are extreme if they are at most xA or at least yA. According to Bob, temper-
atures are extreme if they are at most xB or at least yB. Suppose xA < xB < yA < yB. The
set of possible states of the world is represented in Table 3.1.
State Temperature Ann Bob
ω1 xA recA p recB p
ω2 yA recA p recB ¬p




recA ¬p recB ¬p
Table 3.1: States of the world
Each state is a complete description of all the epistemic and non-epistemic aspects of the
world. In state ω1, the actual temperature is xA. Therefore, the proposition p is deemed as
true by both Ann and Bob. But in state ω2, p is true according to Ann and false according
to Bob. Their disagreement stems from language ambiguity. Since p can be given a plurality
of meanings, different agents may interpret it differently. We emphasize that, in ambiguous
structures, there can be primitive propositions whose interpretation is not ambiguous at all.
For instance, suppose that also the primitive proposition q is in Φ, where q stands for “the
air temperature is xA”. This proposition is unambiguous, and both Ann and Bob interpret
it as true in state ω1 and false otherwise.
The true state of the world is observed through signals. Suppose that the set of signals
is Σ = {p,¬p}. In addition, each player receives σ ∈ Σ in a given state if and only if he
or she deems σ as true in that state. Each row of Table 3.1 indicates the signals received
by either player in the corresponding state. We assume that the interpretation of formulas
of the form reciσ is not ambiguous. For instance, we have (M,ω2)  recA p ∧ recB¬p even
if (M,ω2, A)  p and (M,ω2, B)  ¬p. In words, Ann thinks at ω2 that Bob receives the
signal “the air temperature is not extreme” while she thinks that the temperature is actually
extreme. We use the formulas of the form reciσ to obtain the following information partitions:
HA = {{ω1, ω2}, {ω3, ω4}}
HB = {{ω1, ω3}, {ω2, ω4}} .
Suppose that the common prior µ is uniform over Ω. We now want to make a few remarks
on how agents form beliefs. We start by noticing that
(M,ω1, A)  BA p ∧ BB p
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(M,ω1, B)  BA p ∧ BB p,
or, in compact notation, (M,ω1)  EB p. That is, everybody believes that p at ω1. This
follows from the fact that
µ ([[p]]A|hA(ω1)) = µ ({ω1, ω2}|{ω1, ω2}) = 1
µ ([[p]]B|hB(ω1)) = µ ({ω1, ω3}|{ω1, ω3}) = 1.
However, it holds that (M,ω1)  ¬BABB p. In words, Ann does not believe that Bob believes
that p. Indeed we have




Therefore, even if Ann and Bob receive the very same signal “the air temperature is extreme”
in state ω1, it is not common belief between them that this is indeed the case. More specif-
ically, the formula p (and the formulas recA p and recB p) is a first-order mutual belief at
ω1, but it is not a second-order mutual belief. A fortiori, p is not commonly believed. This
shows how ambiguity generates higher-order uncertainty in the interpretation of formulas.
Things would be different if the epistemic structure had common interpretation. Suppose
that both agents have the same interpretation function as in Ann’s column in Table 3.1. It
is then immediate that, in state ω1, the formula p (and the formulas recA p and recB p) is not
just first-order mutual belief but also common belief. Formally, (M,ω1)  CB p.
3.2.3 Coordination
We now describe how agents make choices in G. We start by assuming the following.
Assumption 6. In any structure M , for every i ∈ I and every ai ∈ Ai,
M  pliai =⇒ ∧a′i 6=ai (¬plia
′
i) .
The assumption simply says that (it is commonly believed that) everyone does not play
more than one action in each state.
Agents have the opportunity to coordinate their choices in G through signals in Σ. More
specifically, they can devise a coordination strategy C that tells them how to playG depending
on the realizations of signals in Σ.
Definition 1 (Coordination strategy). A coordination strategy C is a finite subset of L such
that:
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1. for each player i ∈ I and each signal σ ∈ Σ, there is a unique action ai ∈ Ai such that
the formula reci σ =⇒ pliai belongs to C;
2. for every ϕ ∈ C, M  ϕ.
A coordination strategy is a finite list of conditional propositions of the following form:
“if i receives signal σ, then i plays action ai”, “if j receives signal σ′, then j plays action aj”,
and so on. Notice that a strategy associates every signal with one, and only one, action for
each player, but different signals may be associated with the same action recommendation.
The strategy is public in that every formula contained in it is valid inM , hence it is common
knowledge among everyone.
A coordination strategy is a set of instructions. Definition 1 ensures that such a set is
complete, i.e. it provides everyone with an action recommendation for every signal realization
that can possibly be observed. But it says nothing about the rationality, or lack thereof,
of these recommended actions. Therefore, we want to restrict our analysis to epistemic
structures, and coordination strategies, that meet minimal rationality requirements.
Assumption 7 (Individual rationality). In any structure M , for every i ∈ I, it holds that
(M, i)  rati.
The assumption says that every i chooses an action only if she deems it utility-maximizing.
In other words, it is always true, according to player i, that i’s choices are utility-maximizing.
As a consequence, i always believes in her own rationality, and it is commonly believed that
it is so. When the underlying epistemic structure has common interpretation, Assumption
7 is tantamount to assuming common belief in rationality, i.e. common belief in the event
that everyone is rational.
Remark 1. Let M be a structure satisfying Assumption 7. Then we have:
1. M  CB (∧i∈IBi (rati));
2. If M is a common-interpretation structure, then M  CB (∧i∈Irati).
Proof. By Assumption 7 and the definition of the belief operator, we have that, for every i ∈
I, (M, i)  Bi (rati). Since the interpretation of probability formulas is player-independent,
the latter is equivalent to M  Bi (rati) for every i ∈ I. Therefore, the formula ∧i∈IBi (rati)
is valid in M , and it is always common belief that it is a true formula.
Now suppose that M is a common-interpretation structure. Thus we have that, for every
i, j ∈ I, (M, i)  rati if and only if (M, j)  rati. But then it is immediate to getM  ∧i∈Irati,
from which the result follows.
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In an individually rational structure, any coordination strategy C is self-enforcing in that
no one has the incentive to disobey its action recommendations. Formally, for every ω and
every i, there exists a unique signal σ such that
(M,ω, i)  reciσ ∧ pliai ∧ (a∗i = ai),
where ai is the action prescribed by the formula reciσ =⇒ pliai in C. To see why this is the
case, observe the following. First, Assumptions 4 and 5 assure that there is a unique signal
σ = σi,ω such that (M,ω, i)  reci σ. Second, this signal is associated to a unique action by
the coordination strategy C: there is a unique action ai with reci σ =⇒ pliai in C such
that M  reci σ =⇒ pliai. Third, the previous two points together imply (M,ω, i)  pliai.
Finally, by Assumption 7, we also get (M,ω, i)  (a∗i = ai).
3.3 Results
Our goal is to characterize the probability distributions over A that are induced by a given
coordination strategy. Formally, every coordination strategy C induces a profile (γi)i∈I of
probability distributions over A. For every i, we define
γi(a1, . . . , an) := µ ([[pl1a1 ∧ · · · ∧ plnan]]i) = µ ({ω : (M,ω, i)  pl1a1 ∧ · · · ∧ plnan}) . (3.4)
Each γi is a well-defined probability distribution. First, it is clear from (3.4) that γi(a) ≥ 0
for every a ∈ A. Second, by Assumptions 4 and 5, and Definition 1, for every ω there exists
an action profile a ∈ A such that (M,ω, i)  pl1a1 ∧ · · · ∧ plnan. Third, by Assumption 6,
a 6= a′ implies that
[[pl1a1 ∧ · · · ∧ plnan]]i ∩ [[pl1a′1 ∧ · · · ∧ plna′n]]i = ∅.
Therefore we have that
∑
a∈A γi(a) = 1. From now on, when no confusion should arise, we
abuse notation and write pla instead of pl1a1∧ · · ·∧plnan, and pl−ia−i instead of pl1a1∧ · · ·∧
pli−1ai−1 ∧ pli+1ai+1 ∧ · · · plnan.
3.3.1 Common-interpretation structures
Let us consider first the case of common-interpretation structures. It is clear that, under
common interpretation, γi = γj for every i, j ∈ I. Thus we simplify things by dropping the
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subscript i. For any a ∈ A we can write:
γ(a1, . . . , an) = µ ([[pl1a1 ∧ · · · ∧ plnan]]) .
Recall that a probability distribution γ ∈ ∆(A) is a correlated equilibrium of G if, for
every i ∈ I and every ai ∈ Ai,∑
a−i∈A−i
[ui(ai, a−i)− ui(a′i, a−i)] γ(ai, a−i) ≥ 0 for every a′i ∈ Ai.
We can now establish the first result.
Proposition 4. Let M be a common-interpretation epistemic structure satisfying Assump-
tions 4-7. Then any coordination strategy induces a correlated equilibrium of G.
Proof. The argument is standard. Suppose
∑
a−i∈A−i γ(ai, a−i) > 0. Then we have:∑
a−i∈A−i
[ui(ai, a−i)− ui(a′i, a−i)] γ(ai, a−i) ∝
∑
a−i∈A−i
[ui(ai, a−i)− ui(a′i, a−i)] γ(a−i|ai), (3.5)
and the right hand side of (3.5) is equal to∑
a−i∈A−i





Now we argue that the event [[pliai]] in (3.6) is the union of some cells of Hi. Assumptions
4 and 5 imply that, for every cell hi ∈ Hi, there exists a unique signal σ ∈ Σ such that
(M,ω)  reci σ for every ω ∈ hi. Combining this with Definition 1 and Assumption 6,
we can conclude that, for every hi ∈ Hi, there exists a unique action a′i ∈ Ai such that
(M,ω)  pli a
′
i for every ω ∈ hi.
Since [[pliai]] can be written as the union of some cells of Hi, and by the law of total


























By Assumption 7, for every ω ∈ hi ⊆ [[pliai]], we have that (M,ω)  pliai ∧ (a∗i = ai).
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Therefore, (3.7) is non-negative, so proving the claim.
The result says that, in common-interpretation structures, self-enforcing coordination
strategies always lead to an objective correlated equilibrium of the underlying game. The
result can be interpreted as a syntactic version of the classical analysis of Aumann (1987).
The role of common-interpretation can be described as follows. Even if different agents may
receive different signals in the same state, everyone agrees on the profile of actions that is
being played at that state. It is never the case that i thinks that j is playing aj whereas
k thinks that j is playing bj in a given state. Differently put, agents can have different
information but they all share the same model or view of the world, so ruling out any form
of fundamental disagreement.
The next result is about the opposite direction, namely from correlated equilibria to
epistemic structures.
Proposition 5. Let γ be a correlated equilibrium of G. Then there exist an individually
rational, common-interpretation structure M , a set of signals Σ, and a coordination strategy
C that induce γ.
Proof. Suppose γ is a correlated equilibrium of G. Let A∗ ⊆ A be the support of γ. We
define a common-interpretation structure M = (Ω, µ, π, {Hi}i∈I) by constructing one state
ωa for each action profile a ∈ A∗, so that Ω = {ωa : a ∈ A∗}. The prior corresponds with the
correlated equilibrium: for each state ωa, we set µ(ωa) = γ(a). To define the interpretation
function π and the information partitions {Hi}i∈I , we first need to say more about formulas
in the language L.
Fix a set Σ of signals such that |Σ| = maxi∈I |Ai|. This allows us to choose, for each
player i ∈ I, an injective function si : Ai −→ Σ that we use to assign signals to players.
Since each si is injective, distinct actions correspond to different signals. The interpretation
function is a function π : Ω × Φ −→ {0, 1} such that, for all ωa ∈ Ω, i ∈ I, σ ∈ Σ, and
bi ∈ Ai,
π(ωa, reciσ) =
1 if σ = si(ai),0 otherwise and π(ωa, plibi) =
1 if bi = ai,0 otherwise.
This implies that, for each state ωa and each player i, the formula recisi(ai) ∧ pliai is
deemed true at ωa. For each player i, the information partition Hi is defined so that, for
each state ωa ∈ Ω, the cell hi(ωa) contains all the states where i receives the same signal.
By definition of si, we have
hi(ωa) = {ωb ∈ Ω : si(bi) = si(ai)} = {ωb ∈ Ω : bi = ai} . (3.8)
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One can easily verify that the structureM constructed thus far satisfies Assumptions 4-6.
To show that M is individually rational, suppose that (M,ωa)  pliai. Player i’s expected





























ui(ai, a−i)γ (ai, a−i) .
Therefore, since γ is a correlated equilibrium by assumption, we can conclude that
(M,ω)  a∗i = ai.
Finally, we need to construct a coordination strategy C that induces γ. For each i ∈ I
and each σ ∈ Σ, if σ is in the range of si, then the formula reciσ =⇒ pliai, with ai = s−1i (σ),
is in C. If σ is not in the range of si, then pick an arbitrary a′i ∈ Ai and add the formula
reciσ =⇒ plia′i to C. One can easily verify that C is indeed a coordination strategy as per
Definition 1, and that it induces the correlated equilibrium γ.
In the following example, we illustrate the construction that we have just used in proving
Proposition 5.
Example 2 Consider the base game G in Figure 3.1.
L C R
T 0, 0 2, 1 1, 2
M 1, 2 0, 0 2, 1
B 2, 1 1, 2 0, 0
Figure 3.1: The base game.
This game has a unique Nash equilibrium in which either player randomizes uniformly
over her available strategies. Consider the correlated equilibrium γ that puts weight 1
6
on
every action profile which gives strictly positive payoffs. We want to find an individually
rational, common-interpretation structure that induces such an equilibrium. We start by
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noticing that the support of γ is the following:
A∗ = {(T,C), (T,R), (M,L), (M,R), (B,L), (B,C)} .
Let the state space be Ω = {ωa : a ∈ A∗}. The common prior over Ω is uniform. Fix a
set of signals Σ = {σ, σ′, σ′′}. We assign signals to players through functions si : Ai −→ Σ,
with i = 1, 2, such that
(s1(T ), s1(M), s1(B)) = (s2(L), s2(C), s2(R)) = (σ, σ
′, σ′′).
The interpretation function is a function π : Ω × Φ −→ {0, 1} which satisfies the truth
assignments contained in the following table.
π ωTC ωTR ωML ωMR ωBL ωBC
rec1σ 1 1 0 0 0 0
rec1σ
′ 0 0 1 1 0 0
rec1σ
′′ 0 0 0 0 1 1
rec2σ 0 0 1 0 1 0
rec2σ
′ 1 0 0 0 0 1
rec2σ
′′ 0 1 0 1 0 0
pl1T 1 1 0 0 0 0
pl1M 0 0 1 1 0 0
pl1B 0 0 0 0 1 1
pl2L 0 0 1 0 1 0
pl2C 1 0 0 0 0 1
pl2R 0 1 0 1 0 0
By (3.8), information partitions are defined as follows:
H1 = {{ωTC , ωTR}, {ωML, ωMR}, {ωBL, ωBC}}
H2 = {{ωTC , ωBC}, {ωTR, ωMR}, {ωML, ωBL}} .
It is straightforward to verify that the structure M constructed so far is individually
rational.
Finally, the coordination strategy C that induces γ can be defined as follows:
C = {recisi(ai) =⇒ pliai : i ∈ {1, 2} and ai ∈ Ai} .
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Notice that C contains six formulas, and all of them are true in every state of the world.
This means that it is never the case that, say, player 1 receives signal σ′ and plays action T .
3.3.2 Ambiguous structures
We now characterize the equilibrium distributions induced by epistemic structures that are
possibly ambiguous. Recall that a profile of probability distributions (γ1, . . . , γn) over A is
a subjective correlated equilibrium of G if, for every i ∈ I and every ai ∈ Ai,∑
a−i∈A−i
[ui(ai, a−i)− ui(a′i, a−i)] γi(ai, a−i) ≥ 0 for every a′i ∈ Ai.
Then we have the following.
Proposition 6. Let M be an epistemic structure satisfying Assumptions 4-7. Then any
coordination strategy induces a subjective correlated equilibrium of G.
Proof. The argument is the same as in the proof of Proposition 4 with the proviso that, for













The result can be interpreted as follows. Even if players agree on a coordination strategy,
and even if they share a common prior, language ambiguity may cause them to ascribe
different probabilities to the same event, so leading to inconsistent beliefs. Players may
disagree on what action profile is being played in a given state. Contrary to common-
interpretation structures, it may well be the case that i thinks that j is playing aj whereas k
thinks that j is playing bj in a given state. Differently put, agents may have different views
of the world stemming from a fundamental disagreement about the interpretation of (some)
primitive propositions. We illustrate this point in the next example, where we describe
an ambiguous structure whose induced equilibrium distributions are a subjective correlated
equilibrium but not an objective correlated equilibrium.
Example 3 Consider the elementary coordination game in Figure 3.2.
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L R
U 1, 1 0, 0
D 0, 0 1, 1
Figure 3.2: The base game.
Suppose that the epistemic structure is the same as in Example 4.3 of Halpern and Kets
(2015). The state space is Ω = {ω, ω′}, and the common prior is uniform. The set of signals
is Σ = {σ, σ′}. Players disagree on the interpretation of signals. Values of their interpretation


























[[rec1σ]]1 = {ω} [[rec2σ]]1 = {ω}
[[rec1σ
′]]1 = {ω′} [[rec2σ′]]1 = {ω′}
for player 1 and
[[rec1σ]]2 = {ω, ω′} [[rec2σ]]2 = {ω, ω′}
[[rec1σ
′]]2 = ∅ [[rec2σ′]]2 = ∅
for player 2. In words, each agent thinks that the other always receives the same signal as
hers. Information partitions are given by:
H1 = {{ω}, {ω′}}
H2 = {{ω, ω′}} .
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Now suppose that the coordination strategy C contains the following four formulas:
rec1σ =⇒ pl1 U
rec2σ =⇒ pl2 L
rec1σ
′ =⇒ pl1 D
rec2σ
′ =⇒ pl2 R.
One can verify that C is self-enforcing. The induced subjective probability distributions
over A are γ1(U,L) = γ1(D,R) = 12 and γ2(U,L) = 1. Finally, we observe that (M,ω
′, 2) 
rec1σ ∧ pl1U ∧¬(a∗1 = U). In words, 2 thinks that 1 is choosing an action that is not utility-
maximizing. The reason is that, as we pointed out in Remark 1, individual rationality in
ambiguous structures does not entail common belief in rationality.
The next result is about the opposite direction, namely from subjective correlated equi-
libria to epistemic structures that induce them.
Proposition 7. Let (γ1, . . . , γn) be a subjective correlated equilibrium of G. Then there exist
an individually rational epistemic structureM , a set of signals Σ, and a coordination strategy
C that induce (γ1, . . . , γn).
Proof. The argument follows the same logic as in the proof of Proposition 5. Suppose
(γ1, . . . , γn) is a subjective correlated equilibrium of G. For every i ∈ I, let Ai∗ ⊆ A be the
support of γi. Define A∗ := ×i∈IAi∗. Elements a in A∗ are profiles of action profiles, and we
use the following notation:
a =
(




(a11, . . . , a
1
n), . . . , (a
n





We define an epistemic probability structure M = (Ω, µ, {πi}i∈I , {Hi}i∈I) as follows. We
construct one state ωa for each element a ∈ A∗, so that Ω = {ωa : a ∈ A∗}. The common




Now fix a set Σ of signals such that |Σ| = maxi∈I |Ai|. For each i ∈ I, we can choose
an injective function si : Ai −→ Σ that we use to assign signals to players. Since each si is
injective, distinct actions correspond to different signals. For each i ∈ I, the interpretation
function is a function πi : Ω × Φ −→ {0, 1} such that, for all ωa ∈ Ω, j ∈ I, σ ∈ Σ, and
bj ∈ Aj,
πi(ωa, recjσ) =
1 if σ = sj(aij),0 otherwise and πi(ωa, pljbj) =
1 if bj = aij,0 otherwise. (3.9)
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The above definition implies that, for each state ωa, and each player i, the formulas{
recjsj(a
i
j) ∧ pljaij : j ∈ I
}
are deemed as true at ωa by player i. For each i ∈ I, the infor-
mation partition Hi is defined so that, for each state ωa ∈ Ω, the cell hi(ωa) contains all the
states where, according to i, i receives the same signal. By definition of si, we have
hi(ωa) =
{




ωb ∈ Ω : bii = aii
}
. (3.10)
One can easily verify that the structureM constructed thus far satisfies Assumptions 4-6.
To show that M is individually rational, suppose that (M,ωa, i)  pliai. By (3.9), ai = aii.































{ωb ∈ Ω : bi = (ai, a−i)}
)
. (3.11)





1)× · · · × γi−1(bi−1)× γi+1(bi+1)× · · · × γn(bn)
 ,
(3.12)




ui(ai, a−i)γi (ai, a−i) .
Therefore, since γi is part of a subjective correlated equilibrium by assumption, we can
conclude that (M,ωa, i)  pliai ∧ (a∗i = ai).
It remains to construct a coordination strategy C that induces (γ1, . . . , γn). For each
i ∈ I and each σ ∈ Σ, if σ is in the range of the injective function si, then the formula
reciσ =⇒ pliai, with ai = s−1i (σ), is in C. If σ is not in the range of si, then pick an
arbitrary a′i ∈ Ai and add the formula reciσ =⇒ plia′i to C. One can easily verify that C
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is indeed a coordination strategy as per Definition 1. Finally, to show that it induces the
subjective correlated equilibrium (γ1, . . . , γn), by using (3.12), we have that, for every i ∈ I
and every (a1, . . . , an) ∈ A,
µ ([[pl1a1 ∧ · · · ∧ plnan]]i) = µ
(
{ωb ∈ Ω : bi = (a1, . . . , an)}
)
= γi(a1, . . . , an),
so ending the proof.
3.4 Discussion
We use the word ambiguity as it is done in linguistics, where it expresses the fact that
the map from sentences to meanings is multi-valued. Our analysis has nothing to do with
ambiguity in the decision-theoretic sense of not knowing the “true” probability distribution
of a certain event. We take ambiguity as a given and do not model why different players can
assign different truth values to the very same formula. Our interpretation is that ambiguity
is a structural property of natural language. Differently put, the map from sentences to
meanings induced by any natural language is not commonly known. The gist of our analysis
is that players can agree on sentences and, at the same time, disagree on meanings. When
strategic interaction is conditioned on sentences, it is the uncertainty about their meanings
that acts as a correlating device.
Introduced by Aumann (1974), the standard model for correlated equilibrium is set in
an event-based epistemic framework. That is, players reason about events which are repre-
sented as subsets of a given state space. The language through which agents describe events
is not modeled explicitly. Adopting a syntactic approach, our analysis consists in enriching
the standard model for correlated equilibrium with a formal language. As a consequence,
agents’ reasoning about the world and, in particular, the game they are going to play is
now expressed through formulas; the state space is a representation of how agents assign
meaning to formulas. The standard model can be seen as a reduced form model of the syn-
tactic approach we use. A comparison between the event-based and the syntactic epistemic
frameworks, but without game theoretic applications and without language ambiguity, can
be found in Halpern (2003).
Players are assumed to be fully rational. Even if they have different interpretation func-
tions, they fully understand that the interpretation of probability formulas, hence beliefs,
is not the same for everyone. In addition, their information is always partitional. We refer
to Brandenburger et al. (1992) for a construction of correlated equilibrium with boundedly
rational players. In their model, players make systematic mistakes in processing information,
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so leading to non-partitional information functions. They show that information processing
errors are equivalent to introduce “subjectivity” in beliefs. What we show in this paper is
that, without any information processing error, ambiguity in natural language provides a
justification for heterogeneous beliefs.
At first blush, it might be surprising that players having a common prior over a fixed state
space end up having different subjective beliefs about their play in the underlying game. The
reason why this is the case can be explained as follows. The state space Ω can be seen as
a collection of n models about the world. When all of these models are exactly the same,
then their “projection” over A is obviously the same for everybody. But when the subjective
models differ, different players might have different projections over A, because the event
(a1, . . . , an) is not the same for everybody (i.e. the set of states where it holds is not the
same for everyone). Differently put, language ambiguity induces subjectivity in how players
reason about their choices in G.
3.5 Conclusion
We have examined how players can coordinate their choices when the language through
which they communicate is possibly ambiguous. The gist of our results is that, when players
publicly agree to condition their play on a set of sentences, the meaning of these sentences is
not necessarily commonly known because of language ambiguity. The resulting uncertainty
acts as a correlating device, so inducing correlated equilibrium distributions over outcomes.
We believe that our analysis also provides a justification for why subjective beliefs about
strategic play may not be consistent.
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Chapter 4
Persuading a committee with privately
known preferences
4.1 Introduction
It is often the case that decision-makers have to rely on the information provided by self-
interested third parties. Juries reach a verdict on the basis of the information provided by a
prosecutor; voters are persuaded to vote for a certain candidate through political campaigns;
hiring committees review candidates based on the evidence they provide about their skills;
and so on. A recent and fruitful approach to model this kind of situations goes under the
name of Bayesian Persuasion or Information Design. The basic idea is that the information
designer chooses a disclosure policy before observing the realization of some fundamental
parameter of interest. Existing research shows that Information Design is a rather powerful
tool in that it allows the designer to attain a relatively large set of potential outcomes.
However, this hinges upon a number of rather strong assumptions. For instance, it is typically
assumed that decision-makers’ preferences are commonly known.
In this paper we study the Information Design problem of a persuader who wants to
induce a committee to take a certain action. Contrary to existing models, we assume that
committee members’ preferences about the option to implement are not commonly known.
Examples of such situations are not hard to find. A prosecutor may be uncertain about the
composition of the jury she is addressing. More specifically, she may not know if a given
juror is relatively tough or lenient. Similarly, a job candidate may not be sure about the
composition of the hiring committee who is reviewing her job application in that different
members might be expert in different domains. The fundamental question we address is:
How should the designer choose her persuasion strategy when she is facing this kind of
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uncertainty?
We consider a model where a two-member, possibly heterogeneous committee is called
upon to choose between two alternatives. The evaluation of either alternative depends on
an underlying, unobservable state of nature. Had there been no uncertainty about the
state, both committee members would agree on the decision to make. However, under
uncertainty they might disagree in that they require different amounts of evidence about
the state in order to vote in favor of a given alternative. The information designer provides
the committee with evidence about the state. Her preferences are not perfectly aligned with
those of the committee because she wants to implement one of the two policies irrespective of
the underlying state, whereas both committee members would like to implement one policy
in one state and the alternative policy in the other. Furthermore, the designer does not
know how much evidence a committee member needs in order to vote for any given option.
More specifically, there are two possible types of committee members: those who require
a relatively small amount of evidence to vote for the designer’s preferred alternative (low
types) and those who are harder to persuade (high types).
We characterize the designer’s optimal persuasion strategy in a number of contexts. In
order to do that, we build on Bergemann and Morris (2019) and adapt their unified framework
on Information Design. First, we consider the case in which the designer is allowed to elicit
private information. She asks committee members to confidentially report their preference
types and then she discloses information about the state of nature based on these reports.
This entails that two sets of constraints have to be taken into account, namely obedience
and truth-telling. We analyze both the scenario where a unanimous consent is needed to
implement the designer’s preferred option and the alternative case where a single approval is
sufficient. Secondly, we study the designer’s problem when she is not allowed to elicit private
information. That is, she has a prior distribution about preference types and discloses
information just on the basis of it, without asking committee members to transmit any
information at all. This implies that only obedience constraints have to be taken into account.
Also in this case, both unanimity and single approval are considered.
We show that the optimal persuasion strategy crucially depends on the informativeness
of the prior. We identify three possible cases. If the designer is sufficiently confident that no
committee member is of the high type, then she tailors her strategy entirely to low types and
gives up on persuading high type members. Intuitively, truth-telling constraints require that,
in order to persuade high types, low type members have to vote for the designer’s preferred
option with lower probability. This implies that the expected gain from persuading the
former is more than compensated by the loss arising from the latter. In the intermediate
case, the designer is sufficiently confident that one committee member is of the high type, but
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not both of them. By the same argument as above, she finds it optimal not to persuade the
committee to adopt her preferred policy when both members declare to have a high preference
parameter. In the remaining case, the designer is confident enough that the committee is
composed of high type members. The optimal strategy is now to induce both members to
vote for the designer’s preferred policy irrespective of the private information they transmit
to her. To guarantee that incentive constraints are satisfied, the exact probabilities with
which either alternative is recommended are determined by the high preference type.
The above qualitative features of the optimal persuasion strategy are shown to hold irre-
spective of whether the designer elicits information and of the voting rule adopted. However,
significant differences in the designer’s gains from the optimal strategy arise. Not surpris-
ingly, both information elicitation and non-unanimous voting rules are beneficial to the
designer. Furthermore, uncertainty about committee members’ preferences always entails a
loss for the designer with respect to the benchmark case with commonly known preference
parameters.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the remainder of this section we discuss the related
literature. Then in section 4.2 we set up the model and analyze the benchmark case where
preference parameters are commonly known. In Section 4.3 we study the case of privately
known preferences when the designer is allowed to elicit information from committee mem-
bers. First we introduce the appropriate solution concept and then we give a full characteri-
zation of the designer’s optimal persuasion strategy. The case without information elicitation
is studied in section 4.4. A discussion of results and modeling choices is contained in section
4.5.
Related literature
The paper contributes to the literature on Information Design (or Bayesian Persuasion)
with multiple receivers. The fundamental question in this literature is how to design an
information structure so as to induce one or more agents, who base their decisions on that
information, to take a certain action. The seminal contribution is Kamenica and Gentzkow
(2011). They study the case with one Sender and one Receiver. Using the technique of
concavification, they provide a simple and elegant characterization of the Sender’s value
function in terms of the Receiver’s posterior beliefs about an underlying state of nature. As
a consequence, the Sender’s preferred optimal signal can easily be identified. Furthermore,
they show that, for a large class of environments, Bayesian persuasion is strictly beneficial
to the Sender.
The framework of Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) has been extended along several dimen-
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sions, and used in many applications. In the sequel, we confine our attention to contributions
that are closest to this paper. Taneva (2019) studies the case with finitely many receivers.
She establishes a revelation principle and provides a full characterization of the information
structures that can be implemented in a class of binary games with strategic complements
or substitutes, showing that public signals are typically optimal for persuading players in
games with strategic complements while privately observed signals are optimal for games
with strategic substitutes. In a slightly more general environment, Bergemann and Morris
(2016a) introduce the solution concept of Bayes Correlated Equilibrium, which is a general-
ization of the classical Correlated equilibrium to Bayesian games where players are uncertain
not only about their opponents’ types but also about some underlying state of nature. They
show that, for a given game, the set of outcome distributions that the Sender can induce by
using any feasible information structure is the same as the set of Bayes Correlated Equilibria
of that game. Since the latter set has a more tractable structure than the former, it turns
out that the Sender’s problem of choosing an information structure can be solved by work-
ing exclusively with Bayes Correlated Equilibria. Incidentally, the concavification technique
cannot always be used when more than two receivers are considered.
It is important to point out that Bayesian Correlated Equilibrium is a suitable solution
concept in Information Design provided that one of the following two assumptions are met:
a) the receivers do not have any private information about the underlying state of nature, or
b) receivers have private information about the state but the Sender can condition her action
recommendations on the actual piece of information that each receiver observes. If neither
assumption is satisfied, one has to use different solution concepts in order to characterize the
set of implementable outcome distributions. Bergemann and Morris (2016b, 2019) provide
these solutions concepts. More specifically, if the Sender is allowed to ask receivers to report
the private information they have, then the set of implementable outcomes is identified by a
state-contingent version of the Communication equilibrium of Myerson (1982). If the Sender
does not have any access to the receivers’ private information, then the set of implementable
outcomes is identified by a state-contingent version of the Strategic Form Correlated Equi-
librium of Forges (1993, 2006). The framework we use to carry out our analysis is that of
Bergemann and Morris (2019).
Kolotilin et al. (2017) also consider the problem of designing information with privately
informed receivers, and they focus on the case with only one receiver. They compare two
kinds of mechanisms. With private mechanisms, the Sender elicits the receiver’s private
information through communication; with public mechanisms, the Sender designs experi-
ments that are not contingent on reported information. They show that, for a large class of
environments, the two types of mechanisms are outcome-equivalent.
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Before turning our attention to applications, we point out that all of the contributions
mentioned so far rely, more or less explicitly, on the revelation principle. That is, they all
assume that the Sender is able to fully commit to the information structure she announces
and to select the resulting equilibrium she prefers. A different approach has been proposed
by Mathevet et al. (2019). Considering environments where the revelation principle does not
necessarily hold, they tackle the Information Design problem by working directly with belief
hierarchies over the underlying state. They show that any solution can be represented as
the combination of a private and a public component. Interestingly, the latter is obtained
by making use of the concavification technique that Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011) use in
the case with only one receiver.
As for applications with privately informed receivers, Bergemann et al. (2018) analyze a
model with a monopolist (data seller) and a consumer (data buyer). The latter has private
information about a decision-relevant variable and can buy additional information from the
monopolist. They identify the revenue-maximizing menu of experiments and study their
properties. While they do allow for transfers, we rule them out in our analysis and assume
that information is disclosed by the Sender at no cost.
The problem of persuading a committee (or group of voters) has been studied in a number
of contributions within the Information Design literature. Wang (2013) studies a binary (i.e.
with two states) voting game with n players. She makes a comparison between persuasion
with public signals and persuasion through private signals, showing that the former is always
at least as good for the Sender as the latter. However, this result hinges upon the assumption
that private signals are independent of each other and therefore uncorrelated. Relaxing this
assumption, Chan et al. (2019) provide a full characterization of the optimal information
structure in the same baseline game. They show that the use of correlated signals is strictly
beneficial to the Sender when non-unanimous voting rules are adopted. Furthermore, they
restrict the set of feasible information structures by requiring that only minimal winning
coalitions can implement the Sender’s preferred alternative. A related analysis is conducted
in Alonso and Câmara (2016). They characterize the optimal persuasion mechanism and
study the relationship between voters’ welfare and the voting rule adopted. They find that,
from the voters’ perspective, simple majority rules might be sub-optimal. Their analysis
allows for public signals only and does not consider private persuasion. In all the contri-
butions mentioned so far, voters preferences are commonly known, and they do not possess
any private information whatsoever. To the best of our knowledge, our paper is the first to
study the problem of designing information for a group of receivers under the assumption
that their preferences are not commonly known.
Outside of the Information Design literature, Caillaud and Tirole (2007) study how to
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persuade a committee and cast their problem into the framework of costly information ac-
quisition in mechanism design. They show that the Sender’s optimal policy is to sequentially
disclose information to selected subgroups of committee members.
This paper also touches upon the literature on strategic voting under incomplete infor-
mation. Our basic game is essentially the same as the jury model studied in Austen-Smith
and Banks (1996). Furthermore, the Bayes Communication Equilibrium we characterize in
the section on persuasion with elicitation is a state-contingent version of the Communication
equilibrium in deliberative voting of Gerardi and Yariv (2007). The fundamental difference
with both models is that in our paper the information structure is the designer’s decision
variable whereas in the literature on rational voting the information structure is taken as
given.
Finally, our analysis is also related to the literature on persuasion games, for example
Glazer and Rubinstein (2004, 2006). However, the key difference is that in persuasion games
the information provided to the (single) decision maker is a variable chosen by an informed
persuader, whereas in our model the persuader/sender does not have any informational
advantage over the voters/receivers. To wit, the sender chooses an information structure




We consider a model with one Sender (she) and a two-member committee of receivers who
are called upon to choose between two alternatives. All three agents are expected-utility
maximizers. The set of receivers is I = {1, 2}. The set of alternatives is X = {x0, x1}. We
interpret x0 as the status quo and x1 as the non-status quo alternative. The collective decision
is made through voting. Every receiver i ∈ I selects an action from the set Ai = {0, 1}. We
define A := A1 × A2. Action 0 stands for “maintain the status quo” and action 1 stands for
“implement the alternative x1”. Individual decisions are then aggregated via a k-voting rule,
with k ∈ {1, 2}. More specifically, the alternative x1 is implemented if and only if at least k
receivers vote for it. Otherwise, the status quo is maintained.
The receivers’ evaluation of either alternative depends on an underlying state of nature
and on a preference parameter. Two states of nature are possible, and they are identified by
the set Θ = {θ0, θ1}. Each receiver i ∈ I has a preference parameter ti which belongs to the
set Ti = {t`, th}, where 12 < t` < th < 1. We define T := T1 × T2. The payoff function for
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each receiver i ∈ I is a function ui : A× T ×Θ −→ R such that:
ui ((a1, a2), (t1, t2), θ) =

−ti if a1 + a2 ≥ k and θ = θ0
−(1− ti) if a1 + a2 < k and θ = θ1
0 otherwise.
(4.1)
Both receivers want to implement the alternative x1 if the true state is θ1, and maintain the
status quo if the state is θ0. The payoff from implementing the correct policy is normalized
to zero. If the wrong policy is adopted, then either receiver incurs a utility loss that is
measured by the parameter ti. Intuitively, ti captures how much a receiver is concerned
about the implementation of the wrong policy in state θ0 relative to the implementation of
the wrong policy in the other state.
The Sender has preferences over A× T × Θ that are represented by the following payoff
function:
uS ((a1, a2), (t1, t2), θ) =
1 if a1 + a2 ≥ k0 otherwise.
In words, the Sender wants the alternative x1 to be implemented irrespective of the true
state of nature. This entails a conflict of interests between the Sender and the receivers.
Receivers cannot observe the true state of nature. All agents share a common prior prob-
ability distribution ψ over Θ. Without loss of generality, we assume ψ(θ0) = ψ(θ1) = 1/2.
Throughout the paper, we assume that the Sender’s utility function uS is always commonly
known. As for receivers, we consider both the benchmark case where their preference pa-
rameters are commonly known and the case where their preferences are privately observed.
In the latter case, all agents share a common prior distribution π over T . We assume
types to be independently and identically distributed across receivers. In addition, we define
p := Prob(t1 = t`) = Prob(t2 = t`) and assume p ∈ (0, 1).
The parameter ti can also be interpreted in terms of beliefs about the underlying state
of nature. In the corresponding single-receiver decision problem, which is examined in Ka-
menica and Gentzkow (2011), a receiver i would find it optimal to vote for the alternative x1
if and only if the posterior probability he ascribes to θ1 is at least ti. The assumption that
ti > 1/2 implies that, if i were to make a decision solely on the basis of the prior information
he has, he would vote for x0.
Finally, notice that, when the committee is heterogeneous, i.e. t1 6= t2, it could happen
that receivers have diverging opinions about the alternative to be implemented even if they
share a common belief about the prevailing state of nature. This might be the case even if,
under complete information about θ, they would both agree on what policy to choose.
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4.2.2 Benchmark with commonly known preferences
We begin our analysis by studying the benchmark case where preference parameters ti’s are
commonly known. That is, fix a profile (ti, tj) ∈ T and assume it is common knowledge. The
fundamental object is a persuasion mechanism. Formally, let Si be a finite set of messages or
signal realizations for receiver i. A persuasion mechanism σ is a map σ : Θ −→ ∆ (S1 × S2).
With a slight abuse of notation, we denote σ(s1, s2|θ) as the probability that the mechanism
σ ascribes to receiver 1 receiving signal realization s1 and receiver 2 receiving signal s2,
conditional on the true state being θ.
The problem we are interested in is to choose a persuasion mechanism so as to maximize
the Sender’s objective function, i.e. maximize the probability of implementing the alternative
x1. The interaction between Sender and receivers unfolds as follows:
1. Nature selects the true state θ ∈ Θ;
2. The Sender chooses and publicly announces a persuasion mechanism σ : Θ −→ ∆(S),
where S = S1 × S2;
3. The Sender observes the true state θ and sends signals to receivers according to the
announced mechanism σ;
4. Each receiver privately observes his signal realization si and then chooses an action
from the set Ai;
5. Finally, the chosen social alternative is implemented and payoffs realize.
For any receiver i ∈ I, behavior at stage 4 is described by a strategy αi : Si −→ ∆(Ai). We
assume that receivers play strategies (α1, α2) that constitute a Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of
the extensive game induced by the chosen persuasion mechanism. Furthermore, we assume
that the Sender is able to fully and credibly commit to the mechanism she announces, and
to select the equilibrium that receivers are going to play. By standard arguments1, it follows
that it is without loss of generality to confine our attention to persuasion mechanisms that
are both direct and obedient. More specifically, direct mechanisms are such that Si = Ai for
every i ∈ I. Obedience requires that, for every i ∈ I, and ai ∈ Ai, we have∑
θ∈Θ,aj∈Aj
ψ(θ)σ(ai, aj|θ)ui((ai, aj), (ti, tj), θ) ≥
∑
θ∈Θ,aj∈Aj
ψ(θ)σ(ai, aj|θ)ui((a′i, aj), (ti, tj), θ)
(4.2)
1For a formal proof, see Taneva (2019) and Bergemann and Morris (2016a).
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for all a′i ∈ Ai. The obedience condition (4.2) identifies the solution concept of Bayes
Correlated Equilibrium introduced by Bergemann and Morris (2016a), and it is a special
case of their Definition 1. More specifically, in the framework of Bergemann and Morris
(2016a), one can obtain (4.2) by assuming the following. First, each receiver i has a utility
function ũi : A×Θ −→ R such that, for all a ∈ A and θ ∈ Θ, ũi(a1, a2, θ) = ui((a1, a2), t, θ).
Second, all receivers have the null information structure, i.e. they have “no information over
and above the common prior ψ” (Bergemann and Morris, 2016a, p. 492).
We now introduce a restriction on the set of feasible persuasion mechanisms. Following
Chan et al. (2019), we require any mechanism to be pivotal.
Assumption 8 (Pivotality). If k = 1, then σ(1, 1|θ) = 0 for every θ ∈ Θ.
The assumption says that, when a non-unanimous voting rule is adopted, the Sender
cannot use action recommendation profiles where both receivers are told to vote for the al-
ternative x1. In other words, the Sender can only use minimal winning coalitions of receivers
in order to implement her preferred policy x1. The reason for making this assumption is to
rule out those Bayesian Nash Equilibria in weakly dominated strategies of the underlying
voting game where more than k receivers vote for the alternative x1. Without this assump-
tion, it is easy to show that, when k = 1, the Sender can implement her preferred alternative
with probability 1 in both states. Nonetheless, either receiver would find it optimal to obey
the Sender’s recommendations. Indeed, if receiver i is obedient, he always votes 1, so deter-
mining which policy is going to be implemented. But then j can never profit from disobeying
because his deviation would never affect the voting outcome.
In order to formally state the Sender’s optimization problem, we partition the set A =
A1×A2 into two subsets Ax1 and Ax0 , where Ax1 = {a ∈ A : a1 +a2 ≥ k} is the set of action
profiles where the alternative x1 is implemented and Ax0 = {a ∈ A : a1 + a2 < k} is the set














such that σ is pivotal and satisfies obedience constraints (4.2). Using payoff functions (4.1),





[σ(1, 0|θ0) + σ(0, 1|θ0) + σ(1, 1|θ0) + σ(1, 0|θ1) + σ(0, 1|θ1) + σ(1, 1|θ1)]
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such that
σ(1, 1|θ0) = σ(1, 1|θ1) = 0 (4.3)
t1σ(1, 0|θ0) ≤ (1− t1)σ(1, 0|θ1) (4.4)
t2σ(0, 1|θ0) ≤ (1− t2)σ(0, 1|θ1) (4.5)
(1− t1)σ(0, 0|θ1) ≤ t1σ(0, 0|θ0) (4.6)
(1− t2)σ(0, 0|θ1) ≤ t2σ(0, 0|θ0), (4.7)
where (4.3) is the pivotality restriction, (4.4) and (4.5) are the obedience constraints for
action recommendation ai = 1 for player 1 and player 2, and (4.6) and (4.7) are the obedience
constraints for action recommendation ai = 0. Notice that receiver i’s decision whether to
obey or not the Sender’s action recommendation depends only on action recommendation
profiles where i himself is pivotal.





[σ(1, 1|θ0) + σ(1, 1|θ1)]
such that
t1σ(1, 1|θ0) ≤ (1− t1)σ(1, 1|θ1) (4.8)
t2σ(1, 1|θ0) ≤ (1− t2)σ(1, 1|θ1) (4.9)
(1− t1)σ(0, 1|θ1) ≤ t1σ(0, 1|θ0) (4.10)
(1− t2)σ(1, 0|θ1) ≤ t2σ(1, 0|θ0), (4.11)
where (4.8) and (4.9) are the obedience constraints for action recommendation ai = 1 for
player 1 and player 2, and (4.10) and (4.11) are the obedience constraints for action recom-
mendation ai = 0.
We can now fully characterize the optimal persuasion mechanism when receivers’ pref-
erences are commonly known. The general case with n players and complete information
about preferences is studied in Chan et al. (2019).
Proposition 8. (1) Suppose k = 1. Then the mechanism σ that solves (P-0) is such that:
• if t1 = t2, then
– σ(1, 0|θ1) + σ(0, 1|θ1) = 1,
– σ(1, 0|θ0) = 1−titi σ(1, 0|θ1),
63
– σ(0, 1|θ0) = 1−titi σ(0, 1|θ1);
• if t1 < t2, then σ(1, 0|θ1) = 1 and σ(1, 0|θ0) = 1−t1t1 ;
• if t1 > t2, then σ(0, 1|θ1) = 1 and σ(0, 1|θ0) = 1−t2t2 .
(2) Suppose k = 2. Then the mechanism σ that solves (P-0) is such that σ(1, 1|θ1) = 1.
Furthermore,
• if t1 = t2, then σ(1, 1|θ0) = 1−titi ;
• if t1 < t2, then σ(1, 1|θ0) = 1−t2t2 ;
• if t1 > t2, then σ(1, 1|θ0) = 1−t1t1 .
Proof. (1) Let k = 1. First, we argue that σ(0, 0|θ1) = 0. By pivotality, this is equivalent
to σ(1, 0|θ1) + σ(0, 1|θ1) = 1. Suppose σ(0, 0|θ1) > 0. Then it would always be feasible
to shift probability away from σ(0, 0|θ1) to σ(1, 0|θ1) or σ(0, 1|θ1) without tightening
any obedience constraint. This shift would entail a strict increase in the objective
function, so leading to a contradiction. Second, we argue that both (4.4) and (4.5) are
binding. By way of contradiction, suppose this is not the case. Since ti > (1 − ti) by
assumption, by (4.4) and (4.5) it follows that σ(1, 0|θ0) + σ(0, 1|θ0) < 1. Furthermore,
we already proved that σ(0, 0|θ1) = 0. But then it is feasible to shift probability away
from σ(0, 0|θ0) to either σ(1, 0|θ1) or σ(0, 1|θ1) so as to make constraint (4.4) or (4.5),
respectively, binding. This would entail a strict increase in the objective function, so
leading to a contradiction.









from which the result easily follows.
(2) Let k = 2. By the same argument as above, σ(1, 1|θ1) = 1. The result follows from the
fact that, if t1 = t2, then both (4.8) and (4.9) are binding. And that if t1 6= t2, then
the obedience constraint for ai = 1 must be binding for the receiver with the largest ti
only.
The interpretation of Proposition 8 is straightforward. First, the alternative x1 is imple-
mented with probability 1 if the true state is θ1 and with probability strictly less than 1 in
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the other state, irrespective of the voting rule adopted or preference heterogeneity. We will
see that this is no longer the case when preferences are privately observed. Now suppose
that the voting rule is unanimity, so that the Sender can use only one winning coalition to
implement x1. The probability of recommending to vote for x1 conditional on state θ0 is
determined by the receiver with the largest parameter ti. This can also be seen from the
fact that the obedience constraint for action recommendation ai = 1 is always binding for
the receiver with the highest ti while it is slack for the receiver with the lowest ti if the
committee is heterogeneous. The probability 1−ti
ti
of recommending action 1 conditional on
θ0 is such that the resulting posterior probability ascribed to state θ1 is exactly equal to ti.
Clearly, this implies that, if a receiver i with ti = th obeys the Sender’s recommendation to
vote 1, so does the other receiver with a lower preference parameter.
Consider the case with k = 1. Now the Sender can use two different winning coalitions to
implement x1. Since the receiver with the lowest ti is easier to persuade, it is clear that the
Sender wants to target him rather than the other voter. If the committee is heterogeneous,
the receiver i with ti = t` is told to vote 1 with probability 1 in state θ1 and with probability
1−ti
ti
in the other state, so that his posterior about θ1 is exactly equal to his preference
parameter. The other voter is told instead to vote for 0 irrespective of the true state.
We emphasize that the optimal mechanism in Proposition 8 inherits some features of the
optimal information structure for the one-receiver case in Kamenica and Gentzkow (2011).
Even with two receivers, it is optimal for the Sender to partially obfuscate the true realization
of θ. More specifically, the Sender’s optimal persuasion mechanism can be interpreted as the
conflation of two signals: one that, conditional on the state being θ1, fully discloses the state
to either one or both receivers; and another signal that, contingent on θ0, reveals imperfectly
the true state. Such a property is clearly driven by the fact that Sender and receivers agree
on the policy to adopt in state θ1 while they disagree in the other state.
The Sender’s expected payoff from the optimal mechanism is clearly affected by both the
voting rule and preference parameters. If the committee is homogeneous, then the Sender
is indifferent between the two voting rules. But if the committee is heterogeneous, then
the Sender has a strict preference for the non-unanimous rule. To see this, notice that,
conditional on the true state being θ0, the probability of implementing x1 is P(x1|θ0) = 1−t`t`
when k = 1 and P(x1|θ0) = 1−thth when k = 2. The former probability is strictly greater than
the latter due to assumption that t` < th.
We conclude this section by pointing out that the use of private recommendations is not
necessary when the composition of the committee is common knowledge. It is easy to see
that the equilibrium outcomes induced by Proposition 8 can also be obtained through signals
whose realizations are publicly observed. However, this is not necessarily true when n > 2
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and non-unanimous voting rules are adopted. In addition, public signals are not without
loss of generality when uncertainty about receivers’ preferences is introduced.
4.3 Persuasion with information elicitation
In this section we give a characterization of the optimal persuasion mechanism under two
main assumptions: 1) each receiver i privately observes his preference parameter ti; and 2)
the Sender is allowed to elicit receivers’ private information by asking them to report their
types.
4.3.1 The solution concept
The possibility of eliciting information implies that a persuasion mechanism is a menu of
experiments contingent on reports. More specifically, let Ri be a finite set of reports available
to receiver i = 1, 2. As in the benchmark case with complete information, Si denotes the
set of signal realizations for receiver i. Let R = R1 × R2 and S = S1 × S2. Furthermore,
let µ be a function µ : R × Θ −→ ∆(S). We call ((Ri, Si)i∈I , µ) a persuasion mechanism.
Abusing notation, we denote µ(s1, s2|r1, r2, θ) as the probability that µ ascribes to receiver
1 receiving signal realization s1 and receiver 2 receiving signal s2, conditional on the true
state being θ and on receivers 1 and 2 submitting reports r1 and r2, respectively.
Any mechanism µ induces an extensive game with imperfect information. More specifi-
cally, the sequence of events in the game induced by µ is the following.
1. Nature selects the true state θ ∈ Θ and preference parameters (t1, t2) ∈ T1 × T2;
2. Each receiver i privately observes his own preference type ti;
3. The Sender chooses and publicly announces a persuasion mechanism ((Ri, Si)i∈I , µ);
4. Each receiver i sends a report ri to the Sender. The Sender observes the true state
θ, collects reports r = (r1, r2), and then sends signals to receivers according to the
announced µ;
5. Each receiver privately observes his signal realization si and then chooses an action
from the set Ai;
6. Finally, the chosen social alternative is implemented and payoffs realize.
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Receivers’ behavior in the game above is captured by a pair of functions. More specifically,
either receiver transmits reports to the Sender according to a function ρi : Ti −→ Ri. In
addition, he makes his final decision according to the function δi : Ti×Si −→ Ai. We assume
that receivers play strategy profiles (ρ, δ) = ((ρ1, δ1), (ρ2, δ2)) that constitute a Bayes Nash
Equilibrium (BNE) of the game induced by the announced mechanism. A strategy profile
(ρ, δ) is a BNE of such a game if, for every i ∈ I, and every ti ∈ Ti, we have∑
(si,sj)∈S,tj∈Tj ,θ∈Θ
ψ(θ)π(ti, tj)µ (si, sj|ρi(ti), ρj(tj), θ)ui((δi(ti, si), δj(tj, sj)), (ti, tj), θ) ≥∑
(si,sj)∈S,tj∈Tj ,θ∈Θ
ψ(θ)π(ti, tj)µ (si, sj|ρ̂i, ρj(tj), θ)ui((δ̂i(si), δj(tj, sj)), (ti, tj), θ),
(4.12)
for all ρ̂i ∈ Ri and all functions δ̂i : Si −→ Ai.
We assume that the Sender can credibly and fully commit to the persuasion mechanism
she announces. In addition, she is able to select any BNE of the game induced by the
mechanism she has committed to. As a consequence, we can invoke the revelation principle
and establish the following.
Proposition 9. Fix any mechanism ((Ri, Si)i∈I , µ). For any BNE induced by such a mech-
anism, there exists an outcome-equivalent persuasion mechanism ((Ti, Ai)i∈I , σ), with σ :
T ×Θ −→ ∆(A), such that, for every i ∈ I, and every ti ∈ Ti, we have∑
(ai,aj)∈A,tj∈Tj ,θ∈Θ
ψ(θ)π(ti, tj)σ(ai, aj|ti, tj, θ)ui((ai, aj), (ti, tj), θ) ≥∑
(ai,aj)∈A,tj∈Tj ,θ∈Θ
ψ(θ)π(ti, tj)σ(ai, aj|t′i, tj, θ)ui((δi(ai), aj), (ti, tj), θ)
(4.13)
for all t′i ∈ Ti and all functions δi : Ai −→ Ai.
When ti = t′i in (4.13), we call the corresponding inequalities obedience constraints,
whereas when ti 6= t′i we indicate them as truth-telling constraints.
Proof. The argument can be easily adapted from the proof of Proposition 2 in Myerson
(1982). Let ((Ri, Si)i∈I , µ) be a persuasion mechanism, and let (ρ, δ) be the BNE induced
by it. For any (a, t) ∈ A× T , define
(a, t)−1 := {s ∈ S : δi(ti, si) = ai for all i ∈ I} .
The corresponding direct mechanism is ((Ti, Ai)i∈I , σ), where σ is such that, for every a ∈ A,
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µ (s|((ρ1(t1), ρ2(t2)), θ) .
It is then straightforward to verify that σ is incentive compatible and that it induces the
same outcome distribution as µ.
Proposition 9 can easily be extended to any finite game. Its content is standard. It asserts
that, in order to identify the set of implementable outcomes, we can confine our attention
to persuasion mechanisms that are direct and incentive compatible. Direct mechanisms are
such that, for every receiver, the set of reports is equal to his type set; and the set of signal
realizations coincides with the set of action profiles. Incentive compatibility is defined by
the inequality constraints (4.13). A mechanism is incentive compatible if any receiver finds
it optimal to truthfully reveal his type and to obey the action recommendation he gets from
the Sender.
The solution concept identified by (4.13) is nothing other than a state-contingent version
of the Communication Equilibrium (CE) of Myerson (1982). To emphasize the fact that
the Sender can condition her action recommendations on θ, we call any mechanism σ that
satisfies (4.13) a Bayes Communication Equilibrium (BCE). It is immediate to see that,
for any given game, a CE is also a BCE, whereas the converse is not necessarily true. The
two solution concepts are necessarily equivalent either when |Θ| = 1 or when σ is required
to be independent of θ.
It is important to discuss the connection between the solution concept we are adopting
here and those proposed by Bergemann and Morris (2019) for the case of persuasion with
information elicitation. The incentive compatibility condition (4.13) is a particular case of
the incentive compatibility notion in (Bergemann and Morris, 2019, Definition 2). More
specifically, one can obtain (4.13) in their framework as follows. First, the basic game has
a state space Θ̃ = T × Θ, and the corresponding common prior is defined as ψ̃(t, θ) =
π(t) × ψ(θ), for every t ∈ T and θ ∈ Θ. The payoff function ũi : A × Θ̃ is the obvious




, where T̃1 = T̃2 = {t`, th}
and π̃ : Θ̃ −→ ∆(T̃ ) is such that, for every t̃ ∈ T̃ ,
π̃(t̃|(t̃, θ0)) = π̃(t̃|(t̃, θ1)) = 1.
This captures the assumption that receivers privately observe their true preference types.
Finally, the Sender is constrained to use decision rules that are partially join feasible. As per
(Bergemann and Morris, 2019, Definition 6), a decision rule is join feasible if it is independent
of the true state θ. We require that σ̃ : T̃ × Θ̃ −→ ∆(A) be partially so. That is, for every
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a ∈ A, θ ∈ Θ, t̃ ∈ T̃ , and every t, t′ ∈ T , we have
σ̃(a|t̃, (t, θ)) = σ̃(a|t̃, (t′, θ)).
It is then straightforward to verify that, with the three caveats that we have just mentioned,
the notion of incentive compatibility in (Bergemann and Morris, 2019, Definition 2) reduces
to (4.13).
Before stating the Sender’s problem, we introduce two restrictions on the set of feasible
persuasion mechanisms.
Assumption 9 (Pivotality). If k = 1, then σ(1, 1|t, θ) = 0 for any t ∈ T , and θ ∈ Θ.
Assumption 9 is the incomplete information version of Assumption 8.
Assumption 10 (Symmetry). For any θ ∈ Θ, σ(a1, a2|t1, t2, θ) = σ(a2, a1|t2, t1, θ) for any
a ∈ A and t ∈ T .
Assumption 10 states that we consider persuasion mechanisms that are symmetric across
receivers. Since the Sender’s objective function is symmetric across receivers, the assumption
is without loss of generality.

















such that σ is:
• a BCE of the underlying voting game;
• symmetric;
• pivotal.
We give a full characterization of the solution in the subsequent section.
4.3.2 Unanimity
We now have all the ingredients to solve the Sender’s choice problem (P-1) in the case in
which unanimity is required to implement the social alternative x1.
We use the following abbreviations to save on notation. First, we denote the action profile
(1, 1) simply as (1). In addition, we express any type profile (t1, t2) ∈ T simply as t12. For
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example, we use σ(1|t`h, θ) to denote σ(1, 1|t`, th, θ). Finally, we exploit symmetry and use
σ(1|t`h, θ) or σ(1|th`, θ) interchangeably for any θ ∈ Θ.







p2σ(1|t``, θ) + 2p(1− p)σ(1|t`h, θ) + (1− p)2σ(1|thh, θ)
]
. (4.14)
It is clear that, for every type profile and in each state, the Sender earns a positive
expected payoff only from the action profile where both receivers vote for the alternative x1.
The set of incentive constraints defining a BCE of the underlying voting game includes 7
inequalities for each type of either receiver. However, using symmetry and the fact that the
alternative x1 can be implemented with only one action profile for each type profile, one can
show2 that the set of relevant constraints reduces to the following:
th [pσ(1|t`h, θ0) + (1− p)σ(1|thh, θ0)] ≤ (1− th) [pσ(1|t`h, θ1) + (1− p)σ(1|thh, θ1)] (4.15)
t` [pσ(1|t``, θ0) + (1− p)σ(1|t`h, θ0)] + (1− t`) [pσ(1|t`h, θ1) + (1− p)σ(1|thh, θ1)] ≤
t` [pσ(1|t`h, θ0) + (1− p)σ(1|thh, θ0)] + (1− t`) [pσ(1|t``, θ1) + (1− p)σ(1|t`h, θ1)] (4.16)
th [pσ(1|t`h, θ0) + (1− p)σ(1|thh, θ0)] + (1− th) [pσ(1|t``, θ1) + (1− p)σ(1|t`h, θ1)] ≤
th [pσ(1|t``, θ0) + (1− p)σ(1|t`h, θ0)] + (1− th) [pσ(1|t`h, θ1) + (1− p)σ(1|thh, θ1)] , (4.17)
where (4.15) the obedience constraint against deviations to δi(ai) = 0 for any ai ∈ Ai for
type th, while (4.16) and (4.17) are truth-telling constraints for type t` and th, respectively.
For either type, all incentive constraints crucially depend on the probability of being pivotal
and receiving an action recommendation 1 conditional on being of that type. More specifi-
cally, constraint (4.15) is driven by the quantity pσ(1|t`h, θ) + (1− p)σ(1|thh, θ), which is the
probability of receiving recommendation 1 and being pivotal conditional on being a high-
type receiver and on the state θ. Intuitively, this probability in state θ0 must be sufficiently
low in order for the high type to obey the Sender’s recommendation. As for truth-telling,
constraints (4.16) and (4.17) simply say that each type compares the expected loss from
being sincere with the loss from lying. Notice that obedience and truth-telling are sufficient
2See Appendix A.1.
70
to ensure that double deviations, i.e. misreporting and disobeying at the same time, are not
profitable. This stems from the fact that the Sender has only one action profile at her dis-
posal to implement the alternative she prefers. We will see later on that, in the case of single
approval, obedience and truth-telling alone are not sufficient to prevent double deviations.
We now proceed to characterize the optimal persuasion mechanism(s) as a function of
the prior probability p. In order to do that, we first illustrate three subsets of feasible
mechanisms and then describe the solution set of problem (P-1) in terms of these subsets.
Formally, let Σ be the set of symmetric BCEs of the fundamental voting game. Then we
need to consider three subsets of Σ, namely ΣA, ΣB, and ΣC .
Mechanisms in ΣA: The first subset contains any mechanism σA that satisfies the
following properties:
• σA(1|t``, θ1) = 1,
• σA(1|t``, θ0) = 1−t`t` ,
• σA(1|t, θ) = 0 for any t ∈ T\{t``} and any θ ∈ Θ.
In words, the action profile where receivers vote 1 is recommended with positive probability
only when both of them are of the low type.
Mechanisms in ΣB: Any mechanism σB in the second subset has the following prop-
erties:
• σB(1|t``, θ1) = σB(1|t`h, θ1) = 1,
• σB(1|thh, θ1) = 0,







































Conditional on the state being θ1, the action profile that implements x1 is recommended
with probability 1 if and only if at least one of the receivers is of the low type. In the other
state, the probability of implementing x1 is chosen so as to guarantee that the truth-telling
constraint for t` and the obedience constraint for th are both binding.
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Mechanisms in ΣC: Any mechanism σC in the third subset has the following proper-
ties:
• σC(1|t, θ1) = 1 for any t ∈ T ,


































In words, the alternative x1 is implemented with probability 1 in state θ1, irrespective of
the underlying type profile. Conditional on state θ0, the probability of recommending 1 is
chosen so as to make sure that all incentive constraints (4.15)-(4.17) are binding.
We are now ready to state the following.
Proposition 10. Let k = 2. The following is true:
1. if p ≥ t`+th
2th
, then any σ ∈ ΣA solves (P-1);







, then any σ ∈ ΣB solves (P-1);
3. if p ≤ t`
th
, then any σ ∈ ΣC solves (P-1);
4. If p = t`+th
2th





5. If p = t`
th





where conv(Y ) denotes the convex hull of set Y .
Proof. See Appendix A.2.
The result can be interpreted as follows. Suppose p ≥ t`+th
2th
, so that the Sender is confident
enough that the true type profile is t``. Conditional on the profile of reports t``, the Sender
finds it optimal to recommend actions according to the optimal mechanism of Proposition 8
under complete information. That is, she recommends to vote 1 with probability 1 in state
θ1 and with probability 1−t`t` in the other state, so that the resulting posterior about θ1 is
equal to t` for either receiver. For any other profile of reports, the best persuasion strategy is
to maintain the status quo x0 in either state with probability 1. To see why this is the case,
suppose the Sender implements the alternative x1 even when at least a high type is reported.
In order to do that, she must increase the probability of the high type voting for 1. At the
same time, she must decrease the probability of the low type voting for 1 to make sure that
72
the low type does not find it profitable to misreport his type. Since the prior p is sufficiently
high, the expected gain from persuading committees with at least one receiver of the high
type is more than compensated by the loss from reducing the probability of implementing
x1 contingent on the type profile t``. Intuitively, the Sender tailors her persuasion strategy
entirely on a committee of low types, and she gives up on using possible committees with at
least one receiver of the high type to implement her preferred strategy.







. Intuitively, the prior is not
high enough to conclude that the committee is likely to be made of low types only as in the
previous case. However, the prior p is still sufficiently large to conclude that the committee
is very unlikely to include two receivers of the high type. Consequently, the best persuasion
strategy for the Sender is to implement x1 in θ1 with probability 1 if at least one receiver
reports a preference parameter t`, and with probability zero otherwise. The probability of
implementing x1 in the other state is chosen so as to guarantee that both the obedience
constraint for the high type and the truth-telling constraint for the low type are binding.
The decision of not implementing x1 in state θ1 contingent on reports thh is driven by the
same logic illustrated in the previous case with p ≥ t`+th
2th
. As a consequence, notice that
truth-telling for the low type implies σB(1|t``, θ0) < σA(1|t``, θ0) = 1−t`t` .
If p ≤ t`
th
, the Sender believes that both receivers are most likely to have a preference
parameter th. The resulting optimal persuasion strategy is such that x1 is implemented
with probability 1 in state θ1, irrespective of reported types. Conditional on state θ0, the
Sender implements x1 with strictly positive probability for any profile of reports. More
specifically, the ex-ante probability of implementing x1 in θ0 is equal to 1−thth . Intuitively, the
Sender tailors her persuasion strategy entirely on a committee of high types, which is clearly
the harder–or costlier–to persuade. Again, the cost lies in the fact that the probability of
recommending 1 contingent on state θ0 must be sufficiently low in order to guarantee that
high types obey that recommendation and low types do not want to misreport their types.
Finally, p = t`+th
2th
and p = t`
th
are boundary cases. More specifically, when p = t`+th
2th
, the
Sender gets the same expected utility from persuasion mechanisms in ΣA and ΣB. Since
the set of constraints defining a BCE is convex, and since the Sender’s objective function is
linear, it follows that any convex combination of mechanisms in ΣA and ΣB is a solution to
the Sender’s problem (P-1). An analogous reasoning applies when p = t`
th
.
By substituting in the Sender’s utility function (4.14), we can easily find the value function

























It is clear that US(σA) is decreasing with respect to t`, US(σC) is decreasing with respect
to th, and US(σC) is decreasing with respect to both t` and th. Intuitively, the higher
preference parameters are, the more difficult it gets to persuade receivers to vote in favor of
the alternative x1. As far as the prior p is concerned, US(σA) increases with respect to it
at an increasing rate, while US(σC) is independent of it. Finally, US(σB) is increasing with
respect to p as long as p ≤ t`+th
2th
, and it does so at a decreasing rate. The interpretation is
that, as p gets larger, the committee is more likely to be composed of receivers of the low
type. This means that it is easier to convince them to vote for x1.
4.3.3 Single approval
We now proceed to characterize the solution set of problem (P-1) when a single approval is
sufficient to implement the alternative x1.
In addition to the abbreviations introduced in the previous subsection, we express the
action profiles (1, 0) and (0, 1) simply as (10) and (01), respectively. For instance, σ(10|t`h, θ)
stands for σ(1, 0|t`, th, θ). Notice that, by symmetry, we have σ(10|t`h, θ) = σ(01|th`, θ) for
any θ ∈ Θ.





p2σ(10|t``, θ)+p(1−p) (σ(10|t`h, θ) + σ(01|t`h, θ))+(1−p)2σ(10|thh, θ)
]
. (4.18)
Notice that, for every type profile and in each state, the Sender can implement the alter-
native x1 by using two action recommendation profiles, namely (1, 0) and (0, 1). Due to the
assumption of pivotality, the action profile (1, 1) is never recommended.
To guarantee that σ is a BCE, we have to check 7 incentive constraints for each type
of each receiver. Like in the case with k = 2, symmetry and pivotality allow us to reduce
the set of constraints. In particular, it is sufficient3 to satisfy the following 5 inequalities to
identify a BCE for the voting game with k = 1:
3See Appendix A.3.
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t` [pσ(10|t``, θ0) + (1− p)σ(10|t`h, θ0)] ≤ (1− t`) [pσ(10|t``, θ1) + (1− p)σ(10|t`h, θ1)]
(4.19)
t` [2pσ(10|t``, θ0) + (1− p) (σ(10|t`h, θ0) + σ(01|t`h, θ0))] +
(1− t`) [p (σ(10|t`h, θ1) + σ(01|t`h, θ1)) + 2(1− p)σ(10|thh, θ1)] ≤
t` [p (σ(10|t`h, θ0) + σ(01|t`h, θ0)) + 2(1− p)σ(10|thh, θ0)] +
(1− t`) [2pσ(10|t``, θ1) + (1− p) (σ(10|t`h, θ1) + σ(01|t`h, θ1))] (4.20)
th [pσ(01|t`h, θ0) + (1− p)σ(10|thh, θ0)] ≤ (1− th) [pσ(01|t`h, θ1) + (1− p)σ(10|thh, θ1)]
(4.21)
th [p (σ(10|t`h, θ0) + σ(01|t`h, θ0)) + 2(1− p)σ(10|thh, θ0)] +
(1− th) [2pσ(10|t``, θ1) + (1− p) (σ(10|t`h, θ1) + σ(01|t`h, θ1))] ≤
th [2pσ(10|t``, θ0) + (1− p) (σ(10|t`h, θ0) + σ(01|t`h, θ0))] +
(1− th) [p (σ(10|t`h, θ1) + σ(01|t`h, θ1)) + 2(1− p)σ(10|thh, θ1)] (4.22)
th [p (σ(10|t`h, θ0) + σ(01|t`h, θ0)) + 2(1− p)σ(10|thh, θ0)] +
(1− th) [pσ(10|t``, θ1) + (1− p)σ(01|t`h, θ1)] ≤
th [pσ(10|t``, θ0) + (1− p)σ(01|t`h, θ0)] +
(1− th) [p (σ(10|t`h, θ1) + σ(01|t`h, θ1)) + 2(1− p)σ(10|thh, θ1)] . (4.23)
The first two inequalities refer to the low type: (4.19) is the obedience constraint against
deviations to δi(ai) = 0 for any ai ∈ Ai and (4.20) is the truth-telling constraint. The
remaining inequalities are for type th: (4.21) is the obedience constraint against deviations
to δi(ai) = 0 for any ai ∈ Ai, (4.22) is the truth-telling constraint, and (4.23) is the constraint
that prevents double deviations, i.e. misreporting and deviating to δi(ai) = 0 for any ai ∈ Ai.
Contrary to the case of unanimity, we now have that obedience and truth-telling alone are
no longer sufficient to prevent double deviations. This follows directly from the fact that,
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when k = 1, the Sender can use two action profiles to persuade receivers to vote for x1, so
opening the way for a larger set of possible deviations.
As we did in the previous subsection, we characterize the solution set of (P-1) as a function
of the prior probability p by first illustrating subsets ΣD, ΣE, and ΣF of feasible persuasion
mechanisms.
Mechanisms in ΣD: The first set contains any mechanism σD that satisfies the follow-
ing properties:
• σD(10|t``, θ1) = σD(10|t`h, θ1) = 12 ,
• σD(01|t`h, θ) = σD(10|thh, θ) = 0 for any θ ∈ Θ,
• σD(10|t``, θ0) = σD(10|t`h, θ0) = 1−t`2t` .
In words, only receivers of the low type are recommended to vote for 1 with positive proba-
bility, irrespective of the state θ. More specifically, the low type receives a recommendation
to vote 1 with probability equal to 1
2
in state θ1 and probability 1−t`2t` in the other state.
Consequently, when both receivers are of the low type, the alternative x1 is implemented
with probability 1 in state θ1 and probability 1−t`t` in the other state. It is immediate to check
that obedience constraints for both types are binding, and so are the truth-telling constraint
for the low type and the double deviation constraint for the high type.
Mechanisms in ΣE: Any mechanism σE in the second set has the following properties:
• σE(10|t``, θ1) = 12 ,
• σE(10|t`h, θ1) = 1− σE(01|t`h, θ1),
• σE(10|thh, θ1) = 0,
• σE(10|t``, θ0) = (1−p)(1−th)pth σ
E(01|t`h, θ1)− 1−pp σ




• σE(10|t`h, θ0) = −2(1−th)th σ




• σE(10|thh, θ0) = p(1−th)(1−p)thσ
E(01|t`h, θ1)− p1−pσ
E(01|t`h, θ0),
• σE(01|t`h, θ0) and σE(01|t`h, θ1) are such that:






































Here the high type is persuaded to vote 1 in state θ1 only if the other receiver is of the low
type. Furthermore, the alternative x1 is implemented with probability 1 in state θ1 if there
is at least a receiver of the low type. The remaining action recommendations are such that
the truth-telling constraint for the low type is binding, and so are the obedience and double
deviations constraints for the high type.
Mechanisms in ΣF : Any mechanism σF in the third subset has the following proper-
ties:
• σF (10|t``, θ1) = σF (10|thh, θ1) = 12 ,
• σF (10|t`h, θ1) = σF (01|t`h, θ1) = 12 ,
• σF (10|t``, θ0) = σF (10|t`h, θ0) = σF (01|t`h, θ0) = σF (10|thh, θ0) = 1−th2th .
In the last subset, the Sender implements x1 with probability 1 in state θ1, and with proba-
bility 1−th
th
in the other state. Furthermore, the obedience constraint for the low type is slack
while all the remaining constraints are binding.
We can now establish the following.




≥ −3. The following is true:
1. if p ≥ th
2th−t`
, then any σ ∈ ΣD solves (P-1);







, then any σ ∈ ΣE solves (P-1);
3. if p ≤ t`
2th−t`
, then any σ ∈ ΣF solves (P-1);
4. if p = th
2th−t`





5. f p = t`
2th−t`











≥ −3 ensures that parameters t` and th are not too far
apart form each other. The interpretation of Proposition 11 is analogous to the case with
unanimity. We can partition the range of p into three regions, and the choice of the optimal
persuasion mechanism crucially depends on the region where the prior lies. If p is high
enough, the Sender tailors her persuasion strategy toward the low type. More specifically,
she recommends to vote 1 with strictly positive probability to any receiver that submits a
low report, and with probability zero if the report is th. Contrary to the case with unanimity,
this recommendation strategy enables the Sender to implement her preferred alternative with
positive probability in either state even when the profile of reports is t`h or th`, and not just
t``. This clearly depends on the fact that, under single approval, two action recommendation
profiles can be used to implement x1, giving the Sender more leeway than under unanimity.
The reason why high types are never told to vote 1 is essentially the same as in the case
with k = 2.
In case 2., the Sender is sufficiently confident that both committee members cannot be
of the high type. As a consequence, when both receivers submit a report th, they are told
not to vote for x1 contingent on state θ1. The remaining action recommendations are such
that the truth-telling constraint for the low type, and the obedience and double-deviations
constraints for the high type are all binding. In the remaining case, the prior p is so low
that both receivers are likely to have preference parameter th. Therefore, x1 is implemented
with probability 1 in state θ1 and probability 1−thth in state θ0, irrespective of the profile of
reports. Finally, notice that, when p ≤ t`
2th−t`
, the overall probability of implementing x1 is
the same for both voting rules. In the complementary case, it is not surprising that such a
probability is strictly greater when a single approval is needed.



















It is clear that US(σD) is decreasing with respect to t`, US(σF ) is decreasing with respect
to th, and US(σE) is decreasing with respect to both t` and th. As far as the prior p is
concerned, US(σD) increases linearly with respect to it, while US(σF ) is independent of it.
Finally, US(σE) is increasing with respect to p as long as p ≤ th2th−t` , and it does so at a
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decreasing rate. The interpretation is the same as when k = 2.
4.4 Persuasion without information elicitation
In this section we characterize the persuasion mechanism that solves the Sender’s choice
problem under two main assumptions: 1) each receiver i privately observes his preference
parameter ti; and 2) the Sender is not allowed to elicit receivers’ private information by
asking them to report their types.
Contrary to section 4.3, now the Sender does not have access to the private information
that receivers possess about their preferences. This can be justified in several ways. For in-
stance, one may assume that receivers have a taste for privacy: they just prefer not to disclose
any information at all about themselves to external parties. Alternatively, one may argue
that the Sender has limited commitment power. As we have seen in the previous section,
if information elicitation is allowed, then the Sender collects reports in order to choose the
profile of action recommendations she prefers. If receivers believe that the Sender’s promise
to treat reports confidentially is not credible, then one can model the strategic interaction
between Sender and receivers by dispensing with any type of information reporting.
4.4.1 The solution concept
The interaction between Sender and receivers takes place according to the sequence of events
we outlined in the previous Section, with the important difference that now receivers do not
transmit any information at all to the Sender. In other words, we now have a scenario
of unilateral communication (from Sender to receivers) whereas communication is bilateral
in Section 4.3. The fundamental object we are interested in is still a (direct) persuasion
mechanism σ : T × Θ −→ ∆(A). However, due to the absence of information elicitation,
we have to restrict the set of feasible mechanisms. Following Bergemann and Morris (2019),
we require σ to be publicly feasible. Before giving a formal definition, we need to introduce
some additional objects.
For any i ∈ I, let Bi be the set of pure strategies in the fundamental voting game, with
typical element bi : Ti −→ Ai. With a slight abuse of notation, we denote bi(ti) as the action
ai ∈ Ai that strategy bi prescribes to type ti of receiver i. In addition, B = B1 × B2. Now
let φ : Θ −→ ∆(B) be a strategy recommendation. In words, φ is a rule that, conditional on
state θ, selects the profile b ∈ B of pure strategies with probability φ(b|θ). We say that φ
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Furthermore, the strategy recommendation φ : Θ −→ ∆(B) is obedient if, for every i ∈ I,
ti ∈ Ti, and bi ∈ Bi,∑
bj∈Bj ,tj∈Tj ,θ∈Θ
ψ(θ)π(ti, tj)φ(bi, bj|θ)ui((bi(ti), bj(tj)), (ti, tj), θ) ≥∑
bj∈Bj ,tj∈Tj ,θ∈Θ
ψ(θ)π(ti, tj)φ(bi, bj|θ)ui((a′i, bj(tj)), (ti, tj), θ)
(4.31)
for all a′i ∈ Ai.
Definition 2 (Publicly feasible obedience.). A persuasion mechanism σ : T × Θ −→ ∆(A)
is publicly feasible obedient if there exists a strategy recommendation φ : Θ −→ ∆(B) that
induces σ according to (4.30) and that is obedient according to (4.31).
The restriction to publicly feasible mechanisms can be interpreted as follows. Since the
Sender does not have access to receivers’ private information, she sends recommendations
according to a rule φ that does not depend on reports. Consequently, the Sender no longer
recommends a single action to each receiver. Rather, she recommends a profile of actions,
one for each possible receiver type. This captures the fact that the Sender does not know the
true preference parameter of the receiver she is facing, nor can she rely on reports. Notice
that, even though φ is independent from T , the persuasion mechanism σ induced by φ is not
necessarily so. Furthermore, it is straightforward to see that any publicly feasible obedient
mechanism σ is also a BCE, while a BCE is not necessarily publicly feasible.


















such that σ is:




Notice that we require the persuasion mechanism σ to be symmetric, but we do not impose
such a requirement on the strategy recommendation φ that induces it. That is, we do not
require that φ(b, b′|θ) = φ(b′, b|θ) in every state and for every pair of pure strategies b, b′. In
general, imposing symmetry on φ implies that the corresponding mechanism σ is symmetric
too, while the converse is not necessarily true. However, as we show in Appendices A.5 and
A.7, every strategy recommendation φ that we illustrate in this section without information
elicitation turns out to be symmetric too.
4.4.2 Unanimity
We proceed to give a full characterization of the solution to problem (P-2) when k = 2.
Rather than optimizing directly with respect to mechanisms σ : T × Θ −→ ∆(A), it is
convenient to use strategy recommendations φ : Θ −→ ∆(B) as control variables. In order
to do that, notice that in our binary environment, for each i ∈ I, the set Bi contains four
pure strategies. More specifically, we have B1 = B2 = {b00, b01, b10, b11}, where the first
subscript denotes the action recommended to the low type, and the second subscript is the
action recommended to the high type. One can show4 that, given φ, the Sender’s objective







φ(b11, b11|θ) + p2φ(b10, b10|θ) + 2pφ(b10, b11|θ)
]
. (4.32)
In addition, the set of relevant obedience constraints is:
t` [φ(b10, b11|θ0) + pφ(b10, b10|θ0)] ≤ (1− t`) [φ(b10, b11|θ1) + pφ(b10, b10|θ1)] , (4.33)
(1− th) [φ(b10, b11|θ1) + pφ(b10, b10|θ1)] ≤ th [φ(b10, b11|θ0) + pφ(b10, b10|θ0)] , (4.34)
th [φ(b11, b11|θ0) + pφ(b11, b10|θ0)] ≤ (1− th) [φ(b11, b11|θ1) + pφ(b11, b10|θ1)] , (4.35)
where the first inequality guarantees that type t` obeys strategy b10. Constraints (4.34) and
(4.35) make sure that type th finds it optimal to obey strategies b10 and b11, respectively.
The fact that only three incentive constraints are sufficient can be explained as follows.
A strategy recommendation can prescribe either the same action to each type or different
actions to different types. Bearing in mind that t` is easier to persuade than th to vote for 1,
if both types are told to vote 0, then it suffices to consider the obedience constraint for the
4See Appendix A.5.
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low type. Clearly, it is sufficient to consider the obedience constraint for the high type if the
recommendation is 1. By the same token, it cannot be incentive compatible to recommend
0 to t` and 1 to th. In the remaining case, one has to consider both incentive constraints.
Therefore, under unanimity, the Sender can induce both receivers to adopt option x1 by
choosing strategy recommendation profiles where only b10 and b11 are used.
Like we did in section 4.3, we characterize the optimal mechanism as a function of p
by first illustrating three subsets of strategy recommendations that induce publicly feasible
mechanisms. More specifically, we denote Φ as the set of feasible strategy recommendations,
and focus on subsets ΦA, ΦB, and ΦC .
Strategy recommendations in ΦA: The first subset contains any strategy recommen-
dation φA such that:
• φA(b10, b10|θ1) = 1,
• φA(b10, b10|θ0) = 1−t`t` ,
• φA(b10, b11|θ) = φA(b11, b11|θ) = 0 for any θ ∈ Θ.
In words, the Sender recommends strategy b10 to either player with probability 1 contingent
on state θ1, and with probability determined by the low type (and less than 1) in the other
state. Furthermore, notice that the persuasion mechanism σ induced by φA via (4.30) is such
that the action profile (1, 1) is implemented with positive probability only when both receivers
are of the low type. More precisely, σ(1|t``, θ1) = 1, σ(1|t``, θ0) = 1−t`t` , and σ(1|t, θ) = 0 for
any t 6= t`` and any θ. This shows that mechanisms in ΣA are publicly feasible.
Strategy recommendations in ΦB: The second subset contains any strategy recom-
mendation φB that has the following properties:
• φB(b10, b11|θ1) = 12 ,
• φB(b10, b10|θ1) = φB(b11, b11|θ1) = 0,





















The mechanism σ induced by φB is such that σ(1|t``, θ1) = 1, σ(1|t`h, θ1) = σ(1|th`, θ1) = 12 ,
and σ(1|thh, θ1) = 0. The strategy recommendations contingent on θ0 are such that incentive
constraints (4.33) and (4.35) are both binding. Notice that the persuasion mechanism σ
induced by φB does not belong to ΣB.
Strategy recommendations in ΦC: Finally, the third subset contains any strategy
recommendation φC such that:
• φC(b11, b11|θ1) = 1,
• φC(b11, b11|θ0) = 1−thth ,
• φC(b10, b10|θ) = φC(b10, b11|θ) = 0 for any θ ∈ Θ.
In words, the Sender recommends strategy b11 to either player with probability 1 contingent
on state θ1, and with probability determined by the high type (and less than 1) in the other
state. Furthermore, the persuasion mechanism σ induced by φC is such that the action
profile (1, 1) is implemented with positive probability for every type profile in either state.
More precisely, σ(1|t, θ1) = 1 and σ(1|t, θ0) = 1−thth for any t ∈ T . Notice that the induced
mechanism σ does belong to the set ΣC .
We can now establish the following.
Proposition 12. Let k = 2 and let φ ∈ Φ. Then we have:
1. If p > t`+th
2th
, then φ solves (P-2) if and only if φ ∈ ΦA;







, then φ solves (P-2) if and only if φ ∈ ΦB;
3. If p < 2t`
t`+th
, then φ solves (P-2) if and only if φ ∈ ΦC;
4. If p = t`+th
2th
, then φ solves (P-2) if and only if φ ∈ conv(ΦA ∪ ΦB);
5. If p = 2t`
t`+th
, then φ solves (P-2) if and only if φ ∈ conv(ΦB ∪ ΦC).
Proof. See Appendix A.6.
The interpretation is analogous to the case with information elicitation. As we already
hinted, mechanisms in ΣA are publicly feasible. This implies that mechanisms in ΣA and
strategy recommendations in ΦA are payoff-equivalent. Similarly, mechanisms in ΣC and
strategy recommendations in ΦC are payoff-equivalent, even though the former are not neces-
sarily publicly feasible. Mechanisms in ΣB are not publicly feasible, and they give the Sender
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a strictly larger expected utility than recommendations in ΦB. Therefore, public feasibility

























It is easy to see that US(φA) decreases with respect to t`, that US(φB) is decreasing with
respect to both t` and th, and US(φC) decreases with respect to th. As far as p is concerned,
US(φ
A) increases with respect to it at a quadratic rate, US(φB) grows linearly with it, and
US(φ
C) is independent ot if.
4.4.3 Single approval
We now characterize the solution to (P-2) when k = 1. Even in this case we optimize directly
with respect to strategy recommendations φ rather than mechanisms σ. One can show5 that




[φ(b11, b00|θ) + pφ(b10, b00|θ)] . (4.36)
In addition, the set of relevant incentive constraints is
(1− t`) [φ(b00, b00|θ1) + (1− p)φ(b10, b00|θ1)] ≤ t` [φ(b00, b00|θ0) + (1− p)φ(b10, b00|θ0)] ,
(4.37)
t` [φ(b10, b00|θ0)] ≤ (1− t`) [φ(b10, b00|θ1)] ,
(4.38)
(1− th) [φ(b10, b00|θ1)] ≤ th [φ(b10, b00|θ0)] ,
(4.39)




where the first constraint guarantees that type t` obeys strategy b00, constraints (4.38) and
(4.39) make sure that both types obey strategy b10, and (4.40) is the obedience constraint
for type th and strategy b11.
Contrary to the case with unanimity, the assumption of pivotality is now a substantial
restriction. More specifically, it implies that only strategy recommendations where at least
one of the receivers is told to adopt b00 can be used. As a consequence, we can characterize
the optimal strategy recommendation by making use of just two subsets of feasible strategies.
Strategy recommendations in ΦD: The first subset contains any strategy recom-
mendation φD that has the following properties:
• φD(b10, b00|θ1) = 12 ,
• φD(b10, b00|θ0) = 1−t`2t` ,
• φD(b11, b00|θ) = 0 for any θ ∈ Θ.
In words, only strategies with th voting for 0 are recommended with positive probability
in either state. More specifically, the persuasion mechanism σ induced by φD via (4.30) is
such that σ(10|t``, θ1)+σ(01|t``, θ1) = 1, σ(10|t`h, θ1) = σ(01|th`, θ1) = 12 , and σ(10|thh, θ1) =
σ(01|thh, θ1) = 0. In addition, σ(10|t``, θ0)+σ(01|t``, θ0) = 1−t`t` , σ(10|t`h, θ0) = σ(01|th`, θ0) =
1−t`
2t`
, and σ(10|thh, θ0) = σ(01|thh, θ0) = 0.
Strategy recommendations in ΦE: The second subset contains any strategy recom-
mendation φE that has the following properties:
• φE(b11, b00|θ1) = 12 ,
• φE(b11, b00|θ0) = 1−th2th ,
• φE(b10, b00|θ) = 0 for any θ ∈ Θ.
In this case, the mechanism induced by φE is such that σ(10|t, θ1) +σ(01|t, θ1) = 1 for every
t ∈ T and σ(10|t, θ0) + σ(01|t, θ0) = 1−thth . Therefore, the alternative x1 is implemented with
probability 1 conditional on state θ1, and with probability 1−thth conditional on the other
state, irrespective of the true preference profile.
We can now establish the following.
Proposition 13. Let k = 1 and let φ ∈ Φ. Then we have:
1. If p > t`
th
, then φ solves (P-2) if and only if φ ∈ ΦD;
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2. If p < t`
th
, then φ solves (P-2) if and only if φ ∈ ΦE;
3. If p = t`
th





Proof. See Appendix A.8.
Strategy recommendations in ΦD are payoff-equivalent to mechanisms in ΣD, and those
in ΦE are payoff-equivalent to mechanisms in ΣF . Therefore, public feasibility turns out to



















It is immediate to see how either function varies with respect to parameters p, t`, and th.
4.5 Discussion
1. When preferences are commonly known, the Sender manages to implement her pre-
ferred alternative with probability 1 contingent on state θ1. Under incomplete informa-
tion, this is not necessarily the case. More specifically, the Sender may find it optimal
to implement x1 in θ1 with probability 1 only for a strict subset of type profiles. In-
tuitively, to increase the overall probability of implementing x1 in state θ1, the Sender
has to decrease the overall probability of implementing x1 in the other state. If she
does not, receivers may not be willing to obey the action recommendation to vote for
1 and, even if they are, receivers of the low type have an incentive to misreport their
true preference parameter t`. Depending on the prior p, the expected gain from imple-
menting x1 in state θ1 with larger probability could be more than compensated by the
loss incurred in the other state θ0.
2. With just one receiver, the qualitative features of the optimal persuasion strategy are
essentially the same. More precisely, if p < t`
th
the Sender’s optimal strategy is to
recommend action 1 to either type with probability 1 conditional on state θ1, and with
probability 1−th
th
conditional on the other state. If p > t`
th
, then she always recommends
action 0 to the high type, whereas type t` is told to vote 1 with probability 1 in state
θ1 and with probability 1−t`t` in state θ0. When p =
t`
th
, then any mixture between the
two mechanisms is optimal. Notice that the corresponding Sender’s value function is
exactly the same as in the case of publicly feasible persuasion when k = 1. Furthermore,
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the Sender never has a strict incentive to use information elicitation when only one
receiver is present. Bergemann and Morris (2019) show that this equivalence between
information elicitation and public feasibility holds for every game with one receiver
and a binary set of states Θ.
3. We have assumed that prior distributions ψ ∈ ∆(Θ) and π ∈ ∆(T ) are statistically
independent. This means that, when the Sender observes θ, she cannot learn anything
more about preference types than what is already contained in the prior. Similarly,
receivers do not learn additional information about θ from learning their preference
parameters. The assumption is made in order to isolate the effect of uncertainty
about preference parameters. In the limit case of perfect correlation between the two
variables, we have a scenario where both Sender and receivers are able to learn the true
profile (t, θ) of payoff-relevant parameters, so that any persuasion strategy becomes
fruitless.
4.6 Conclusion
We have studied the information design problem of a Sender who wants to persuade a
committee whose members have privately known preferences, i.e. thresholds of reasonable
doubt. We have seen how the optimal persuasion strategy depends on the informativeness
of the prior distribution over preference types. The Sender finds it optimal to target her
strategy towards the profile of preference types that is deemed more likely to occur. Both
“separation” and “pooling” may occur. When both receivers are more likely to be of the
low type, every report of being of the high type receives a recommendation to not vote for
the policy that the Sender prefers. On the other hand, when the committee is more likely
to be composed of high types, the Sender implements her preferred policy with the same
probability independently of reported types. The possibility of relying on private reports is
beneficial to the Sender. When the persuasion strategy is required to be publicly feasible,
the Sender turns out to be worse off for intermediate values of the prior. In particular,
when the committee is more likely to be heterogeneous, She can discriminate between type
profiles that are homogeneous, but not between profiles where both high and low types
are present. Showing that uncertainty is always costly for the Sender, our results offer a
theoretical insight for why firms or political parties are willing to invest in order to obtain
information about their potential voters or customers that is as detailed as possible, e.g.
microtargeting. Finally, we conjecture that most of the qualitative features of the optimal
persuasion strategy carry over to the case with more than two players, either with unanimous
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or non unanimous voting rules. A full analysis of this case is left for future research.
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Appendix A
Proofs and additional computation for
Chapter 4
A.1 Incentive constraints for the case with information
elicitation and k = 2
The whole set of BCE incentive compatibility constraints for type t` is:
t` [pσ(1|t``, θ0) + (1− p)σ(1|t`h, θ0)] ≤ (1− t`) [pσ(1|t``, θ1) + (1− p)σ(1|t`h, θ1)] (A.1)
(1− t`) [pσ(10|t``, θ1) + (1− p)σ(01|t`h, θ1)] ≤ t` [pσ(10|t``, θ0) + (1− p)σ(01|t`h, θ0)] (A.2)
t` [pσ(1|t``, θ0) + (1− p)σ(1|t`h, θ0)] + (1− t`) [pσ(10|t``, θ1) + (1− p)σ(01|t`h, θ1)] ≤
(1− t`) [pσ(1|t``, θ1) + (1− p)σ(1|t`h, θ1)] + t` [pσ(10|t``, θ0) + (1− p)σ(01|t`h, θ0)] (A.3)
t` [pσ(1|t``, θ0) + (1− p)σ(1|t`h, θ0)] + (1− t`) [pσ(1|t`h, θ1) + (1− p)σ(1|thh, θ1)] ≤
t` [pσ(1|t`h, θ0) + (1− p)σ(1|thh, θ0)] + (1− t`) [pσ(1|t``, θ1) + (1− p)σ(1|t`h, θ1)] (A.4)
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t` [pσ(1|t``, θ0) + (1− p)σ(1|t`h, θ0)] + (1− t`) [pσ(1|t`h, θ1) + (1− p)σ(1|thh, θ1)] +
(1− t`) [pσ(10|t`h, θ1) + (1− p)σ(10|thh, θ1)] ≤
t` [pσ(1|t`h, θ0) + (1− p)σ(1|thh, θ0)] + (1− t`) [pσ(1|t``, θ1) + (1− p)σ(1|t`h, θ1)] +
t` [pσ(10|t`h, θ0) + (1− p)σ(01|thh, θ0)] (A.5)
t` [pσ(1|t``, θ0) + (1− p)σ(1|t`h, θ0)] + (1− t`) [pσ(10|t`h, θ1) + (1− p)σ(10|thh, θ1)] ≤
t` [pσ(10|t`h, θ0) + (1− p)σ(01|thh, θ0)] + (1− t`) [pσ(1|t``, θ1) + (1− p)σ(1|t`h, θ1)] , (A.6)
where (A.1) is the obedience constraint against deviations to δi(ai) = 0 for any ai ∈ Ai,
(A.2) is the obedience constraint against deviations to δi(ai) = 1 for any ai ∈ Ai, (A.3) is
the obedience constraint against deviations to δi(1) = 0 and δi(0) = 1, (A.4) is the truth-
telling constraint, (A.5) is the truth-telling constraint against deviations to δi(ai) = 1 for
any ai ∈ Ai, and (A.6) is the truth-telling constraint against deviations to δi(1) = 0 and
δi(0) = 1. The truth-telling constraint against deviations to δi(ai) = 0 for any ai ∈ Ai
coincides with (A.1).
Similarly, the set of BCE constraints for type th is:
th [pσ(1|t`h, θ0) + (1− p)σ(1|thh, θ0)] ≤ (1− th) [pσ(1|t`h, θ1) + (1− p)σ(1|thh, θ1)] (A.7)
(1− th) [pσ(10|t`h, θ1) + (1− p)σ(01|thh, θ1)] ≤ th [pσ(10|t`h, θ0) + (1− p)σ(01|thh, θ0)]
(A.8)
th [pσ(1|t`h, θ0) + (1− p)σ(1|thh, θ0)] + (1− th) [pσ(10|t`h, θ1) + (1− p)σ(01|thh, θ1)] ≤
(1− th) [pσ(1|t`h, θ1) + (1− p)σ(1|thh, θ1)] + th [pσ(10|t`h, θ0) + (1− p)σ(01|thh, θ0)]
(A.9)
th [pσ(1|t`h, θ0) + (1− p)σ(1|thh, θ0)] + (1− th) [pσ(1|t``, θ1) + (1− p)σ(1|t`h, θ1)] ≤
th [pσ(1|t``, θ0) + (1− p)σ(1|t`h, θ0)] + (1− th) [pσ(1|t`h, θ1) + (1− p)σ(1|thh, θ1)] (A.10)
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th [pσ(1|t`h, θ0) + (1− p)σ(1|thh, θ0)] + (1− th) [pσ(1|t``, θ1) + (1− p)σ(1|t`h, θ1)] +
(1− th) [pσ(10|t``, θ1) + (1− p)σ(01|t`h, θ1)] ≤
th [pσ(1|t``, θ0) + (1− p)σ(1|t`h, θ0)] + (1− th) [pσ(1|t`h, θ1) + (1− p)σ(1|thh, θ1)] +
th [pσ(10|t``, θ0) + (1− p)σ(01|t`h, θ0)] (A.11)
th [pσ(1|t`h, θ0) + (1− p)σ(1|thh, θ0)] + (1− th) [pσ(10|t``, θ1) + (1− p)σ(01|t`h, θ1)] ≤
th [pσ(01|t``, θ0) + (1− p)σ(01|t`h, θ0)] + (1− th) [pσ(1|t`h, θ1) + (1− p)σ(1|thh, θ1)] ,
(A.12)
where (A.7) is the obedience constraint against deviations to δi(ai) = 0 for any ai ∈ Ai,
(A.8) is the obedience constraint against deviations to δi(ai) = 1 for any ai ∈ Ai, (A.9)
is the obedience constraint against deviations to δi(1) = 0 and δi(0) = 1, (A.10) is the
truth-telling constraint, (A.11) is the truth-telling constraint against deviations to δi(ai) = 1
for any ai ∈ Ai, and (A.12) is the truth-telling constraint against deviations to δi(1) = 0
and δi(0) = 1. The truth-telling constraint against deviations to δi(ai) = 0 for any ai ∈ Ai
coincides with (A.7).
The full problem is to maximize (4.14) subject to the whole set of constraints (A.1)-
(A.12). It is immediate that (A.3) is implied by (A.2) and (A.1); and that (A.9) is implied
by (A.8) and (A.7). Consider now a reduced problem where we maximize the same function
over the same set of constraints, but with the restriction that σ(10|t, θ1) = σ(01|t, θ1) = 0
for every t ∈ T . It is then straightforward to verify that, for any solution σ of the original
problem, there exists an outcome-equivalent solution σ′ of the reduced problem, obtained
from σ by shifting for each t the probability mass on σ(10|t, θ1) and σ(01|t, θ1) to σ(00|t, θ1).
Conversely, if a mechanism solves the simplified problem, then it is also a solution of the
original problem. Thus it is without loss of generality to confine our attention to the reduced
problem. This implies that constraints (A.2), (A.5), (A.6), (A.8), (A.11), and (A.12) are
redundant. Finally, to show that also (A.1) is redundant, notice that using the assumption
t` < th in constraint (A.7) yields
t` [pσ(1|t`h, θ0) + (1− p)σ(1|thh, θ0)] ≤ (1− t`) [pσ(1|t`h, θ1) + (1− p)σ(1|thh, θ1)] .
Using the latter in (A.4), one obtains (A.1). Therefore, we are left with constraints (A.4),
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(A.7), and (A.10), which are the three constraints mentioned in the main text.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 10
We start by observing that Problem (P-1) has a linear objective function and a set of
linear constraints, irrespective of whether k = 1 or k = 2. Therefore, Karush-Kuhn-Tucker
conditions are both necessary and sufficient. The same applies to Problem (P-2).
The set of probability constraints for Problem (P-1) when k = 2 is
(µ1)→ σ(1|t``, θ0) ≤ 1; (µ4)→ σ(1|t``, θ1) ≤ 1;
(µ2)→ σ(1|t`h, θ0) ≤ 1; (µ5)→ σ(1|t`h, θ1) ≤ 1;
(µ3)→ σ(1|thh, θ0) ≤ 1; (µ6)→ σ(1|thh, θ1) ≤ 1,
where µi’s are the associated Lagrange multipliers.
Let λ1, λ2, and λ3 be the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to incentive constraints
(4.16), (4.15) and (4.17), respectively. The set of first-order conditions with respect to the
six control variables is:
p2
2
− µ1 − pt`λ1 + pthλ3 ≤ 0, (A.13)
p(1− p)− µ2 + (2p− 1)t`λ1 − pthλ2 + (1− 2p)thλ3 ≤ 0, (A.14)
(1− p)2
2
− µ3 + (1− p)t`λ1 − (1− p)thλ2 − (1− p)thλ3 ≤ 0, (A.15)
p2
2
− µ4 + p(1− t`)λ1 − p(1− th)λ3 ≤ 0, (A.16)
p(1− p)− µ5 + (1− 2p)(1− t`)λ1 + p(1− th)λ2 + (2p− 1)(1− th)λ3 ≤ 0, (A.17)
(1− p)2
2
− µ6 − (1− p)(1− t`)λ1 + (1− p)(1− th)λ2 + (1− p)(1− th)λ3 ≤ 0, (A.18)
where each condition holds with equality if the corresponding variable is strictly positive. We
now show what are the conditions under which mechanisms in ΣA, ΣB, and ΣC are solutions
to problem (P-1).
• ΣA is a solution. Suppose the optimal mechanism belongs to ΣA. It follows by
substitution that (4.15) and (4.16) are binding. Furthermore, t` < th implies that
(4.17) is slack. By complementary slackness, we have µ1 = µ2 = µ3 = µ5 = µ6 = 0,
and λ3 = 0. From first-order conditions (A.13)-(A.16) we easily get λ1 = p2t` > 0,
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λ2 ≥ 12th > 0 and µ4 =
p2
2t`





The right-hand side of (A.19) is greater than 1
2th
if and only if p ≥ t`+th
2th
. Finally, FOC









, we can conclude that any mechanism
in ΣA is a solution provided that p ≥ t`+th
2th
.



























is nonempty if and only if
p >
th − t`
th + 2t`th − 2t`
. (A.21)
Suppose that p satisfies (A.21). Then σB(1|t`h, θ0), σB(1|thh, θ0), and σB(1|t``, θ0) are
all strictly between 0 and 1. Thus we have that µ1 = µ2 = µ3 = µ6 = 0. Condition
(A.13) and µ1 = 0 imply λ1 > 0. Summing side by side FOC’s (A.13)-(A.15) one gets
λ2 > 0. In addition, combining the binding constraints (4.16) and (4.15), it follows
that (4.17) is slack, so implying λ3 = 0. From FOC (A.13) we obtain λ1 = p2t` , while
FOC (A.14) implies λ2 = 12th . From (A.16) we obtain µ4 =
p2
2t`








which is non-negative if and only if p ≤ th+t`
2th
. Finally, using all of the above, we have
that (A.18) is satisfied if and only if p ≥ t`
th









th + 2t`th − 2t`
if and only if 2t`(th − t`) > th(th − 2t2`), which is always true since 12 < t` < th by
assumption. Therefore, we can conclude that every mechanism in ΣB is a solution if
t`
th























− (1− th)(1− 2p)
p2th
)
is always non-empty. This implies that σC(1|t``, θ0), σC(1|t`h, θ0), and σC(1|thh, θ0)
are all strictly between 0 and 1. It follows that µ1 = µ2 = µ3 = 0, and that all










To make sure that λ3 ≥ 0, it must be the case that p ≤ t`th . It remains to check FOC
(A.18). If p ≤ 1
2







, then it must be the
case that
λ3 ≤
pth + pt` − 2p2th
4pt2h − 2t2h + 2t`th − 4pt`th
. (A.22)














pth + pt` − 2p2th
4pt2h − 2t2h + 2t`th − 4pt`th
}
.
Thus any mechanism in ΣC is a solution provided that p ≤ t`
th
.
• Finally, suppose p = t`+th
2th
. We have established that mechanisms in ΣA and ΣB
belong to the solution set. Now consider any convex combination σ = xσA + (1 −
x)σB, where x ∈ [0, 1]. Since the feasible set is convex, σ is feasible. Furthermore, it
follows immediately from the linearity of the objective function that US(σ) = US(σA) =
US(σ
B). This shows that σ is a solution for every x ∈ [0, 1]. The same line of reasoning
applies when p = t`
th
, so ending the proof.
A.3 Incentive constraints for the case with information
elicitation and k = 1
The whole set of BCE incentive compatibility constraints for type t` is:
t` [pσ(10|t``, θ0) + (1− p)σ(10|t`h, θ0)] ≤ (1− t`) [pσ(10|t``, θ1) + (1− p)σ(10|t`h, θ1)]
(A.23)
94
(1− t`) + t` [2pσ(10|t``, θ0) + (1− p) (σ(10|t`h, θ0) + σ(01|t`h, θ0))] ≤
t` + (1− t`) [2pσ(10|t``, θ1) + (1− p) (σ(10|t`h, θ1) + σ(01|t`h, θ1))] (A.24)
t` [2pσ(10|t``, θ0) + (1− p) (σ(10|t`h, θ0) + σ(01|t`h, θ0))] +
(1− t`) [p (σ(10|t`h, θ1) + σ(01|t`h, θ1)) + 2(1− p)σ(10|thh, θ1)] ≤
t` [p (σ(10|t`h, θ0) + σ(01|t`h, θ0)) + 2(1− p)σ(10|thh, θ0)] +
(1− t`) [2pσ(10|t``, θ1) + (1− p) (σ(10|t`h, θ1) + σ(01|t`h, θ1))] (A.25)
t` [2pσ(10|t``, θ0) + (1− p) (σ(10|t`h, θ0) + σ(01|t`h, θ0))] +
(1− t`) [pσ(10|t`h, θ1) + (1− p)σ(10|thh, θ1)] ≤
t` [pσ(10|t`h, θ0) + (1− p)σ(10|thh, θ0)] +
(1− t`) [2pσ(10|t``, θ1) + (1− p) (σ(10|t`h, θ1) + σ(01|t`h, θ1))] (A.26)
(1− t`) + t` [2pσ(10|t``, θ0) + (1− p) (σ(10|t`h, θ0) + σ(01|t`h, θ0))] +
t` [pσ(01|t`h, θ0) + (1− p)σ(10|thh, θ0)] ≤
t` + (1− t`) [pσ(01|t`h, θ1) + (1− p)σ(10|thh, θ1)] +
(1− t`) [2pσ(10|t``, θ1) + (1− p) (σ(10|t`h, θ1) + σ(01|t`h, θ1))] , (A.27)
where (A.23) is the obedience constraint against deviations to δi(ai) = 0 for any ai ∈ Ai,
(A.24) is the obedience constraint against deviations to δi(ai) = 1 for any ai ∈ Ai, (A.25)
is the truth-telling constraint, (A.26) is the truth-telling constraint against deviations to
δi(ai) = 0 for any ai ∈ Ai, and (A.27) is the truth-telling constraint against deviations to
δi(1) = 0 and δi(0) = 1. The truth-telling constraint against deviations to δi(ai) = 1 for any
ai ∈ Ai coincides with (A.24). The obedience constraint against deviations to δi(1) = 0 and
δi(0) = 1 is implied by (A.23) and (A.24).
The set of incentive constraints for type th is:
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th [pσ(01|t`h, θ0) + (1− p)σ(10|thh, θ0)] ≤ (1− th) [pσ(01|t`h, θ1) + (1− p)σ(10|thh, θ1)]
(A.28)
(1− th) + th [p (σ(10|t`h, θ0) + σ(01|t`h, θ0)) + 2(1− p)σ(10|thh, θ0)] ≤
th + (1− th) [p (σ(10|t`h, θ1) + σ(01|t`h, θ1)) + 2(1− p)σ(10|thh, θ1)] (A.29)
th [p (σ(10|t`h, θ0) + σ(01|t`h, θ0)) + 2(1− p)σ(10|thh, θ0)] +
(1− th) [2pσ(10|t``, θ1) + (1− p) (σ(10|t`h, θ1) + σ(01|t`h, θ1))] ≤
th [2pσ(10|t``, θ0) + (1− p) (σ(10|t`h, θ0) + σ(01|t`h, θ0))] +
(1− th) [p (σ(10|t`h, θ1) + σ(01|t`h, θ1)) + 2(1− p)σ(10|thh, θ1)] (A.30)
th [p (σ(10|t`h, θ0) + σ(01|t`h, θ0)) + 2(1− p)σ(10|thh, θ0)] +
(1− th) [pσ(10|t``, θ1) + (1− p)σ(01|t`h, θ1)] ≤
th [pσ(10|t``, θ0) + (1− p)σ(01|t`h, θ0)] +
(1− th) [p (σ(10|t`h, θ1) + σ(01|t`h, θ1)) + 2(1− p)σ(10|thh, θ1)] (A.31)
(1− th) + th [p (σ(10|t`h, θ0) + σ(01|t`h, θ0)) + 2(1− p)σ(10|thh, θ0)] +
th [pσ(10|t``, θ0) + (1− p)σ(10|t`h, θ0)] ≤
th + (1− th) [pσ(10|t``, θ1) + (1− p)σ(10|t`h, θ1)] +
(1− th) [p (σ(10|t`h, θ1) + σ(01|t`h, θ1)) + 2(1− p)σ(10|thh, θ1)] , (A.32)
where (A.28) is the obedience constraint against deviations to δi(ai) = 0 for any ai ∈ Ai,
(A.29) is the obedience constraint against deviations to δi(ai) = 1 for any ai ∈ Ai, (A.30)
is the truth-telling constraint, (A.31) is the truth-telling constraint against deviations to
δi(ai) = 0 for any ai ∈ Ai, and (A.32) is the truth-telling constraint against deviations to
δi(1) = 0 and δi(0) = 1. Similarly to the low type, the truth-telling constraint against
deviations to δi(ai) = 1 for any ai ∈ Ai coincides with (A.29), and the obedience constraint
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against deviations to δi(1) = 0 and δi(0) = 1 is implied by (A.28) and (A.29).
Now we argue that constraints (A.26) and (A.27) are redundant. From constraint (A.28)
and the assumption t` < th we easily obtain
t` [pσ(01|t`h, θ0) + (1− p)σ(10|thh, θ0)] ≤ (1− t`) [pσ(01|t`h, θ1) + (1− p)σ(10|thh, θ1)] .
(A.33)
Combining (A.33) and (A.25) gives (A.26); combining (A.33) and (A.24) gives (A.27).
To find the Sender’s optimal persuasion mechanism, we solve a relaxed problem where
we ignore constraints (A.24), (A.29), and (A.32). It is tedious but straightforward to verify
that, at every solution we are going to find in Proposition 11, constraints (A.24), (A.29),
and (A.32) are all satisfied.
A.4 Proof of Proposition 11
The set of probability constraints for Problem (P-1) when k = 1 is
(µ1)→ σ(10|t``, θ0) ≤
1
2




(µ3)→ σ(10|t`h, θ0) + σ(01|t`h, θ0) ≤ 1; (µ4)→ σ(10|t`h, θ1) + σ(01|t`h, θ1) ≤ 1;
(µ5)→ σ(10|thh, θ0) ≤
1
2




where µi’s are the associated Lagrange multipliers.
Let λ1, λ2, λ3, λ4, and λ5 be the Lagrange multipliers corresponding to constraints (4.19),
(4.20), (4.21), (4.22), and (4.23), respectively. The set of first-order conditions with respect
to the eight control variables is:
p2 − µ1 − pt`λ1 − 2pt`λ2 + 2pthλ4 + pthλ5 ≤ 0, (A.34)
p(1− p)− µ3 + (2p− 1)t`λ2 − pthλ3 + (1− 2p)th(λ4 + λ5) ≤ 0, (A.35)
p(1− p)− µ3 − (1− p)t`λ1 + (2p− 1)t`λ2 + (1− 2p)thλ4 − pthλ5 ≤ 0, (A.36)
(1− p)2 − µ5 + 2(1− p)t`λ2 − (1− p)thλ3 − 2(1− p)th(λ4 + λ5) ≤ 0, (A.37)
p2 − µ2 + p(1− t`)λ1 + 2p(1− t`)λ2 − 2p(1− th)λ4 − p(1− th)λ5 ≤ 0, (A.38)
p(1− p)− µ4 + (1− 2p)(1− t`)λ2 + p(1− th)λ3 + (2p− 1)(1− th)(λ4 + λ5) ≤ 0, (A.39)
p(1−p)−µ4+(1−p)(1−t`)λ1+(1−2p)(1−t`)λ2+p(1−th)λ5+(2p−1)(1−th)λ4 ≤ 0, (A.40)
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(1− p)2−µ6− 2(1− p)(1− t`)λ2 + (1− p)(1− th)λ3 + 2(1− p)(1− th)(λ4 +λ5) ≤ 0, (A.41)
where each condition holds with equality if the corresponding variable is strictly positive.
We now show what are the conditions under which mechanisms in ΣD, ΣE, and ΣF are
solutions to problem (P-1).
• ΣD is a solution. Suppose the optimal mechanism belongs to ΣD. It follows immedi-
ately that µ1 = µ3 = µ4 = µ5 = µ6 = 0. Furthermore, constraints (4.19), (4.20), (4.21)
and (4.23) are binding, whereas (4.22) is slack, so implying λ4 = 0. From FOC (A.34),










(th − t`)(2p− 1)
. (A.43)




Using the above in (A.38), µ2 = 1t` > 0. FOC (A.35) is satisfied as long as λ3 ≥
(1−p)2
p(th−t`)
> 0. The fact that p ≥ th
2th−t`
implies that also FOC (A.37) is satisfied. Finally,




mechanism in ΣD is solution provided that p ≥ th
2th−t`
.
• ΣE is a solution. To show that ΣE is non-empty, notice that (4.26) and (4.28) can








which is equivalent to
1− (2p− 1)(1− th)
th
− 2(1− p)(1− t`)
t`
> 0. (A.44)
Now, the left-hand side of (A.44) is increasing with respect to p. Since we are looking
for solutions when p ≥ t`
2th−t`




, we can write
1− (2p− 1)(1− th)
th












≥ −3. It is then
straightforward to verify that all remaining inequalities in the Definition of ΣE can
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hold simultaneously. In addition, one can verify that any mechanism in ΣE is such that
every control variable, except for σE(10|thh, θ1), is strictly positive, and that the three
probability constraints for state θ0 are all slack. Therefore, if an optimal mechanism
is in ΣE, it follows immediately that µ1 = µ3 = µ5 = µ6 = 0. Furthermore, incentive
constraints (4.20), (4.21) and (4.23) are all binding while (4.19) and (4.22) are slack,




> 0, λ3 = 1−pth > 0, and λ5 =
p
th
> 0. FOC (A.37) always holds with equality.
From FOC (A.38) we can easily obtain µ2, which is always strictly positive. From
(A.40) we can easily solve for µ4, which is non-negative if and only if p ≤ th2th−t` . In




• ΣF is a solution. Suppose the optimal mechanism belongs to ΣF . It follows im-
mediately that µ1 = µ3 = µ5 = 0. Furthermore, incentive constraints (4.20), (4.21),
(4.22), and (4.23) are binding, whereas (4.19) is slack, so implying λ1 = 0. From FOC
(A.34)-(A.36) we easily obtain λ2 = pt` +
th
t`




FOC (A.37) always holds with equality. From (A.38) we can easily obtain µ2, which
is non-negative for any λ4 ≥ 0. FOCs (A.39) and (A.40) turn out to be equivalent.
From either of them we can easily obtain the expression for µ4. If p ≤ 12 , then µ4 > 0
for every λ4 ≤ 0. If p > 12 , then µ4 is non-negative if and only if
λ4 ≤
t`
(2p− 1)(th − t`)
[


















2(1− p)(th − t`)
[







The right-hand side of (A.47) is non-negative if and only if p ≤ t`
2th−t`
. Therefore, we
can conclude that every mechanism is ΣF is a solution provided that p ≤ t`
2th−t`
.
• When p = t`
2th−t`
or p = th
2th−t`
, the same argument as in the previous proposition
applies, so ending the proof.
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A.5 Incentive constraints for the case without informa-
tion elicitation and k = 2
The full set of obedience constraints for player 1 is the following:
(1− t`) [φ(b00, b11|θ1) + pφ(b00, b10|θ1) + (1− p)φ(b00, b01|θ1)] ≤
t` [φ(b00, b11|θ0) + pφ(b00, b10|θ0) + (1− p)φ(b00, b01|θ0)] (t`, b00)
(1− th) [φ(b00, b11|θ1) + pφ(b00, b10|θ1) + (1− p)φ(b00, b01|θ1)] ≤
th [φ(b00, b11|θ0) + pφ(b00, b10|θ0) + (1− p)φ(b00, b01|θ0)] (th, b00)
(1− t`) [φ(b01, b11|θ1) + pφ(b01, b10|θ1) + (1− p)φ(b01, b01|θ1)] ≤
t` [φ(b01, b11|θ0) + pφ(b01, b10|θ0) + (1− p)φ(b01, b01|θ0)] (t`, b01)
th [φ(b01, b11|θ0) + pφ(b01, b10|θ0) + (1− p)φ(b01, b01|θ0)] ≤
(1− th) [φ(b01, b11|θ1) + pφ(b01, b10|θ1) + (1− p)φ(b01, b01|θ1)] (th, b01)
t` [φ(b10, b11|θ0) + pφ(b10, b10|θ0) + (1− p)φ(b10, b01|θ0)] ≤
(1− t`) [φ(b10, b11|θ1) + pφ(b10, b10|θ1) + (1− p)φ(b10, b01|θ1)] (t`, b10)
(1− th) [φ(b10, b11|θ1) + pφ(b10, b10|θ1) + (1− p)φ(b10, b01|θ1)] ≤
th [φ(b10, b11|θ0) + pφ(b10, b10|θ0) + (1− p)φ(b10, b01|θ0)] (th, b10)
t` [φ(b11, b11|θ0) + pφ(b11, b10|θ0) + (1− p)φ(b11, b01|θ0)] ≤
(1− t`) [φ(b11, b11|θ1) + pφ(b11, b10|θ1) + (1− p)φ(b11, b01|θ1)] (t`, b11)
100
th [φ(b11, b11|θ0) + pφ(b11, b10|θ0) + (1− p)φ(b11, b01|θ0)] ≤
(1− th) [φ(b11, b11|θ1) + pφ(b11, b10|θ1) + (1− p)φ(b11, b01|θ1)] , (th, b11)
where the tag (t, b) indicates that the corresponding constraint is for type t to obey her
action recommendation contained in b.
Now, since t` < th by assumption, it is immediate that constraint (t`, b11) is implied by
(th, b11), and that (th, b00) is implied by (t`, b00).
Now define
x := φ(b01, b11|θ1) + pφ(b01, b10|θ1) + (1− p)φ(b01, b01|θ1)
y := φ(b01, b11|θ0) + pφ(b01, b10|θ0) + (1− p)φ(b01, b01|θ0),
so that we can rewrite constraints (t`, b01) and (th, b01) as
(1− t`)x ≤ t`y
thy ≤ (1− th)x,
respectively. We argue that x = y = 0. To show this, let us consider two cases. First,
suppose y = 0. It is immediate that x = 0 by (t`, b01). Consequently, both (t`, b01) and
(th, b01) hold trivially with equality. Alternatively, suppose y > 0. By constraint (th, b01), we










from (t`, b01). These two inequalities cannot hold simultaneously because t` < th by assump-
tion. Therefore, we must have x = y = 0, which is equivalent to
φ(b01, b11|θ1) = φ(b01, b10|θ1) = φ(b01, b01|θ1) = 0
φ(b01, b11|θ0) = φ(b01, b10|θ0) = φ(b01, b01|θ0) = 0.
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Notice that the obedience constraints (t`, b01) and (th, b01) for player 2 read as
(1− t`) [φ(b11, b01|θ1) + pφ(b10, b01|θ1) + (1− p)φ(b01, b01|θ1)] ≤
t` [φ(b11, b01|θ0) + pφ(b10, b01|θ0) + (1− p)φ(b01, b01|θ0)] (t`, b01, player 2)
and
th [φ(b11, b01|θ0) + pφ(b10, b01|θ0) + (1− p)φ(b01, b01|θ0)] ≤
(1− th) [φ(b11, b01|θ1) + pφ(b10, b01|θ1) + (1− p)φ(b01, b01|θ1)] . (th, b01, player 2)
By the same argument that we have just used for player 1, we can conclude that
φ(b11, b01|θ1) = φ(b10, b01|θ1) = φ(b01, b01|θ1) = 0
φ(b11, b01|θ0) = φ(b10, b01|θ0) = φ(b01, b01|θ0) = 0.
Now we argue that it is without loss of generality to set, for each θ ∈ Θ,
φ(b00, b01|θ) = φ(b01, b00|θ) = 0 (A.48)
φ(b00, b10|θ) = φ(b10, b00|θ) = 0 (A.49)
φ(b00, b11|θ) = φ(b11, b00|θ) = 0. (A.50)
To see why this is true, suppose that we are at a solution where some variables in (A.48)-
(A.50) are positive. Then it is always feasible to shift all the probability mass from these
positive variables to φ(b00, b00|θ) in the corresponding state. This shift does not affect the
Sender’s objective function. In addition, constraint (t`, b00) will hold trivially with equality
for either player, whereas other incentive constraints will not be affected.
To sum up, the variables that are not necessarily equal to zero are
φ(b00, b00|θ), φ(b10, b10|θ), φ(b10, b11|θ), φ(b11, b10|θ), φ(b11, b11|θ).
Since the induced σ is symmetric by assumption, we must also have
σ(1, 1|t`h, θ) = σ(1, 1|th`, θ),
which simplifies to
φ(b10, b11|θ) + φ(b11, b11|θ) = φ(b11, b10|θ) + φ(b11, b11|θ).
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Thus we obtain that φ(b10, b11|θ) = φ(b11, b10|θ).
Using all the above, the incentive constraints for both players are equivalent to each other
and simplify to the three inequalities (4.33)-(4.35) in the main text.





p2 [φ(b10, b10|θ0) + 2φ(b10, b11|θ0) + φ(b11, b11|θ0)]
+ 2p(1− p) [φ(b10, b11|θ0) + φ(b11, b11|θ0)]






p2 [φ(b10, b10|θ1) + 2φ(b10, b11|θ1) + φ(b11, b11|θ1)]
+ 2p(1− p) [φ(b10, b11|θ1) + φ(b11, b11|θ1)]








φ(b11, b11|θ) + p2φ(b10, b10|θ) + 2pφ(b10, b11|θ)
]
,
which is expression (4.32) in the main text.
A.6 Proof of Proposition 12
The control variables are φ(b10, b10|θ), φ(b10, b11|θ), and φ(b11, b11|θ). The probability con-
straints are
φ(b10, b10|θ0) + φ(b11, b11|θ0) + 2φ(b10, b11|θ0) ≤ 1
φ(b10, b10|θ1) + φ(b11, b11|θ1) + 2φ(b10, b11|θ1) ≤ 1.
At any solution, the following is true.
• Constraint (4.33) is binding. By way of contradiction, suppose this is not the case.
Then we must have either φ(b10, b10|θ1) > 0 or φ(b10, b11|θ1) > 0 (or both). Suppose
φ(b10, b10|θ1) > 0. Then it is feasible to decrease φ(b10, b10|θ1) by a sufficiently small ε >
0 and increase φ(b11, b11|θ1) by the same amount, leading to an increase in the objective
function equal to ε(1−p2) > 0 without violating any incentive or probability constraint.
An analogous reasoning applies to the complementary case with φ(b10, b11|θ1) > 0.
• Constraint (4.34) is redundant. This follows from the fact that (4.33) binds and the
assumption t` < th.
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• The probability constraint for state θ1 is binding. Suppose not. Then we must have
φ(b11, b11|θ1) < 1. Consequently, it is always feasible to increase φ(b11, b11|θ1) so as to
relax constraint (4.35) and increase the Sender’s objective function.
Using the results above, we solve a relaxed problem where we ignore the probability
constraint in state θ0. One can verify that, at any solution that we are going to find,
the probability constraint in θ0 is always satisfied. Notice that in this relaxed problem
the constraint (4.35) is always binding. If not, then it would always be feasible to raise the
objective function by increasing φ(b11, b11|θ0). From the binding constraints (4.33) and (4.35)












[φ(b11, b11|θ1) + pφ(b10, b11|θ1)]− pφ(b10, b11|θ0). (A.52)












with respect to φ(b10, b11|θ0), φ(b10, b10|θ1), φ(b10, b11|θ1), and φ(b11, b11|θ1), subject to non-
negativity constraints and the probability constraint
φ(b10, b10|θ1) + φ(b11, b11|θ1) + 2φ(b10, b11|θ1) = 1.
The first-order conditions for optimality with respect to φ(b10, b10|θ1), φ(b10, b11|θ1), and
φ(b11, b11|θ1), are respectively
p2
2t`
− λ ≤ 0 (A.53)
p(t` + th)
2t`th
− 2λ ≤ 0 (A.54)
1
2th
− λ ≤ 0, (A.55)
where λ is the Lagrange multiplier for the probability constraint. The first-order condition
with respect to φ(b10, b11|θ0) is trivial. Now, it is immediate that at least one of the control





(A.53). Using this, the other two first-order conditions hold simultaneously if and only if
p ≥ t`+th
2th
. If the latter holds with equality, then both (A.53) and (A.54) hold with equality,
and (A.55) holds with strict inequality, so that we must have φ(b11, b11|θ1) = 0. If p > t`+th2th ,
then (A.53) holds with equality, and (A.54) and (A.55) hold with strict inequality, so that
we have φ(b10, b10|θ1) = 1 and φ(b10, b11|θ1) = φ(b11, b11|θ1) = 0.
Now suppose that φ(b10, b11|θ1) > 0. From (A.54) we get λ = p(t`+th)4t`th . Using this, the
other two first-order conditions hold simultaneously if and only if 2t`
t`+th





, then (A.54) and (A.55) hold with equality, and (A.53) holds with strict inequality,
so that φ(b10, b10|θ1) = 0. If 2t`t`+th < p <
t`+th
2th
, then (A.54) holds with equality, and (A.53)
and (A.55) hold with strict inequality, so that we have φ(b10, b11|θ1) = 12 and φ(b10, b10|θ1) =
φ(b11, b11|θ1) = 0.
Finally, suppose φ(b11, b11|θ1) > 0. We get λ = 12th from (A.55). Using this, the other
two first-order conditions hold simultaneously if and only if p ≤ 2t`
t`+th
. If the latter holds
with equality, then both (A.54) and (A.55) hold with equality, and (A.53) holds with strict
inequality, so that we must have φ(b10, b10|θ1) = 0. If p < 2t`t`+th , then (A.55) holds with
equality, and (A.53) and (A.54) hold with strict inequality, so that we have φ(b11, b11|θ1) = 1
and φ(b10, b10|θ1) = φ(b10, b11|θ1) = 0. In all cases, the values for control variables in state θ0
are found by using (A.51) and (A.52) and the corresponding non-negativity constraints.
A.7 Incentive constraints for the case without informa-
tion elicitation and k = 1
By pivotality, σ(1, 1|t, θ) = 0 for every t ∈ T and every θ ∈ Θ. This implies that, for every
θ ∈ Θ, we have the following:
φ(b01, b01|θ) = φ(b01, b10|θ) = φ(b01, b11|θ) = 0
φ(b10, b01|θ) = φ(b10, b10|θ) = φ(b10, b11|θ) = 0
φ(b11, b01|θ) = φ(b11, b10|θ) = φ(b11, b11|θ) = 0.
It follows that the full set of obedience constraints for player 1 is the following:
(1− t`) [φ(b00, b00|θ1) + pφ(b00, b01|θ1) + (1− p)φ(b00, b10|θ1)] ≤
t` [φ(b00, b00|θ0) + pφ(b00, b01|θ0) + (1− p)φ(b00, b10|θ0)] (t`, b00)
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(1− th) [φ(b00, b00|θ1) + pφ(b00, b01|θ1) + (1− p)φ(b00, b10|θ1)] ≤
th [φ(b00, b00|θ0) + pφ(b00, b01|θ0) + (1− p)φ(b00, b10|θ0)] (th, b00)
(1− t`)φ(b01, b00|θ1) ≤ t`φ(b01, b00|θ0) (t`, b01)
thφ(b01, b00|θ0) ≤ (1− th)φ(b01, b00|θ1) (th, b01)
t`φ(b10, b00|θ0) ≤ (1− t`)φ(b10, b00|θ1) (t`, b10)
(1− th)φ(b10, b00|θ1) ≤ thφ(b10, b00|θ0) (th, b10)
t`φ(b11, b00|θ0) ≤ (1− t`)φ(b11, b00|θ1) (t`, b11)
thφ(b11, b00|θ0) ≤ (1− th)φ(b11, b00|θ1), (th, b11)
where the tag (t, b) indicates that the corresponding constraint is for type t to obey her
action recommendation contained in b.
Now, by using t` < th, it is immediate that constraint (t`, b11) is implied by (th, b11), and
that (th, b00) is implied by (t`, b00). Furthermore, we must have
φ(b01, b00|θ0) = φ(b01, b00|θ1) = 0.
To see why this is true, let us consider two cases. First, suppose φ(b01, b00|θ0) = 0. By
constraint (t`, b01), we must have φ(b01, b00|θ1) = 0 as well. Consequently, both (t`, b01) and
(th, b01) would hold trivially with equality. Alternatively, suppose φ(b01, b00|θ0) > 0. By
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from (t`, b01). These two inequalities cannot hold simultaneously because t` < th by assump-
tion.
By symmetry and pivotality of σ, we have
φ(b10, b00|θ) + φ(b11, b00|θ) = φ(b00, b10|θ) + φ(b00, b11|θ) (A.56)
and
φ(b01, b00|θ) + φ(b11, b00|θ) = φ(b00, b01|θ) + φ(b00, b11|θ). (A.57)
Now, the obedience constraints (t`, b01) and (th, b01) for player 2 are
(1− t`)φ(b00, b01|θ1) ≤ t`φ(b00, b01|θ0) (t`, b01, player 2)
and
thφ(b00, b01|θ0) ≤ (1− th)φ(b00, b01|θ1), (th, b01, player 2)
respectively. By the same argument that we used for player 1, we can conclude that
φ(b00, b01|θ) = 0. Since we also proved that φ(b01, b00|θ) = 0, it follows that (A.57) reduces
to
φ(b11, b00|θ) = φ(b00, b11|θ),
and using the latter in (A.56) we also get
φ(b10, b00|θ) = φ(b00, b10|θ).
Notice that, by using all of the restrictions on φ’s derived so far, the incentive constraints
for player 1 and player 2 become exactly the same. Thus it is without loss of generality to
focus on player 1 alone, as done in the main text.
Finally, using all the restrictions on φ’s obtained above, the Sender’s objective function
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p2 [2φ(b10, b00|θ0) + 2φ(b11, b00)|θ0]
+ 2p(1− p) [φ(b10, b00|θ0) + 2φ(b11, b00)|θ0]






p2 [2φ(b10, b00|θ1) + 2φ(b11, b00)|θ1]
+ 2p(1− p) [φ(b10, b00|θ1) + 2φ(b11, b00)|θ1]





[φ(b11, b00|θ) + pφ(b10, b00|θ)] ,
which is expression (4.36) in the main text.
A.8 Proof of Proposition 13
Consider first the set of incentive constraints (4.37)-(4.40). The probability constraints are:
φ(b00, b00|θ0) + 2φ(b10, b00|θ0) + 2φ(b11, b00|θ0) = 1
φ(b00, b00|θ1) + 2φ(b10, b00|θ1) + 2φ(b11, b00|θ1) = 1.
At any solution, the following is true.
• Constraint (4.38) is binding. To see this, suppose by way of contradiction that it
is slack. Since the left-hand side of (4.38) must be non-negative, it follows that
φ(b10, b00|θ1) on the right-hand side must be strictly positive. Then one can decrease
φ(b10, b00|θ1) by a sufficiently small amount ε > 0 and increase φ(b11, b00|θ1) by the same
amount ε so as to leave incentive and probability constraints unaffected. This shift of
probability mass determines a change in the objective function equal to ε(1− p) > 0,
so reaching a contradiction.
• The fact that (4.38) is binding and that t` < th by assumption imply that constraint
(4.39) is redundant.






and plugging the latter expression into (4.37) we have that constraint (4.37) reduces
to
(1− t`)φ(b00, b00|θ1) ≤ t`φ(b00, b00|θ0). (A.58)
• It must be the case that φ(b00, b00|θ1) = 0. If not, then it is always feasible to decrease
φ(b00, b00|θ1) by an arbitrarily small amount ε > 0 and increase φ(b11, b00|θ1) by ε2 . This
shift of probability mass relaxes incentive constraints (A.58) and (4.40) and entails a
strict increase in the objective function, so contradicting optimality. Since we must
have φ(b00, b00|θ1) = 0, it follows that constraint (A.58) is implied by the non-negativity































where (A.59) and (A.60) are probability constraints, and (A.61) is a rewriting of (4.40). Now
we argue that (A.61) must be binding at every solution. Suppose by way of contradiction
that this is not the case. The first-order condition for optimality with respect to φ(b11, b00|θ0)
is 1 − λ2 − λ3th ≤ 0, where λ2 is the Lagrange multiplier associated to (A.60) and λ3
is the multiplier associated to (A.61). Since (A.61) is slack by assumption, λ3 = 0 by
complementary slackness. Consequently, 1 ≤ λ2, so that (A.60) must be binding. From the








and substituting into (A.61), which is slack by assumption, we must have
th
2






Now, since φ(b10, b00|θ1) ≤ 12 by (A.59), the left-hand side of (A.62) is always greater than




. But then we have
th
2






which is impossible since t` > 12 by assumption.







Substituting the latter into (A.60), one can verify that (A.60) always holds if φ(b10, b00|θ1)
satisfies (A.59). Finally, substituting (A.63) into the objective function, we can easily see











Therefore, if p < t`
th
, the coefficient of φ(b10, b00|θ1) in US(φ) is strictly negative, so that it is
optimal to set φ(b10, b00|θ1) = 0. If p > t`th , the coefficient of φ(b10, b00|θ1) is strictly positive,
and then φ(b10, b00|θ1) = 12 is optimal. If p =
t`
th
, the coefficient is null, and φ(b10, b00|θ1) is
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